Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Viciousness and the structure of reality

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Given the centrality of arguments from vicious infinite regress to our philosophical reasoning, it is little wonder that they should also appear on the catalogue of arguments offered in defense of theses that pertain to the fundamental structure of reality. In particular, the metaphysical foundationalist will argue that, on pain of vicious infinite regress, there must be something fundamental. But why think that infinite regresses of grounds are vicious? I explore existing proposed accounts of viciousness cast in terms of contradictions, dependence, failed reductive theories and parsimony. I argue that no one of these accounts adequately captures the conditions under which an infinite regress—any infinite regress—is vicious as opposed to benign. In their place, I suggest an account of viciousness in terms of explanatory failure. If this account is correct, infinite grounding regresses are not necessarily vicious; and we must be much more careful employing such arguments to the conclusion that there has to be something fundamental.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Folks who make recourse to arguments from vicious infinite regress—or something that looks a lot like them—in the contemporary grounding literature include Schaffer (2010, pp. 37, 63). Cameron (2008) also discusses the role arguments from vicious infinite regress might play in arguments to the conclusion that there must be something fundamental. Historical figures of note who endorse similar arguments include Leibniz (1989), and Bradley (1908).

  2. See Brzozowski (2009, chap. 2), Orilia (2009, pp. 6–8), and Vlastos (1954, p. 328, footnote 12) for a characterization of vicious infinite regresses in something like these terms. I have also heard this suggestion made by philosophers on several occasions. Whilst this is no explanation of why grounding regresses are vicious, it secures the necessity of the viciousness of infinite grounding regresses. Although I know of nowhere that anyone has written this down.

  3. Nolan (2001) and Clark (1988).

  4. Aikin (2005), Clark (1988), Klein (2003), and Nolan (2001).

  5. Nolan (2001).

  6. Nolan (2001).

  7. There are many different versions of the Bradley regress as it pertains to states of affairs and propositions. For some discussions see (Orilia 2009), Schnieder (2004) and Vallicella (2000).

  8. See Armstrong (1997, pp. 118–119).

  9. Armstrong (1997, p. 118).

  10. Cameron (2008, pp. 1–3) and Orilia (2009, especially Sect. 6), discuss this interpretation of the regress.

  11. Nolan (2001, pp. 524–530). Clark (1988, p .372) is more reserved about whether or not there turns out to be a connection, but he mentions the suggestion nonetheless.

  12. Vlastos (1954, p. 320).

  13. Vlastos (1954, p. 321).

  14. Vlastos (1954, p. 324).

  15. Vlastos (1954, p. 325)

  16. Nolan (2001, pp. 524–525). Italics my own.

  17. That the regress is prior to the contradiction—if indeed there is a connection between the two at all—is hinted at by Clark, who states ‘what is special about valid infinite regress arguments as instances of species of reduction is the derivation of an infinite regress. But what is not clear is how, if at all, the regress in turn figures in delivering the required contradiction’ (Clark 1988, p. 372.)

  18. Of course, one place to start would be by looking to other theories that harbor both vicious infinite regresses and contradictions and seeing if we can observe similar patterns.

  19. Nolan (2001, pp. 528–530).

  20. Clark (1988) and Nolan (2001) discuss viciousness and dependence more generally. In the debates over foundational epistemology and arguments from vicious infinite regress, the discussions of inferential justification relations and what is thought to be wrong with the appearance of an infinite regress seems like a discussion of a specific instance of the more general phenomenon of the suspected involvement of dependence relations with viciousness. For discussions of the issue as they take place in foundational epistemology see Aikin (2005, esp pp. 194-202) and Klein (2003).

  21. Leibniz (1989, p. 85). Italics my own.

  22. Cameron (2008, p. 3).

  23. Schaffer (2010, pp. 37, 62).

  24. Nolan (2001, pp. 531–532).

  25. I borrow this terminology from Clark (1988).

  26. Aikin notes this same point. See Aikin (2005, p. 197).

  27. The situation with epistemic foundationalists’ arguments from vicious infinite regress is somewhat more complicated than this. But of the additional concerns expressed by the epistemic foundationalist, there are also good reasons to be suspicious. I do not discuss these arguments here because they are not directly pertinent to the matter to hand. For further elaboration see especially Aikin (2005) and Klein (2003).

  28. Aikin (2005, p. 197).

  29. Klein (2003, p. 729) also makes this observation.

  30. I think there is more to be said about the types of reductions of relevance, amongst other things. I follow Nolan, however, and only present his very rough sketch of the kinds of reductive theories involved.

  31. Nolan (2001, p. 530) discusses the homuncular theory of perception but it is originally introduced in Ryle (1949).

  32. Bennett (2011, p. 31)

  33. Nolan (2001, pp. 533–536).

  34. Problems with an argument from theoretical virtue are also discussed by Aikin (2005, p. 196).

  35. An example of an infinite regress that seems to be genuinely vicious but does not appear to be accounted for in terms of explanatory failure is the Weissman regress: the regress generated when we attempt to establish \(\sqrt 2\) as rational. See Nolan (2001, pp. 525–526) for a discussion.

