Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Nanoethics: Old Wine, New Bottles?

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Journal of Consumer Policy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper reviews the question of whether “nanoethics” should be treated as a special essay in ethics, quite different to bioethics, cyberethics, or neuroethics. Whilst some believe that a fundamental rethinking of our ethics is needed, others conclude that ethics as applied to nanoproducts or to nanomedicine will prove to be largely a case of business as usual. The paper is in four principal parts. In the first part, the basic pattern of ethical argument is set out, a pattern that holds no matter which of the emerging technologies is under debate. In the second part, a sketch is offered of the way in which precautionary reasoning plays relative to three key ethical constituencies (utilitarian, rights-led, and dignitarian), including some reflections on how these constituencies would view the so-called precautionary principle (as a guide to regulators). In the third part, the essential features of a particular kind of ethical community, (a “community of rights”) are outlined, such a community being put forward as the appropriate setting for debating matters of nanorisk and regulation. In such a community, the protection of rights is focal, ethics and regulation are viewed as deeply connected discourses, and the aspiration is to develop regimes of control and compensation that are fully integrated and coherent. Finally, there is a discussion of the way in which this kind of community, with its rights-led approach to precaution, would address questions concerning liability for nanoproducts and nanomedical services in a context of profound uncertainty.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. In general, see Brent Blackwelder (2007). According to Wardak and Gorman (2006), there are already more than 200 nanotechnology-based products in the consumer marketplace, and, more recently, the Royal Commission on Environmental Protection (2008) puts the figure at more than 600.

  2. See Lin (2007; for the view that US regulatory provisions are inadequate), Giorgia Guerra (2008; for the view that European Commission (EC) regulation does not fit very well with potential nanomedical applications), and, generally, Phelps (2007).

  3. Brownsword (2008a). See, too, Brownsword (2008b).

  4. Compare Holm (2005).

  5. Of the emerging technologies, it is neurotechnology rather than nanotechnology that seems most likely to destabilize our self-understanding as agents; but nanotechnology (particularly in conditions of convergence) might destabilize the division between agent subjects and technological objects.

  6. Reno v ACLU 521 US 844 (1997). For regulatory purposes, is the Internet to be viewed as akin to “a library, a telephone, a public park, a local bar, a shopping mall, a broadcast medium, a print medium, a medical clinic, a private living room, [or] a public educational institution[?]”, see Biegel (2001).

  7. Compare Dupuy (2007).

  8. Compare Brownsword (2009).

  9. See Weckert and Moor (2007).

  10. See Yusuf (2007).

  11. UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (adopted by acclamation on 19 October 2005 by the 33rd session of the General Conference), Article 1.

  12. Compare Spinello (2006). Spinello employs three ethical approaches (utilitarian, contractarian rights-based, and Kantian duty-based), in conjunction with a post-Lessig range of regulatory options, to review four key issues, namely freedom of on-line expression, intellectual property in cyberspace, Internet privacy, and security.

  13. See Klang and Murray (2005).

  14. Compare, Department of Biotechnology, Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India, National Biotechnology Development Strategy (2006) at 23: “A precautionary, yet promotional approach should be adopted in employing transgenic R & D activities based on technological feasibility, socio-economic considerations and promotion of trade.”

  15. See, further, Brownsword (2007a).

  16. For an excellent discussion, see Stewart (2002).

  17. Moreover, in societies where the trajectory is pro-technology, the precautionary principle is unlikely to be interpreted in a way that does more than slow down the pace of change: see the insightful analysis by van den Daele (2007).

  18. OJ EPO 10/1992, 590.

  19. For discussion of this issue in the context of supposedly “dangerous” offenders, see Bottoms and Brownsword (1983) and Bottoms and Brownsword (1982).

  20. Compare the interesting discussion in Baylis and Fenton (2007).

  21. Compare the analysis in Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001), especially Chapter 6.

  22. For cultural conservativism masquerading as risk analysis, see again Wolfgang van den Daele (2007).

  23. See Brownsword (2005a).

  24. See, e.g., Marchant and Sylvester (2006).

  25. For a more specific elaboration, see Pfizer [2002] ECR II-3305, at para 143: “a preventive measure cannot properly be based on a purely hypothetical approach to risk, founded on mere conjecture which has not been scientifically verified.” So, mere conjecture and hypothesis will not suffice. But, a precautionary measure may apply where the risk “has not yet been fully demonstrated” (para 146). The underlying science must be consistent with principles of “excellence, transparency and independence” (para 172).

