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Swing and a myth: a review of Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter

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References

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Correspondence to Loren Lomasky.

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Lomasky, L. Swing and a myth: a review of Caplan’s The Myth of the Rational Voter . Public Choice 135, 469–484 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9273-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9273-7

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