Abstract
In the mid-20th century, descriptive meta-ethics addressed a number of central questions, such as whether there is a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation, whether moral reasons are absolute or relative, and whether moral judgments express attitudes or describe states of affairs. I maintain that much of this work in mid-20th century meta-ethics proceeded on an assumption that there is good reason to question. The assumption was that our ordinary discourse is uniform and determinate enough to vindicate one side or the other of these meta-ethical debates. I suggest that ordinary moral discourse may be much less uniform and determinate than 20th century meta-ethics assumed.
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Notes
There are a number of different projects that can be called “meta-ethical.” I will focus here on only one of them, a project that can be called “descriptive meta-ethics.” The task of someone engaged in descriptive meta-ethics is to provide the best analysis of the ordinary uses of moral terms. The descriptive task is different from (although related to) the ontological task of determining what if any moral properties actually exist. The descriptive task is also different from (although related to) the prescriptive task of showing that we ought to use moral terms in a certain way. The mid-twentieth century meta-ethicists I am concerned with here were concerned to answer the descriptive question—even if the early 20th century theorists such as Moore, Prichard, and Ross were more concerned with the ontological questions, and even if early 21st century theorists may have become more concerned with the ontological questions as well. Stevenson, for instance, says that his work is concerned to analyze “the judgments of the ordinary man as he finishes reading the morning’s newspaper” (Stevenson, Facts and Values, v) and that his meta-ethical “conclusions are based upon observation of ethical discussions in daily life, and can be clarified and tested only by turning to that source” (Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 13). Hare compares his task to that of a descriptive grammarian (see Hare 1964, i and 4) and he says explicitly that he is giving an account of moral terms as they are used, not as they might be used (see Hare 1964, p. 92). Mackie makes it clear that he is trying to explain “ordinary thought” or what the “ordinary user of moral language means to say” (Mackie 1977, pp. 31–33). Smith says that he intends to give an account of the features of morality “that are manifest in ordinary moral practice as it is engaged in by ordinary folk” (Smith 1994, p. 5). Brink is not always as clearly descriptivist as Hare, Mackie, or Smith, but he too says that his account fits better than its rivals with “commonsense moral thinking” (Brink 1989, p. 37; although Brink also says that this way of putting it is “perhaps a little misleading”). Meta-ethicists who believe that there is a blanket Yes or No answer to the question of whether commonsense morality is in error (see Mackie 1977, pp. 48–49; Smith 1994, p. 4–13; Brink 1989, p. 34) will have to be particularly concerned to keep their descriptive results separate from the prescriptivist ones, for the only way to answer the question of whether commonsense morality as a whole is in error is to first describe commonsense morality in a way that does not prejudge whether or not it is erroneous.
Sinnott-Armstrong (forthcoming) provides ample evidence of the UD assumption in 20th century meta-ethics, convincingly citing texts from Ayer, Hare, Blackburn, Gibbard, Timmons, Brink, Jackson, Smith, and Mackie.
Sinnott-Armstrong (forthcoming) has argued that while the Indeterminacy Thesis is compelling, the Variability Thesis is untenable. He focuses exclusively on the debate between expressivists and descriptivists, arguing against the view that some uses of moral language express attitudes and that other uses of moral language describe states of affairs. I do not have the space here to respond fully to Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge, but let me say first that even if Sinnott-Armstrong’s arguments against variability in the expressivist–descriptivist case succeed (and his arguments are very cogent), it is not at all clear that they will translate to the debates between internalists and externalists, or to the debate between relativists and absolutists. Indeed, there might be good reasons to think that variability is more apt in these other debates (such as that lay-people get in arguments with each other about whether morality is relative or absolute, and about moral motivation, in ways that they do not argue about the semantic issues separating expressivists and descriptivists). But secondly, I would also note that Sinnott-Armstrong’s arguments rely on there being a very uncontroversial and easy-to-draw line between moral and non-moral judgments, and between standard and deviant uses of moral terms. I doubt such lines can be easily and uncontroversially drawn. The uses that some theorists discount as non-moral and deviant, others will take to be moral and standard. And the best diagnosis of this kind of dispute might be the Variability Thesis. Thirdly, however, the “moderate Pyrrhyonism” that Sinnott-Armstrong eventually opts for seems to me to be in substance very close to the combination of the Indeterminacy Thesis and Variability Thesis I advance here. A challenge from the opposite direction of Sinnott-Armstrong’s has been raised by a Philosophical Studies referee. While Sinnott-Armstrong holds that the Indeterminacy part of the IV Thesis captures all the phenomena and the Variability part ought to be jettisoned, this referee asks whether “the threat of indeterminacy recedes if we adopt the lessons of variability. If we focus descriptive meta-ethics in an appropriately narrow way (granting differences between individuals and between contexts), does this assuage some worries about indeterminacy?” Let me say first of all that I don’t see indeterminacy as being a “threat” or something to “worry” about. I think moral discourse can function perfectly well if it’s indeterminate with regard to the oft-disputed meta-ethical questions, as it may still be determinate enough with regard to other commitments to do most of the work we need it to do. But secondly, indeterminacy with regard to these oft-disputed meta-ethical questions does seem to me to be the appropriate analysis of some areas of discourse, even if this is something that may be hard to establish using the kinds of survey-experiments that Knobe (2003), Nichols (2004) and other experimental philosophers have fruitfully deployed. In a survey-experiment, subjects are typically asked to make a choice between, say, a more absolutist and a more relativist account of their moral thinking. But while in this kind of setting people may feel pressure to choose one particular answer, their everyday discourse may not involve (and they may not think it involves) commitments that favor one side of the meta-ethical debate or the other.
For empirical evidence seeming to support “different person” variability with regard to a number of moral and psychological concepts, see Nichols (2004) (especially chapter 8), Nichols and Ulatowski (2007), Goodwin and Darley (2008), Cushman and Mele (forthcoming), and Cokely and Feltz (forthcoming). For criticism of “different person” variability, see Sinnott-Armstrong (forthcoming).
Indeed, one possible explanation for why such a great amount of writing in 20th century meta-ethics has been concerned with the disputed commitments is that those commitments separate out different conceptions of morality but fall outside the concept of morality; meta-ethicists have actually been arguing for the superiority of their own favored conceptions of morality but have mistakenly taken themselves to be disagreeing about the concept of morality. Another explanation is that the concept of morality bears important similarities to the concept of a game as Wittgenstein thought of it: blurred, and best captured only by family resemblance claims.
For evidence of different context variability, see Goodwin and Darley (2008); for criticism, see Sinnott-Armstrong (forthcoming).
See Loeb (2008).
To put the point again in Rawlsian terminology: there may be decisive reasons for adopting one conception of morality over another, even if the concept of morality is neutral between them.
Thanks to Nathan Ballantyne, Thomas Christiano, Terry Horgan, Uriah Kriegel, Shaun Nichols, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Sharon Street, and Mark Timmons.
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Gill, M.B. Indeterminacy and variability in meta-ethics. Philos Stud 145, 215–234 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9220-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9220-6