  26. See, further, Beyleveld and Brownsword (2009).

  27. According to Weckert and Moor (2007, p. 144), a plausible version of the precautionary principle provides as follows: “If an action A poses a credible threat P of causing some serious harm E, then apply an appropriate remedy R to reduce the possibility of E.” This version still leaves scope for interpretation in relation to the requirements of credibility and seriousness, and the qualifier “appropriate” cues in judgments of proportionality.

  28. The best deep defence of the benchmark involves teasing out the implications of viewing ourselves as agents (with the capacity to engage in practical reason). Seminally, see Gewirth (1978) and Gewirth (1996).

  29. See, further, Brownsword (2005b, 2006).

  30. On will and interest theories of rights, see Hart (1973) and MacCormick (1977).

  31. Compare Beyleveld and Brownsword (2006).

  32. See, further, Brownsword (2004) and Beyleveld and Brownsword (2007).

  33. Compare Beyleveld and Pattinson (2002).

  34. See, further, e.g., Brownsword (2007b).

  35. Compare Blackwelder (2007).

  36. See Farrelly (2007).

  37. Compare the helpful discussion in Weckert and Moor (2007), especially at pp. 140–141.

  38. Compare Farrelly (2007), especially at pp. 220–222.

  39. Compare Mandel (2008).

  40. Compare Dupuy (2007).

  41. This is a strong theme in the Royal Commission on Environmental Protection (2008).

  42. See McHale (2008).

  43. But see van den Hoven (2007).

  44. See, e.g., Harris (2007); and Sandel (2007).

  45. European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission (2007) at para 4.1.

  46. European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission (2007) at para 5.7.

  47. O’Neill (2003)—a point that is repeated in Manson and O’Neill (2007).

  48. See Brownsword (2008a, Chapter 3).

  49. Compare Mandel (2008).

  50. Compare Noah (2000).

  51. The focal legal provision for the conduct of research trials is Directive 2001/20/EC (the Clinical Trials Directive) but this is part of a larger network of regulation, including Directive 93/42/EEC (on medical devices), Directive 2001/83/EC (on medicinal products for human use), and, most recently, the Advanced Therapies Medicinal Products Regulation (1394/2007/EC).

  52. This, of course, should not be taken as implying that I think that such an evaluation of existing regulation (and the associated processes of review and approval) is unimportant. For relevant discussions, see, e.g., van Calster and Bowman (2008) and Dorbeck-Jung (Dorbeck-Jung 2008).

  53. But, for a different assessment, see, e.g., Goldsmith (1998).

  54. Notably, see Lessig (2001, 2006) and Reidenberg (1998).

  55. For a helpful review, see Deibert and Villeneuve (2005).

  56. See, further, Brownsword (2008a, Chapter 3).

References

  • Baylis, F., & Fenton, A. (2007). Chimera research and stem cell therapies for human neurodegenerative disorders. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 16, 195.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bazelon, D. L. (1977). Coping with technology through the legal process. Cornell Law Review, 62(817), 826–827.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beyleveld, D., & Brownsword, R. (2001). Human dignity in bioethics and biolaw. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beyleveld, D., & Brownsword, R. (2006). Principle, proceduralism and precaution in a community of rights. Ratio Juris, 19, 141.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beyleveld, D., & Brownsword, R. (2007). Consent in the law. Oxford: Hart.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beyleveld, D., & Brownsword, R. (2009). Complex technology, complex calculations: Uses and abuses of precautionary reasoning in law. In M. Duwell & P. Sollie (Eds.), Evaluating new technologies: Methodological problems for the ethical assessment of technological developments (pp. 175–190). New York: Springer.

  • Beyleveld, D., & Pattinson, S. (2002). Horizontal applicability and direct effect. Law Quarterly Review, 118, 623.

