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Notes
Unless noted otherwise, page numbers refer to the original article, Abizadeh and Gilabert (2008).
Although we do not make much of this ambiguity here, it should be clear that each of these articulations of what is entailed by a commitment to equal moral worth will give rise to quite distinct requirements. As we suggest later, this ambiguity about the content of the equality to which Abizadeh and Gilabert are committed makes it difficult to understand what they mean by ‘deontic duties’ later in their essay.
Note that our objection is simply that such a strict account of what constitutes a “genuine tension” has the consequence of belittling the struggles—indeed, the tensions—that are the subject of most political philosophical disputes. Their interpretation suggests, for example, that the disputes between libertarianism and egalitarianism would not be accurately described in terms of tensions.
It is not part of Scheffler’s argument that moral values themselves are discrete and independent; indeed, that would be a strong claim since some people could endorse Scheffler’s thesis about the two different kinds of duties, which are in ineliminable tension with each other, and remain agnostic on the question of whether, at the most fundamental level, moral values might be related. This was widely believed among deontologists in the early part of the last century. See Ross (1930), pp. 41–42. Ross famously believed that duties were pluralistic but he also believed that, at the foundational level, they were connected. For Ross, duties arose out of different relations—of “promiser to promissee, of creditor to debtor, of wife to husband, of child to parent, of friend to friend, of fellow countrymen to fell countrymen, and the like; and each of these relations is the foundation of a prima facie duty.”
Bernard Williams was critical of this aspect of ‘obligation talk’, at least in so far as it contributes to the thesis that therefore obligations cannot conflict. See Williams (1985), pp. 56–70.
This helpful list is taken from Seth Lazar, “On the Justification of Associative Duties”, unpublished manuscript, on file with authors.
Bernard Williams invokes the notion of importance, although he also notes that that notion is poorly understood, and that the connections of importance to deliberative priority are not straightforward. Williams (1985), pp.182–183.
To be fair, at times, Scheffler and others write as if the main value of the relationship is to the person who is in it, and so give the impression that the value of relationships is derived from a commitment to equal moral worth. Although they often emphasize that special relationships are fundamental to our well being, and that they import meaning and value to life, it is clear that the basis of the associative duty cannot straightforwardly, or indeed exclusively, be cached out in terms of its contribution to the wellbeing of the duty-bearer.
For this argument, see Seth Lazar’s excellent paper, “On the justification of Associative Duties”. He also points out that since moral duties (including associative duties) cannot be waived by the duty-bearer but can be waived by the beneficiary, it is contradictory to ground the value of the relationship solely in terms of the welfare of the duty-bearer. As Lazar, following Thomas Scanlon, has argued, there are different kinds of appropriate responses to value, many of which are attitudinal (loving x, admiring x, respecting x, etc.), and that an appropriate response to value might also give us good reasons for specific types of actions (protecting, promoting, emulating). This means that a given associative duty must be related to the relationship in an appropriate way, and that the relationship has to be seen as instantiating (intrinsic) value, such that the duty is an appropriate response to that particular value. This view is also central to Scanlon’s account of moral reasoning, in which he caches out the importance of responding to valuable properties.(See Scanlon (2000), pp. 88–101).
David Miller also argues that only relationships that are morally valuable are able to ground associative duties (See Miller 2005).
It is clear in Scheffler, too. He accepts, as Abizadeh and Gilabert acknowledge, that “the mere existence of a relationship that one values non-instrumentally is not sufficient to ground special responsibilities: one must also have reason to value the relationship, or, to put it differently, the relationship must in fact be non-instrumentally valuable” (p. 356).
Abizadeh and Gilabert’s position directly denies the Schefflerian view of the grounding of associative duties. They contend, without really offering an argument, that if the duty is a moral duty, then it must be based on the equal moral worth of persons. In their view, both kinds of duties are somehow based on a commitment to the equal moral worth standard, which suggests either (a) that nothing can count as moral unless it embodies a basic commitment to equality—which requires a fairly monolithic view of the basis of value—and doesn’t explain why one kind of duty constrains the other kind (since they are both, in some way, involved in this standard), or (b) that universal duties are more directly related to equal moral worth, which explains their constraining function, over associative duties. We accept the importance of the claim that all people have equal moral worth, but in such an abstract formulation, it is not clear how this is intended to map onto general and associative duties, nor is it clear that all moral values can be understood as embodying this perspective.
The usual formulation is that it should not violate “certain” constraints, left open. But, at p. 360 they elaborate that these constraints are in fact “deontic” constraints, or at least that these are an example of certain constraints. As we noted in note 1, the content of the “deontic” duties is ambiguous, not least because Abizadeh and Gilabert are relatively silent on the content of the equality to which they are committed.
See Miller (2007).
References
Abizadeh, A., & Gilabert, P. (2008). Is there a genuine tension between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities? Philosophical Studies, 138, 349–365.
Dworkin, R. (1986). Law’s empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Miller, D. (2005). Reasonable partiality towards compatriots. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 8, 63–81.
Miller, D. (2007). National responsibility and global justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ross, W. D. (1930). The right and the good. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [reprinted with same pagination by Hackett 1988].
Scanlon, T. (2000). What we owe to each other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Scheffler, S. (2001). Boundaries and allegiances. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tamir, Y. (1993). Liberal nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Williams, B. (1985). Ethics and the limits of philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to Rahul Kumar, David Miller and Christine Straehle for helpful comments on an earlier version of this Reply. Margaret Moore is also grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a grant in support of her research.
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Lenard, P.T., Moore, M.R. Ineliminable tension: a reply to Abizadeh and Gilabert’s ‘Is there a genuine tension between cosmopolitan egalitarianism and special responsibilities?’. Philos Stud 146, 399–405 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9273-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9273-6