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The A-theory of time and induction

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Abstract

The A-theory of time says that it is an objective, non-perspectival fact about the world that some events are present, while others were present or will be present. I shall argue that the A-theory has some implausible consequences for inductive reasoning. In particular, the presentist version of the A-theory, which holds that the difference between the present and the non-present consists in the present events being the only ones that exist, is very much in trouble.

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Notes

  1. Unless, of course, the particular moving spotlight theorist has some independent reason to reject the existence of events altogether. One would have to hear what such a theorist’s story about induction is before seeing how to adapt the criticism of this paper.

  2. For a discussions of approaches of this sort, see Bigelow (1996) and Crisp (2007).

  3. See Merricks (2007).

  4. E.g., Rhoda et al. (2006).

  5. This is a modification of the referee’s improvement on my original suggestion.

  6. This will not be the case for the weird A-theory discussed at the end of the response to Objection 2.

  7. Cf. Merricks (2007).

  8. Some would prefer to apply the operators to sentences, and the same point could still be made, but as a sociological matter of fact, presentists tend to be friendly to propositions.

  9. I would like to thank Jonathan Kvanvig and Trenton Merricks for helpful discussions of the argument of this paper, and Trent Dougherty for comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am very grateful to the referees for a careful reading and a number of objections that led to significant improvements in the paper.

References

  • Bigelow, J. (1996). Presentism and properties. Philosophical Perspectives, 10, 35–52.

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  • Crisp, T. M. (2007). Presentism and the grounding objection. Nous, 41, 90–109.

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  • Merricks, T. (2007). Truth and ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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  • Rhoda, A. R., Gregory, G. A., & Belt, T. G. (2006). Open theism, omniscience, and the nature of the future. Faith and Philosophy, 23, 432–459.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, One Bear Place #97273, Waco, TX, 76798-7273, USA

    Alexander R. Pruss

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  1. Alexander R. Pruss
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Correspondence to Alexander R. Pruss.

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Pruss, A.R. The A-theory of time and induction. Philos Stud 152, 335–345 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9483-6

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