Abstract
This paper generalises classical revision theory of the AGM brand to sets of norms. This is achieved substituting input/output logic for classical logic and tracking the changes. Operations of derogation and amendment—analogues of contraction and revision—are defined and characterised, and the precise relationship between contraction and derogation, on the one hand, and derogation and amendment on the other, is established. It is argued that the notion of derogation, in particular, is a very important analytical tool, and that even core deontic concepts such as that of permission resists a satisfactory analysis without it. By way of illustration the last section of the paper analyses the much debated concept of positive permission, of which there turns out to be more than one kind.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The inference from (a, f) to \((t, \neg a)\) is not, however, licensed by any of the input/output systems currently on offer.
Proofs of the lemmas and theorems in this subsection—they are all very easy—can be found in Stolpe (2008a).
The failure of the global version of recovery for contraction of input/output systems was noted in Boella et al. (2009). The authors do not offer an alternative, however.
Having said that, I shall resort to the use of D-Relevance in the characterisation of revision of sets of norms in Sect. 6, since a better representation of the revision operation has not been forthcoming.
References
Alchourrón CE, Bulygin E (1971) Normative systems. Volume 5 of Library of exact philosophy. Springer
Alchourron CE, Bulygin E (1981) The expressive conception of norms. In: Hilpinen R (ed) New studies in deontic logic. D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht
Alchourron C, Makinson D (1981) Hierarchies of regulations and their logic. In: Hilpinen R (ed) New studies in deontic logic. D Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht
Alchourron CE, Makinson D (1982) On the logic of theory change: contraction functions and their associated revision functions. Theoria 48:14–37
Alchourron CE, Gärdenfors P, Makinson D (1985) On the logic of theory change: partial meet contraction and revision functions. J Symbolic Log 50(2):510–530
Bochman A (2001) A logical theory of nonmonotonic inference and belief change. Springer, Berlin
Boella G, van der Torre L, Verhagen H (2006) Introduction to normative multiagent systems. Comput Math Organ Theory 12:71–79
Boella G, Pigozzi G, van der Torre L (2009) Normative framework for normative system change. In: Proceedings of the 8th international conference on autonomous agents and multiagent systems 1:169–176
Carmo J, Jones AJI (2002) Deontic logic and contrary-to-duties. In: Gabbay D, Guenthner F (eds) Handbook of philosophical logic, vol 8. Kluwer, Netherlands
Davey BA, Priestley HA (2002) Introduction to lattices and order. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Dubislav W (1937) Zur Unbegründbarkeit der Forederungsätze. Theoria 3:330–342
Fuhrmann A (1991) Theory contraction through base contraction. J Philos Log 20(2):175–203
Fuhrmann A, Hansson SO (1994) A survey of multiple contractions. J Log Lang Inform 3(1):39–75
Fuhrmann A (1997) An essay on contraction. CSLI Publications, CA
Governatori G, Rotolo A, Sartor G (2005) Temporalised normative positions in defeasible logic. In: Proceedings of the 10th international conference on artificial intelligence and law, pp. 25–34
Governatori G, Rotolo A, Riveret R, Palmirani M, Sartor G (2007) Variants of temporal defeasible logic for modelling norm modifications. In: Proceedings of the 11th international conference on artificial intelligence and law, pp. 155–159
Governatori G, Rotolo A (2008) Changing legal systems: legal abrogations and annulments in defeasible logic. Log J IGPL 18(1):157–194
Gärdenfors P (1988) Knowledge in flux. MIT Press, Cambridge
Gärdenfors P, Rott H (1995) Belief revision. In: Gabbay DM, Hogger CJ, Robinson JA (eds) Handbook of logic in artifcial intelligence and logic programming, volume IV. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 35–132
Hansen J (2004) Conflicting imperatives and dyadic deontic logic. In: 7th international workshop on deontic logic in computer science, Springer
Hansson SO (1991) Belief revision without recovery. Studia Log 50:251–260
Hansson SO (1993) Reversing the Levi identity. J Philos Log 22(6):637–669
Hansson SO (1999) A Textbook of Belief Dynamics: Theory Change and Database Updating. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands
Harper WL (1976a) Ramsey test conditionals and iterated belief change. In: Harper WL, Hooker CA (eds) Foundations of probability theory, statistical inference, and statistical theories of sciences. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp 117–135
Harper WL (1976b) Rational conceptual change. PSA 2:462–494
Hilpinen R (2001) Deontic logc. In: Lou G (eds) The Blackwell guide to philosophical logic. Blackwell, Oxford
