Skip to main content
Log in

Why Parfit did not go far enough

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Parfit has argued for the revolutionary thesis that personal identity does not matter in ordinary survival, only the R-relation does. “Reconciliationists,” such as Lewis, have tried to stop this revolution, arguing that both personal identity and the R-relation matter. The disagreement has been between those who hold that only the R-relation matters and those who hold that, in addition, personal identity matters. But there is a third option. I argue that Parfit is right that personal identity does not matter but he is wrong that the R-relation matters, and the reconciliationists are wrong to think both matter since neither does.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This means that if C 1 continues to exist but ceases to be a person then the what-matters relation is not satisfied.

  2. We do not need to assess the plausibility of each determinate answer.

  3. By “stage” I do not mean to refer only to “instantaneous” temporal parts, but to temporal parts more generally.

  4. Also, if there are no shared stages, the maximal I-relation is transitive.

  5. s 1 and s 2 (along one branch) are stages of one person, Mr. Fissionyleft, and s 1 and s 3 (along the other branch) are stages of another person, Mr. Fissionyright. Hence, s 1 is R-related to all and only stages to which it is also I-related since all and only stages to which s 1 is R-related are stages of some continuant person of which s 1 is also a stage.

  6. Mr. Fissionyleft at that pre-fission moment has what matters in ordinary survival with respect to t 5 since there is a person Mr. Fissionyright at t 5 that stands to Mr. Fissionyleft at that pre-fission moment in the what-matters relation.

  7. The pre-fission people do not have such singular desires but they share the existential desire that there be some person stage in the future, which is a stage of some continuant of which my present stage is also a stage. This existential desire is fully satisfied along both branches in fission cases according to Lewis.

  8. “We can, I think, ask what matters to a person (in the relevant sense) independently of asking what that person is capable of desiring. Suppose I am comatose, but will recover in a year. Though I am currently incapable of having desires, it seems that what will happen to me in a year matters to me now, in the relevant sense. The fact that I will be tortured in the future is bad for me now, even though I cannot appreciate this act” (Sider 1996, p. 5).

  9. “B’s experiences are qualitatively indistinguishable from C’s except insofar as they are B’s, and not C’s. But this does not mean that B’s thoughts are related to C’s in the way that matters for personal survival, for it is precisely the indexicality that matters. …It is surely incumbent on the reductionist to provide some other basis—one which does not presuppose personal identity—for holding two person-stages to be R-related. There is no reason to assume either that this can be done, or that, if it can, it will have the result that any of B’s states will be R-related to any of C’s” (Mills 1993, p. 46).

  10. A referee suggests that a supporter of this view might hold that Mr. Fissionyleft and Mr. Fissionyright do not have the “same” brain, but rather two different brains composed of the same particles or consisting of the same stuff. Even if that is the case (and we can no longer use the expression “the” brain) the main point will still hold as that same referee suggests. “Sister” thoughts that have physical vehicles involving all the same particles or stuff will share their causal relations to other thoughts.

  11. Any difference in indexically based content or ownership will be a matter of the relational properties of Q. For the sake of discussion, suppose that Q expresses distinct thoughts in virtue of being overdetermined. This will not determine different causal relations for t 1 and t 2. The later effects of Q will be the same, whether or not Q has a history of overdetermination (and hence whether Q expresses a single or a double thought). Whatever state in the future t 1 is causally related, t 2 must be causally related to on this model. In addition, the causal relations of these distinct thoughts to later thoughts cannot normally depend on any future-oriented relational properties of Q that determine ownership. For a concrete case, consider again Mills’ example of remembering the thought that “I will be in jail on Friday” from Sunday, earlier in the week. If the thought, t 1, had by Mr. Fissionyleft on Sunday causes Mr. Fissionyleft’s apparent memory experience on Friday, then so does the sister thought t 2, Mr. Fissionyright’s qualitatively indistinguishable thought on Sunday.

  12. The assumption that what matters is psychological continuity is not particularly controversial. For example, even animalists may hold that psychological continuity, although not required for identity, is required for what matters.

  13. I am indebted to Brad Thompson for this point (as well as for the objection).

  14. I have claimed that we do not get what matters in Case 3, a claim that is intuitively appealing. However, it is also intuitively appealing to claim that we get what matters in ordinary survival and that there is something that matters in ordinary survival. However, as a referee suggests, given various other theses in this paper, the claim that we do not get what matters in Case 3 is in conflict with the latter claim, and one of these intuitively appealing claims must be abandoned. Why should it be the latter rather than the former? First, I would suggest that the stronger of these two intuitions is that we do not get what matters in Case 3. If so, that puts the burden on those who want to retain the intuition that there is something that matters in ordinary survival. Second, we can explain away the intuition that there is something that matters in ordinary survival, but there is no explaining away our intuition that we don’t get what matters in Case 3. I would suggest that our intuition that there is something that matters in ordinary survival is, in fact, based on the following faulty inference.

    Personal identity is associated with ordinary survival and personal identity matters. Hence, by existential generalization, in ordinary survival there is something that matters.

    In fact, this reasoning embodies a mistake. Our existential belief is derived from our more specific belief that personal identity matters in ordinary survival but the latter belief is false. Once we grant to Parfit that personal identity does not matter, we should not be so sure that something matters in ordinary survival.

References

  • Ehring, D. (1987). Survival and trivial facts. Analysis, 47, 50–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ehring, D. (1995). Personal identity and the R-relation: Reconciliation through cohabitation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73, 337–346.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ehring, D. (1998). Fission, fusion and the Parfit revolution. Philosophical Studies, 94, 329–332.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johansson, J. (2010). Parfit on fission. Philosophical Studies, 150, 21–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1976). Survival and identity. In A. Rorty (Ed.), The identities of persons. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maddy, P. (1979). Is the importance of identity derivative? Philosophical Studies, 35, 151–170.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mills, E. (1993). Dividing without reducing: Bodily fission and personal identity. Mind, 102, 37–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parfit, D. (1975). Personal identity and survival. In J. Perry (Ed.), Personal identity. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parfit, D. (1976). Lewis, Perry, and what matters. In A. Rorty (Ed.), The identities of persons. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, S. (1984). Personal identity: A materialist’s account. In S. Shoemaker & R. Swinburne (Eds.), Personal identity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sider, T. (1996). All the world’s a stage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 433–453.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sider, T. (2001). Four-dimensionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Robert Howell and Brad Thompson for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to thank an anonymous referee for a number of useful comments and suggestions.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Douglas Ehring.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Ehring, D. Why Parfit did not go far enough. Philos Stud 165, 133–149 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9921-8

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9921-8

Keywords

Navigation