  36. Passmore (1961, p. 31).

  37. Passmore (1961, p. 33).

  38. Ryle (1949, p. 30).

  39. See Passmore (1961, p. 26).

  40. Passmore also points out that the regress assumes that the way in which an action is intelligent is the same as the way in which a thought is intelligent. Where the way in which intelligence of thought is expressed differently to intelligence of action, the regress doesn’t get going. See Passmore (1961, p. 27).

  41. Thank you to an anonymous referee for pointing out the need to address this issue.

  42. These notions of sameness of form, constitution explanation and explanatory failure are going to connect up with discussions of circularity—and its cluster of associated notions—along with requiring a more developed account of both metaphysical explanation and grounding.

  43. I do not define a notion of ground. There is disagreement in the literature, which cuts along several different lines that I do not discuss here. I assume that whether grounding involves facts, propositions or particulars, one can wonder whether infinite regresses of grounds are vicious or benign. I also assume that, allowing for slight variations in detail, the reasons for which an infinite grounding regress is vicious will be similar regardless of what category we take the relata to belong to.

  44. Although philosophers agree that grounding is involved with metaphysical explanation, they disagree on whether grounding simply is metaphysical explanation, or whether real grounding relations underwrite, or correspond to, metaphysical explanations. I’m sure many will also disagree with how I am characterizing the notion of metaphysical explanation here.

  45. These arguments include arguments from something like intuition (Cameron 2008; Lowe 1998, p. 158.), arguments from theoretical virtue (Cameron 2008), and arguments that employ something like a principle of sufficient reason (Cameron 2008; Schaffer 2010).

  46. Consider causal explanations. The smashing of the window by the tree is adequately explained in terms of the storm, plus other relevant details such as the brittleness of the glass, etc. Although one might wonder why anything exists at all, our explanation of the broken window is not inadequate because it does not make recourse to the Big Bang or God.

  47. This is not to say that the foundationalist doesn’t have other, powerful reasons in defense of their position.

  48. Thank you to an anonymous referee for pointing out the need to address this issue.

  49. I am not claiming that the foundationalist is a closet theist but, rather, that there may be a form of argument in operation here with which we are familiar. The application of which may have some very surprising and interesting consequences.

  50. Ultimately such an argument won’t work because the viciousness of the regress shows us that the way we have set about explaining something is incorrect in the first place.

References

  • Aikin, S. F. (2005). who is afraid of epistemology’s regress problem. Philosophical Studies, 126, 191–217.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. M. (1989). A combinatorial theory of possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. M. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Aquinas, T. (1964). The first three ways. Summa theologica (pp. 13–15). New York: Blackfriars.

  • Bennett, K. (2011). By our bootstraps. Philosophical Perspectives, 25, 27–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bradley, F. H. (1908). Appearance and reality. New York: Swan Sonnenschein and Co..

    Google Scholar 

  • Brzozowski, J. (2009). Location, parts, and properties. Doctoral Dissertation, The Australian National University, Canberra.

  • Cameron, R. (2008). Turtles all the way down: Regress, priority and fundamentality. The Philosophical Quarterly, 58, 1–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, R. (1988). Vicious infinite regress arguments. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 369–380.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klein, P. (1999). Human knowledge and the infinite regress of reasons. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 297–325.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klein P. (2003). When infinite regresses are not vicious. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXVI, 718–729.

  • Leibniz, G.W. (1989). From the letters to Arnauld. R. Ariew & D. Garber (Eds.), G.W.Leibniz: Philosophical essays (pp. 69–90). Indiana: Hackett.

  • Lowe, E.J. (1998). The possibility of metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nolan, D. (2001) What’s wrong with infinite regresses?. Metaphilosophy, 23(5), 523–538.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Orilia, F. (2009). Bradley’s regress and ungrounded dependence chains. Dialectica, 63, 333–341.

    Google Scholar 

  • Orilia, F. (2011). States of affairs and Bradley’s regress: Armstrong versus fact infinitism. Manuscript.

  • Passmore, J. (1961). Philosophical reasoning. London: Gerald Duckworth.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schaffer, J. (2010). Monism: The priority of the whole. Philosophical Review, 119(1), 31–76.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schnieder, B. (2004). Once more: Bradley regresses. In H. Hochberg and K. Mulligan (Eds.), On relations and predicates (pp. 219–56). Frankfurt: Ontos.

  • Vallicella, W. (2000). Three conceptions of states of affairs. Nous, 34(2), 237–259.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vlastos, G. (1954). The third man argument in the Parmenides. Philosophical Review, 63, 319–349.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank audiences at the workshop The One and The Many, at the University of Melbourne, the Melbourne Logic Group and Lingnan University. I would particularly like to thank Aaron Guthrie, Daniel Nolan, Graham Priest, Greg Restall and Benjamin Schnieder for comments and discussion.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Graduate Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan

    Ricki Leigh Bliss

Authors
  1. Ricki Leigh Bliss
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ricki Leigh Bliss.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Bliss, R.L. Viciousness and the structure of reality. Philos Stud 166, 399–418 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0043-0

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0043-0

Keywords

Search

Navigation