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Forms and objects of thought

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Abstract

It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore, 3 Arts Link, Singapore, 117570, Singapore

    Michael W. Pelczar

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  1. Michael W. Pelczar
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Pelczar, M.W. Forms and objects of thought. Linguistics & Philosophy 30, 97–122 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-006-9012-4

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