Abstract
This paper analyzes how differences in disclosure environments affect the firm’s choice between private and public capital. Disclosure requirements prescribe to what extent the firm has to release private information that may lead to the firm incurring proprietary costs. We examine which firm types go public in equilibrium, and how the equilibrium outcomes change with changes in the disclosure environments. Our findings show that in a partial financing equilibrium, should such an equilibrium exist, good firms finance privately. This result is robust to changes in the disclosure environment.
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JEL Classification: G32, M49
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Marra, T., Suijs, J. Going-Public and the Influence of Disclosure Environments. Rev Acc Stud 9, 465–493 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-004-7793-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-004-7793-7