Abstract
Group formation, social capital and collective action have been the focus of much recent attention amongst donors and policy makers. Optimistic scenarios highlight their contributions to poverty reduction and effective natural resource management. However, recent critiques have focused on the exclusionary potential or ‘dark side’ of groups and social capital. Not only are their longer term livelihood impacts unclear, but lacunae persist in our understanding of how social capital, especially trust, is built. This paper presents a longitudinal evaluation of trust, collective action and cooperation among herders in post-Soviet Mongolia in the context of recent donor projects. Results highlight the important catalytic effect of external interventions in overcoming a lack of trust and promoting formalised collective action, but only in the context of a particular conjunction of circumstances. Indications for livelihood outcomes confirm the differentiated benefits, exclusionary potential and fragility of social capital and new institutional forms.
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Notes
Social capital is defined herein, following Putnam (1993), as norms, trust and social networks. Despite the existence of various typologies of social capital (e.g. see Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000; Westermann et al. 2005), these aspects form the core of most current definitions (Grootaert et al. 2004; Paldam and Svendsen, 2000).
Godoy et al. (2007) found an inverted U-shaped relationship between age and investment in social capital and a positive relationship between social capital and income amongst isolated rural households in the Brazilian Amazon.
These include the World Bank ‘Sustainable Livelihoods Project’ (2002–2006), UNDP ‘Sustainable Grassland Management Project’ (2002–2007), GTZ ‘Nature Conservation and Bufferzone Development Project’ (1995–2002) and GTZ ‘Conservation and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources—Gobi Component’ (2002–2006), the latter being implemented by the New Zealand Nature Institute (NZNI).
Bags are the smallest administrative units in Mongolia and typically include 100–150 herders’ households.
The predominance of individual households in the Gobi region has led some authors to deny the local existence of khot ail. However, this term is retained by Mongolian researchers and was used by herders in my case study areas when referring to camps comprising more than one household.
For example protecting winter grazing in other seasons through seasonal mobility. Pasture use was also regulated by secular authorities or religious officials, at least prior to the communist revolution in 1921.
New legislative instruments such as the Land Laws (1994 and 2002) devolved considerable responsibilities to local state representatives in allocation of pastures, control of seasonal movements and resolution of conflicts (Fernández-Giménez and Batbuyan 2004).
New herders are those who did not herd livestock for the negdels. They are arguably more likely to free ride than more established herders due to lack of herding experience, poor integration with local norms and weak pasture rights (Fernández-Giménez 2002).
By autumn 2004 the World Bank Sustainable Livelihoods Project was also active in bag a.
Residential groups typically consisting of parents and dependent children in one household (after Sneath 1999).
Defined here as two households comprising a nuclear family with a separate household comprising one or both parents of one of the spouses.
These data do not attempt to evaluate all aspects of social networks, relations of obligation and ritual activities, but are confined to cooperation over herding/ NRM.
The AHI, a government funded research body, employed a minority of herders in bag a to tend its herds. In 2000 employees’ benefits included a cash wage plus assistance with transport for one seasonal movement.
Numbers are used in order to protect herders’ identity.
Data presented in Table 1 concern single most important barriers to collective action, as identified by herders. Lack of trust was widely remarked on by herders in addition to the 24 who cited it as their primary concern.
Aravt were compulsory groups of 10 herding households in bag a, reportedly created by the bag governor in 1999/2000 to facilitate cooperation over cultural activities and labour sharing. However, herders reported little or no activity amongst aarvd, or follow-up from the bag governor. Herders generally concurred that aarvd existed in ‘name only’.
The notion of formation of community groups or nukhurlul first appeared in project documents in 1999.
Frequency of meetings varied for example depending on seasonal conditions. Monthly meetings were not uncommon in more active communities.
Training opportunities included felt-making, vegetable growing and preserving and processing of livestock products.
sum are intermediate-scale administrative units, equivalent to districts, and typically include 3–5 bags.
1,000 Mongolian tögrög (tg) were approximately equivalent to US $1 in summer 2001.
Bag a itself experienced little direct impact of dzud in the period prior to formation of the earliest communities. However, in summer 2001 herders displaced by dzud in adjacent regions came to the study area, resulting in serious pressure on pasture and water resources.
Winter 2000 datasets were also evaluated against provisional summer 2001 community membership lists for these criteria. Again, no significant associations were noted. However, the analysis here concentrates on 2004 datasets, for which herders’ community membership was more clearly established.
The western area is more distant from bag and sum centres than the eastern part of the bag with which it was amalgamated in 2000.
Numbers reflect households present in bag a in both 2000 and 2004. Of the original 24 households in bag a who cited lack of trust as a primary barrier to collective action, only 16 remained in 2004. Of these 12 (75%) were or had been community members by summer 2004.
The well was mended in a collaborative project between two communities and with the financial support of the World Bank Sustainable Livelihoods Project.
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Upton, C. Social Capital, Collective Action and Group Formation: Developmental Trajectories in Post-socialist Mongolia. Hum Ecol 36, 175–188 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10745-007-9158-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10745-007-9158-x