    Google Scholar 

  • Biegel, S. (2001). Beyond our control? (p. 28). Cambridge, MA: MIT.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blackwelder, B. (2007). Nanotechnology jumps the gun: Nanoparticles in consumer products. In M. Nigel, S. de Cameron & M. E. Mitchell (Eds.), Nanoscale (p. 71). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Bottoms, A. E., & Brownsword, R. (1982). The dangerousness debate after the Floud report. British Journal of Criminology, 22, 229–254.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bottoms, A. E., & Brownsword, R. (1983). Dangerousness and rights. In J. Hinton (Ed.), Dangerousness: Problems of assessment and prediction (pp. 9–22). London: Allen and Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownsword, R. (2004). The cult of consent: Fixation and fallacy. King’s College Law Journal, 15, 223.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownsword, R. (2005a). Biotechnology and rights: Where are we coming from and where are we going? In M. Klang & A. Murray (Eds.), Human rights in the digital age (p. 219). London: Cavendish.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownsword, R. (2005b). Making people better and making better people: Bioethics and the regulation of stem cell research. Journal of Academic Legal Studies, 1, 3.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownsword, R. (2006). Cloning, zoning and the harm principle. In S. A. M. McLean (Ed.), First do no harm (p. 527). Aldershot: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownsword, R. (2007a). Ethical pluralism and the regulation of modern biotechnology. In F. Francioni (Ed.), The impact of biotechnologies on human rights (p. 45). Oxford: Hart.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownsword, R. (2007b). The ancillary care responsibilities of researchers: Reasonable but not great expectations. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 35, 679–691.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownsword, R. (2008a). Rights, regulation and the technological revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Brownsword, R. (2008b). Regulating nanomedicine—the smallest of our concerns? Nanoethics, 2, 73–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brownsword, R. (2009). Regulating nanotechnologies: A matter of some uncertainty. Politeia (in press)

  • Davies, J. C. (2006). Managing the effects of nanotechnology. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/docs/Effectsnanotechfinal.pdf (last visited August 30, 2007).

    Google Scholar 

  • Deibert, R. J., & Villeneuve, N. (2005). Firewalls and power: An overview of global state censorship of the Internet. M. Klang & A. Murray (Eds.), Human rights in the digital age (p. 111). London: Cavendish.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dorbeck-Jung, B. (2008). How can hybrid nanomedical products regulation cope with wicked governability problems? Presented at the TILT “Tilting Perspectives on Regulating Technologies” Conference, University of Tilburg, December 10 and 11, 2008 (on file with author).

  • Dupuy, J.-P. (2007). Complexity and uncertainty: A prudential approach to nanotechnology. In F. Allhoff, P. Lin, J. Moor & J. Weckert (Eds.), Nanoethics, Ch. 9 (p. 119). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European Commission (2007). Opinion on the ethical aspects of nanomedicine (Opinion No 21).

  • Farrelly, C. (2007). Deliberative democracy and nanotechnology. In F. Allhoff, P. Lin, J. Moor & J. Weckert (Eds.), Nanoethics (pp. 215–216). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gewirth, A. (1978). Reason and morality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gewirth, A. (1996). Community of rights. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldsmith, J. (1998). Against cyberanarchy. University of Chicago Law Review, 65, 1199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guerra, G. (2008). European regulatory issues in nanomedicine. Nanoethics, 2, 87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harris, J. (2007). Enhancing evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart, H. L. A. (1973). Bentham on legal rights. In A. W. B. Simpson (Ed.), Oxford essays in jurisprudence (second series) (p. 171). Oxford: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holm, S. (2005). Does nanotechnology require a new ‘nanoethics’?. Wales: CCELS.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, D. R., & Post, D. (1996). Law and borders—the rise of law in cyberspace. Stanford Law Review, 48, 1367.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klang, M. & Murray, A. (Eds.) (2005). Human rights in the digital age. London: Cavendish.

  • Lessig, L. (2001). The future of ideas. New York: Vintage Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lessig, L. (2006). Code Version 2.0. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lin, A. C. (2007). Size matters: Regulating nanotechnology. Harvard Environmental Law Review, 31, 349. at 361–374.

