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Intrinsic value and the supervenience principle

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Abstract

An important constraint on the nature of intrinsic value---the “Supervenience Principle” (SP)---holds that some object, event, or state of affairs ϕ is intrinsically valuable only if the value of ϕ supervenes entirely on ϕ's intrinsic properties. In this paper, I argue that SP should be rejected. SP is inordinately restrictive. In particular, I argue that no SP-respecting conception of intrinsic value can accept the importance of psychological resonance, or the positive endorsement of persons, in explaining value.

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Notes

  1. Cf. Bradley (2002, p. 23). See also Moore (1951, p. 206).

  2. Korsgaard (1996, p. 253).

  3. Zimmerman (2001, p. 62).

  4. Not all people who identify “intrinsic value” with “final value” accept SP. See, for instance, Kagan (1998).

  5. See, for instance, Temkin (1993, p. 260).

  6. Lemos (1994, pp. 3–4).

  7. Ibid., p. 4.

  8. The obvious inspiration for this view is Mill (1861, Chap. II).

  9. Bradley (2002, p. 26). See also Zimmerman (2001, Chap. 3).

  10. Korsgaard (1996, p. 264).

  11. Ibid., p. 261.

  12. See, for instance, Heathwood (2008, p. 51).

  13. According to Ben Bradley, SP is a “non-negotiable” constraint on acceptable theories of well-being or relational intrinsic value. See Bradley (2009, pp. 19, 27).

  14. Griffin (1989, pp. 10–11) and Murphy (1999).

  15. See Griffin (1989, Chap. 2); for criticism, see Sobel (1994).

  16. Most importantly, see Railton (2002).

  17. See Lewis (2000).

  18. Railton (2002, p. 54). My emphasis.

  19. Hobbes (1651), I 6.

  20. Sidgwick (1981[1907], pp. 111–112). My emphasis.

  21. This feature is shared by a number of other desiderative views. See, for instance, Mulgan’s account of the desire-satisfaction view. See Mulgan (2007, p. 73).

  22. Many have held that existence internalism is a crucial plank in the argument for desiderative views of practical reason and the personal good. See, for instance, Williams (1981), Brink (2008) and Railton (2002, p. 47).

  23. Rosati (1996).

  24. Of course, the view that only desires motivate is certainly controversial. For defense, see Smith (1987) and Sinhababu (2009). Critics include Darwall (1983) and Scanlon (1999).

  25. Railton (2002, p. 47).

  26. Railton writes: “One might join the Kantians in challenging the premise of instrumentalism, and attempt to argue that some substantive ends or actions are indeed mandated by rationality. Such challenges have a noble history, and even a noble representation in the present, but I find the ignoble instrumentalist view the clearest idea we have of what it is, at a minimum, to have a reason for acting” (Railton 2002, p. 47).

  27. Larry Temkin notes this feature of a desiderative view: “on this view, the agent is the ultimate arbiter of her own good. What she desires is good for her, and, importantly, it is her desiring it which makes it so” (Temkin (1993, p. 264).

  28. Sumner (1996, p. 42).

  29. Brink (2008, pp. 40–45).

  30. Ibid., pp. 39–40.

  31. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this response.

  32. See footnote 26.

  33. This could be for many different reasons, and I remain neutral concerning which of the relata, “value” or “reason to promote”, is explanatorily prior.

  34. Bradley (2006). The “other things being equal” qualifier is meant to rule out bad instrumental effects of intrinsic goods.

  35. Bradley (2009, p. 19).

  36. Ibid., p. 5.

  37. See Feldman (2004, pp. 173–174).

  38. Bradley (2009, p. 19).

  39. Cf. Feldman (2004, p. 174).

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Ben Bradley, Chris Heathwood, Doug Portmore, and participants in a discussion of the issue of this paper at PEASoup: http://peasoup.typepad.com, for their extremely helpful comments. I would also like to thank an anonymous reviewer.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1445 Jayhawk Boulevard, Wescoe Hall, rm. 3090, Lawrence, KS, 66045, USA

    Dale Dorsey

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Dorsey, D. Intrinsic value and the supervenience principle. Philos Stud 157, 267–285 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9636-7

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