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An Intuitionistic Reformulation of Mally’s Deontic Logic

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Abstract

In 1926, Ernst Mally proposed a number of deontic postulates. He added them as axioms to classical propositional logic. The resulting system was unsatisfactory because it had the consequence that A is the case if and only if it is obligatory that A. We present an intuitionistic reformulation of Mally’s deontic logic. We show that this system does not provide the just-mentioned objectionable theorem while most of the theorems that Mally considered acceptable are still derivable. The resulting system is unacceptable as a deontic logic, but it does make sense as a lax logic in the modern sense of the word.

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Correspondence to Gert-Jan C. Lokhorst.

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Lokhorst, GJ.C. An Intuitionistic Reformulation of Mally’s Deontic Logic. J Philos Logic 42, 635–641 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9242-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9242-6

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