Abstract
The Peltzman Effect is a well known and controversial theory in the literature. Studies have struggled to find a dataset that can accurately test for the presence of the effect. We have created a unique dataset and use a natural experiment from the sport of stock car racing to test the theory. Using race-level data from NASCAR events, we find strong evidence that a major safety regulation has led to more on-track accidents and an increased risk to both spectators and pit crew members.
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The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City or the Federal Reserve System.
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Pope, A.T., Tollison, R.D. “Rubbin’ is racin''': evidence of the Peltzman effect from NASCAR. Public Choice 142, 507–513 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9548-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9548-2