Jørgensen J (1937) Imperatives and logic. Erkenntnis 7:288–296
Kelsen H (1967) Pure theory of law. Translation from the second (revised and enlarged edition) by Max Knight. University of California press, CA
Kelsen H (1991) General theory of norms. Clarendon press, op. post, Oxford
Shafer-Landau R (2003) Moral realism: a defence. Clarendon press, Oxford
Levi I (1977) Subjunctives, dipositions and chances. Synthese 34:423–455
Levi I (1991) The fixation of belief and its undoing. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Makinson D (1987) On the status of the postulate of recovery in the logic of theory change. J Philos Log 16:383–394
Makinson D (1999) On a fundamental problem of deontic logic. In: McNamara P, Prakken H (eds) Norms, logics and information systems. New studies in deontic logic and computer science. IOS Press, Amsterdam, pp 29–53
Makinson DC (2003) Bridges from classical to nonmonotonic Logic. Texts in computing vol 5. King’s college press 2005
Makinson D, Gärdenfors P (1988) Revision of knowledge systems and epistemic entrenchment. In: Vardi M (ed) Proceedings of the second conference on theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Morgan Kaufmann, lk, pp 83–95
Makinson DC, Gärdenfors P (1991) Relations between the logic of theory change and nonmonotonic logic. In: Fuhrmann, Morreu (eds) The logic of theory change, Springer, pp 185–205
Makinson D, van der Torre L (2000) Input/output logics. J Philos Log 29:383–408
Makinson D, van der Torre L (2001) Constraints for input/output logics. J Philos Log 30:155–185
Makinson D, van der Torre L (2003) What is input/output logic. Foundations of the formal sciences II: Applications of mathematical logic in philosophy and linguistics 17:163–174
Makinson D, van der Torre L (2003) Permission from an input/output perspective. J Philos Log 32:391–416
Nebel B (1992) Syntax-based approaches to belief -revision. In: Gärdenfors P (eds) Belief revisison. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 52–88
Prakken H (1997) Logical tools for modelling legal argument: a study of defeasible reasoning in law. Kluwer, Dodrecht
Prakken H, Sartor G (1997) Argument-based logic programming with defeasible priorities. J Appl Non-classical Log 7:25–75
Ross A (1968) Directives and norms. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
Rott H (1992) Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment. J Log Lang Inform 1:45–78
Segerberg K (2009) Blueprint for a dynamic deontic logic. J Appl Log 7(4)
Stolpe A (2008a) Norms and norm-system dynamics. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen, Norway
Stolpe A (2008b) Normative consequence: the problem of keeping it whilst giving it up. In: Proceedings of DEON08, Springer
Stolpe A (2010) A theory of permission based on the notion of derogation. J Appl Log 8:97–113
Stolpe A (2010) Relevance, derogation and permission. In: Proceedings of DEON 2010. Springer
Vranas PBM (2008) New foundations for imperative logic II. Nôus 42(4):529–572
Vranes E (2006) The definition of ‘norm conflict’ in international law and legal theory. J Int Law 17(2)
Weinberger O (1985) The expressive conception of norms—an impasse for the logic of norms. Law Philos 4(2):165–198
Weitzner DJ, Abelson H, Berners-Lee T, Feigenbaum J, Hendler J, Sussman GJ (2008) Information accountability. Commun ACM 51(6)
Williams M-A, Rott H (eds) (2001) Frontiers in belief revision, vol 22 of Applied logic series. Kluwer Academic Publishers
von Wright GH (1963) Norm and action. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London
von Wright GH (1998) Is and ought. In: Normativity and norms. Clarendon press, Oxford
von Wright GH (1999) Deontic logic—as I see it. In: McNamara P, Prakken H (eds) Norms, logics and information systems. IOS, Amsterdam
Acknowledgments
This work was partially funded by the Semicolon project supported by the Norwegian Research Council, contract no. 183260.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendix
Appendix
1.1 Proof of theorem 8
Proof
We need to show that any operation ‘–’ satisfying the listed properties coincides with a partial meet derogation operation. That is, we need to show the existence of a selection function δ such that
We construct the selection function δ, using a familiar technique, as follows:
We need to show, first of all, that δ is well-defined and that it is a selection function: Well-definedness. Starting with well-definedness we need to show that \(\delta(out(G)\perp(a, b)) = \delta(out(G)\perp(c, d))\) whenever \(out(G)\perp(a, b) = out(G)\perp(c, d)\). So assume that \(out(G)\perp(a, b) = out(G)\perp (c, d)\).
In the limiting case that \(out(G)\perp(a, b) = \emptyset = out(G)\perp(c, d)\), we have \(\delta(out(G)\perp(a, b)) = \{out(G)\} = \delta(out(G)\perp(c, d))\), by the first case of the definition of δ, so we may assume that \(out(G)\perp(a, b) \neq \emptyset \neq out(G)\perp(c, d)\).
