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Constructive Empiricism and the Closure Problem

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Abstract

In this paper I articulate a fictionalist solution to the closure problem that affects constructive empiricism. Relying on Stephen Yablo’s recent study of closure puzzles, I show how we can partition the content of a theory in terms of its truthmakers and claim that a constructive empiricist can believe that all the observable conditions that are necessary to make a part of her theory true obtain and remain agnostic about whether or not the other truthmakers for the other parts of her theory obtain. This can be done even though she asserts her theory as if it was wholly true.

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Notes

  1. One might argue that the closure problem is in fact a pseudo-problem since it presupposes a syntactic view of scientific theories—a view that is explicitly rejected by van Fraassen. Although this might be true, I wish to remain neutral on that issue. What I am proposing on the other hand is a solution for the proponents of a syntactic view that is in line with van Fraassen’s metaphor. In other words, I want to show that the closure problem is not a sufficient reason for a constructive empiricist to adopt a semantic view of scientific theories.

  2. Yablo also mentions the falsemakers of p, but we do not need to get into this detail for the aim of this paper.

References

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Acknowledgments

I wish to thank Alexander Bird, Ioannis Votsis and James Ladyman for much helpful discussions and comments. I am also grateful to several anonymous referees for their challenging and useful remarks on earlier drafts of this essay.

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  1. 734 Monk, Quebec, QC, G1S 3M4, Canada

    Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda

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  1. Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda
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Correspondence to Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda.

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Rochefort-Maranda, G. Constructive Empiricism and the Closure Problem. Erkenn 75, 61–65 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9278-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9278-y

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