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Pacifying monogamy

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Abstract

This paper proposes a theory of institutionally imposed monogamy. In a society where many women are allocated to the elite, there are high returns for the non-elite men to rebel. Monogamy, or “constrained” polygyny, can pacify non-elite men, and thus serve the elite’s reproductive interests. The more unequal is the society, the stricter constraints the elite want to impose on themselves. This suggests how monogamy might have arisen in response to rising class cleavages, e.g., in the wake of the introduction of agriculture. Another result is that, if the elite can write a law that commits not only themselves but also any group that would come to replace them in a rebellion, then polygyny will be more constrained than if they cannot. We speculate that the Church in Europe may have facilitated the imposition of such binding constraints.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, ON, M3J 1P3, Canada

    Nils-Petter Lagerlöf

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  1. Nils-Petter Lagerlöf
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Correspondence to Nils-Petter Lagerlöf.

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Lagerlöf, NP. Pacifying monogamy. J Econ Growth 15, 235–262 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10887-010-9056-8

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