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On the Duties of Commission in Commercial Life. A Kantian Criticism of Moral Institutionalism

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Abstract

In latter-day discussions on corporate morality, duties of commission are fiercely debated. Moral institutionalists argue that duties of commission—such as a duty of assistance—overstep the boundaries of moral duty owed by economic agents. “Moral institutionalism” is a newly coined term for a familiar position on market morality. It maintains that market morality ought to be restricted, excluding all duties of commission. Neo-Classical thinkers such as Baumol and Homann defend it most eloquently. They underpin their position with concerns that go to the core of liberalism—the dominant western political theory that sustains the ideals of both the free market and the free, rational person. Those authors claim that liberalism calls for a fully differentiated market because it resents the politicization of the market. Fully differentiated markets exclude duties of commission. They also claim that full differentiation of the market closes the troublesome gap between moral motivation and moral virtue. Full differentiation redeems the promise of “easy virtue”. In this paper moral institutionalism will be rejected from a Kantian point of view, mostly inspired by Herman’s thesis on the invisibility of morality. Liberalism may perhaps ban the politicization of the market; it does not forbid its moralization. The idea of a fully differentiated market must also be rejected because it is either morally over-demanding (to the morally autonomous person) or morally hazardous (to the person with failing moral motivation). Contrary to what the moral institutionalists claim, right action, morally, is actually quite difficult in fully differentiated markets.

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Notes

  1. Many discussions on the concrete duties of businesses are nowadays eclipsed by the meta-issue whether corporations—as the dominant agents on today’s markets—can bear moral responsibility at all. We will assume that corporations are a type of agent to which moral duties can be attributed. We have argued for our position elsewhere (Dubbink and Smith 2011). However, just as important is the consideration that moral institutionalists themselves are usually indifferent about this issue. The thrust of their argument relates to the working of the free market as a system. It does not depend on the nature of the economic agent.

  2. Many moral institutionalists will deny the relevance of all categories of duties of commission in the domain of the market. Baumol takes an exceptional position. He (1975) acknowledges the relevance of one constitutive duty of commission. Markets cannot function properly if companies do not help the government to make proper laws. Still, he fiercely opposes the validity of the duty of beneficence.

  3. “Freiheit als Chance zur Selbstverwirklichung aller Menschen. Diese beiden Werte sind als das Erbe der Abendländisch-ler Einzelnen und die Solidarität Christliche Ethiek zu betrachten. (…) . Die hier vertretene … Kritik an der Marktwirtschaft stützen sich damit .. (…) . über die geeigneter Mittel.

  4. Moral institutionalists may exempt situations in which the duties of commission are called upon to deal with day-to-day issues at micro level, such as helping a neighbor. But these are not the situations that the discussion in business ethics is about.

  5. For a recent case in which grocers where pushed to stop selling certain products, see: (http://businessethicsblog.com/2006/02/15/wal-mart-the-morning-after-pill/, viewed 10 April 2011.

  6. Hayek was not opposed to all government intervention. The kind of interventions he rejects are those which lead to an infringement of the private sphere or economic freedom which they are supposed to protect (Hayek 1960: 193).

  7. Kant denies that the morally autonomous person is subjecting their will to an alien element called ‘rationality’. If a human will is to be anything but randomly pushed around, it has to use the faculty of reason to determine what is right and wrong, good or bad, smart or dumb. A will determined by reason therefore is a free will that complies with its own laws. That is why autonomous persons can also be referred to as law-givers unto themselves. This is also why morality can be seen as a consequence of rational willing, and why rational willing can be used as a criterion to determine the principles that ought to count as moral laws (Herman 2007).

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  1. School of Humanities, Department of Philosophy, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Wim Dubbink, Wim Dubbink & Bert van de Ven

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  1. Wim Dubbink
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  2. Bert van de Ven
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Correspondence to Wim Dubbink.

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Dubbink, W., van de Ven, B. On the Duties of Commission in Commercial Life. A Kantian Criticism of Moral Institutionalism. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 15, 221–238 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-011-9283-x

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