    Google Scholar 

  • MacCormick, D. N. (1977). Rights in legislation. In P. M. S. Hacker & J. Raz (Eds.), Law, morality, and society (p. 189). Oxford: Clarendon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mandel, G. N. (2008). Nanotechnology governance. Alabama Law Review, 59, 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • Manson, N. C., & O’Neill, O. (2007). Rethinking informed consent in bioethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marchant, G. E., & Sylvester, D. J. (2006). Transnational models for regulation of nanotechnology. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 34, 714–725.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McHale, J. V. (2008). Nanomedicine—small particles, big issues: A new regulatory dawn for health care law and bioethics? In M. Freeman (Ed.), Law and bioethics (p. 376). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Moor, J. H. (2008). Why we need better ethics for emerging technologies. In J. van den Hoven & J. Weckert (Eds.), Information technology and moral philosophy (pp. 26–39). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • NCB. (1999). Genetically modified crops: The ethical and social issues (p. 162). London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noah, L. (2000). Rewarding regulatory compliance: The pursuit of symmetry in products liability. Georgetown Law Journal, 88, 2147.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Neill, O. (2003). Some limits of informed consent. Journal of Medical Ethics, 29, 6.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Phelps, T. A. (2007). The European approach to nanoregulation. In M. Nigel, S. de Cameron & M. E. Mitchell (Eds.), Nanoscale (p. 189). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • RCEP. (2008). Novel materials in the environment: The case of nanotechnology. London: Royal Commission on Environmental Protection.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reidenberg, J. R. (1998). Lex Informatica: The formulation of information policy rules through technology. Texas Law Review, 76, 553.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reidenberg, J. R. (2005). Technology and Internet jurisdiction. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 153, 1951.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sandel, M. (2007). The case against perfection. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandler, R., & Kay, W. D. (2006). The national nanotechnology initiative and the social good. Journal of Law Medicine, and Ethics, 34, 675.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spinello, R. A. (2006). Cyberethics: Morality and law in cyberspace (3rd ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stewart, R. B. (2002). Environmental regulatory decision making under uncertainty. In T. Swanson (Ed.), An introduction to the law and economics of environmental policy: Issues in institutional design (p. 71). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Sunstein, C. (2005). Laws of fear. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ten Have, H. (2006). UNESCO and Ethics of Science and Technology. In UNESCO (Ed.), Ethics of science and technology: Explorations of the frontiers of science and ethics, 5–16, at 6. Paris: UNESCO.

    Google Scholar 

  • van Calster, G., & Bowman, D. (2008). Sufficient or deficient? A review of the adequacy of current EU legislative instruments for regulating nanotechnologies across three industry sectors. Presented at the TILT “Tilting Perspectives on Regulating Technologies” conference, University of Tilburg, December 10 and 11, 2008 (on file with author).

  • van den Daele, W. (2007). Legal framework and political strategy in dealing with the risks of new technology: The two faces of the precautionary principle. In H. Somsen (Ed.), The regulatory challenge of biotechnology (p. 118). Cheltenham: Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • van den Hoven, J. (2007). Nanotechnology and privacy: Instructive case of RFID. In F. Allhoff, P. Lin, J. Moor & J. Weckert (Eds.), Nanoethics (p. 253). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wardak, A., & Gorman, M. E. (2006). Using trading zones and life cycle analysis to understand nanotechnology regulation. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 34, 695.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weckert, J., & Moor, J. (2007). The precautionary principle in nanotechnology. In F. Allhoff, P. Lin, J. Moor & J. Weckert (Eds.), Nanoethics, Ch. 10. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, R. F. (2006). Nanotechnology: The challenge of regulating known unknowns. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 34, 704–713.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yusuf, A. A. (2007). UNESCO standard-setting activities on bioethics: Speak softly and carry a big stick. In F. Francioni (Ed.), Biotechnologies and international human rights (p. 85). Oxford: Hart.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. King’s College London, London, UK

    Roger Brownsword

Authors
  1. Roger Brownsword
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Roger Brownsword.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Brownsword, R. Nanoethics: Old Wine, New Bottles?. J Consum Policy 32, 355–379 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10603-009-9100-2

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10603-009-9100-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation