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Truth, Meaning, and Circularity

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Abstract

It is often argued that the combination of deflationism about truth and the truth-conditional theory of meaning is impossible for reasons of circularity. I distinguish, and reject, two strains of circularity argument. Arguments of the first strain hold that the combination has a circular account of the order in which one comes to know the meaning of a sentence and comes to know its truth condition. I show that these arguments fail to identify any circularity. Arguments of the second strain hold that the combination has a circular explanation of the ideas or concepts of meaning and truth. I show that these arguments identify a genuine, but acceptable, circularity.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri, 438 General Classroom Building, Columbia, MO, 65211-4160, USA

    Claire Horisk

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Horisk, C. Truth, Meaning, and Circularity. Philos Stud 137, 269–300 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-8541-y

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