Proceeding on that assumption, we we turn to the case where either (a, b) or (c, d), say wlog. (a, b), is not in out(G). Then \(out(G)\perp (a, b) = \{out(G)\}\), whence \(out(G)\perp (c, d) = \{out(G)\}\) as well. Hence, it suffices to show that \(\delta(out(G)\perp (g, h))\neq \emptyset\) for any (g, h) whenever \(out(G)\perp (g, h)\neq \emptyset\). The proof splits into two cases:
-
1.
Suppose \((g, h)\notin out(G)\), then \(out(G)\subseteq out(G)-(g, h)\) by D-Vacuity. Hence \(out(G)\in \delta(out(G)\perp(g, h))\) by the second case of the definition of δ, and we are done.
-
2.
Suppose on the contrary that (g, h) ∈ out(G). Since we are assuming that \(out(G)\perp (g, h)\) is non-empty it follows that \(\nvdash h\) by the properties of out-entailment. By D-Success, therefore, it follows that \((g, h)\notin out(G)-(g, h)\), whence, by D-inclusion and lemma 8, out(G) − (g, h) can be expanded to a subset F of out(G) such that maximally \((g, h)\notin out(F)\). It follows that \(F\in out(G)\perp(g, h)\) and since \(out(G)-(g, h)\subseteq F\) we also have \(F\in \delta(out(G)\perp(g, h))\). Hence \(\delta(out(G)\perp(a, b))= \delta(out(G)\perp(c, d))\) as desired.
This completes the limiting cases. \(\square\)
Now, for the principal case where \(out(G)\perp(a, b) = out(G)\perp (c, d) \neq \emptyset \) and (a, b), (c, d) ∈ out(G), note that \(F\in \delta(out(G)\perp(a, b))\) implies \(out(G)-(a, b)\subseteq F\) by the second case of the definition of δ. Since \(out(G)\perp(a, b) = out(G)\perp(c, d)\) and (a, b), (c, d) ∈ out(G) it follows, by lemma 13 that out((a, b)) = out((c, d)), whence out(G) − (a, b) = out(G) − (c, d) by D-Extensionality. Hence \(out(G)-(c, d) \subseteq F\), so \(F\in \delta(out(G)\perp(c, d))\) by the definition of δ. Therefore \(\delta(out(G)\perp(a, b))\subseteq \delta(out(G)\perp(c, d))\). The other direction is similar so δ is well-defined.
δ is a selection function. To prove that δ is a selection function in the sense of definition 3, we need to show that \(\emptyset \subset \delta(out(G)\perp(a, b))\subseteq out(G)\perp(a, b)\) whenever \(out(G)\perp(a, b)\neq \emptyset\), and that \(\delta(out(G)\perp(a, b)) = \{out(G)\}\) otherwise. The is immediate from the first case of the definition of δ. For \(\emptyset\subseteq \delta(out(G)\perp(a, b))\) we have already shown that this holds whenever \(out(G)\perp (g, h)\neq \emptyset\). The remaining case where \(out(G)\perp (g, h) = \emptyset\) is again immediate from the first case of the definition of δ. It only remains to show therefore, that \(\delta(out(G)\perp(a, b))\subseteq out(G)\perp(a, b)\), which is immediate from the second case of the definition of δ.
For\({\bf out(G) - (a, b)} = \varvec{\bigcap\delta }{\bf (out(G)}\varvec{\perp} ({\bf a, b})).\) Finally, we need to show that \(out(G) - (a, b) = \bigcap\delta (out(G)\perp(a, b))\). There are two cases to consider:
-
(a)
Suppose \(out(G)\perp(a, b) = \emptyset\): Then \(\bigcap\delta(out(G)\perp(a, b)) = out(G)\), by the definition of δ, whence \(out(G)-(a, b) \subseteq out(G) = \bigcap\delta(out(G)\perp(a, b))\) by D-Inclusion. For the converse inclusion, note that \(out(G)\perp(a, b) = \emptyset\) implies \(\vdash b\). Hence out(G) − (a, b) = out(G) by D-Failure, and therefore \(\bigcap\delta (out(G)\perp(a, b)) = out(G) \subseteq out(G)-(a, b)\) as desired.
