Abstract
Consider an elected politician who wants to identify politically savvy people who could offer him good advice. Since the incumbent won an election, people who supported him are probably better attuned to the political winds than are people who did not. The official should therefore listen to people who had supported him. For similar reasons, he may preferentially listen to groups that had given him political contributions than to groups that had not. And a politician who is initially unsure about which voters best recognize benefits promised them will favor groups that he had previously favored and that had supported him.
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I am grateful to Alan Simpson for his insights into the relation between lobbyists and senators, to an anonymous referee, and to the editor.
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Glazer, A. Rewarding political supporters. Public Choice 126, 453–463 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-5058-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-5058-7