-
(b)
Suppose \(out(G)\perp(a, b) \neq \emptyset\): Since \(F\in \delta (out(G)\perp(a, b)) \; iff\; F\in out(G)\perp(a, b)\) and \(out(G)-(a, b)\subseteq F\), the inclusion \(out(G)-(a, b) \subseteq \bigcap\delta(out(G)\perp(a, b))\) follows immediately from the second case of the definition of δ. For the converse inclusion suppose \((c, d)\in out(G)\setminus out(G)-(a, b)\). We need to find an \(F\in \delta (out(G)\perp(a, b))\) such that \((c, d)\notin F\). Since \((c, d)\in out(G)\setminus out(G)-(a, b)\), we have \(a\vdash c\) by Input Dependence, whence \((c, d) \in out((out(G)- (a, b))\cup (c, b))\), by Local Recovery. From lemma 4 it follows that (c, b→d) ∈ out(G) − (a, b). By SI and D-Closure, therefore, we have (a, b→d) ∈ out(G) − (a, b), whence \((a, \neg b\rightarrow d)\notin out(G)-(a, b)\) by another application of D-Closure together with AND.Therefore \((a, b\vee d)\notin out(G)-(a, b)\) by WO, whence out(G) − (a, b) can be extended to a set \(F\in out(G)\perp (a, b\vee d)\) by lemma 8. Since \(F\in out(G)\perp (a, b \vee d)\) we have \((a, b\vee d)\notin F\), whence \((a, d)\notin F\) by WO and \((c, d)\notin F\) by SI. Moreover, since \((a, b\vee d)\notin F\) we also have \((a, b)\notin F\), again by WO, so \(F\in out(G)\perp (a, b)\) by lemma 10. Taking stock we have \(F\in out(G)\perp (a, b)\) and \((c, d)\notin F\), so the proof is complete.
This completes the proof.
1.2 Proof of theorem 12
Proof: It suffices to find a partial meet derogation operation which yields \(\dotplus\) via the Levi identity. Let δ be defined as follows:
We need to check that δ is a selection function and that it is well-defined:
Well-definedness. We need to show that \(\delta(out(G)\perp(a, b)) = \delta(out(G)\perp(c, d))\) whenever \(out(G)\perp(a, b) = out(G)\perp(c, d)\). All the limiting cases are similar to theorem 8. For the principal case where \(out(G)\perp (a, b)\neq \emptyset\) and (a, b), (c, d) ∈ out(G) we reason as follows: Since \(out(G)\perp(a, b) = out(G)\perp(c, d)\), we have out((a, b)) = out((c, d)) by lemma 13. Moreover, since \(out(G)\perp(a, b)\neq \emptyset\) we also have \(\nvdash b\), whence a≡c by lemma 1. By A-Extensionality it follows that \(out(G)\dotplus (a, b) = out(G)\dotplus (c, d)\), so \(\delta(out(G)\perp(a, b)) = \delta(out(G)\perp(c, d))\) as desired.
\(\varvec{\delta}\)is a selection function. To show that δ is a selection function, it suffices to show that \(\delta(out(G)\perp(a, \neg b))\neq \emptyset\), whenever \(out(G)\perp(a, \neg b)\neq \emptyset\), since, as is easy to check, all other cases are similar to theorem 8. In other words, we need to show, on the assumption that \(\delta(out(G)\perp(a, \neg b))\neq \emptyset\), that there is an \(F\in out(G)\perp (a, \neg b)\) such that \((out(G)\dotplus(a, b))\cap out(G)\subseteq F\). Clearly \((out(G)\dotplus(a, b))\cap out(G)\subseteq out(G)\), so it suffices to show that \((a, \neg b)\notin out(G)\dotplus(a, b)\), because then \((a, \neg b)\notin (out(G)\dotplus(a, b))\cap out(G)\) so this set can be extended to an \(F\in out(G)\perp (a, \neg b)\) by lemma 8. Suppose for reductio ad absurdum that \((a, \neg b)\in out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\). Then since \((a, b)\in out(G)\dotplus(a, b)\) by A-Success it follows that \((a, f)\in out(G)\dotplus(a, b)\) by AND. By A-Consistency therefore \(b\vdash f\) whence \(\vdash\neg b\). But then \(out(G)\perp(a, \neg b) = \emptyset\) contrary to assumption.
Finally we verify the identity
As a mnemonic device put;
We thus need to prove that \(out(G)\dotplus_\delta (a, b) = out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\). We split the proof into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive cases:
-
(a)
Suppose b is inconsistent: Then we have \(\vdash \neg b\), so \(\bigcap\delta(out(G)\perp(a, \neg b)) = out(G)\) whence \(out(G)\dotplus_\delta (a, b) = out(G\cup (a, b))\) by the definition of \(\dotplus_\delta\). It suffices to show, therefore, that \(out(G\cup (a, b)) = out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\). The right-in-left is is just A-Inclusion. For the converse we need only show that \(out(G) \subseteq out(G)\dotplus(a, b)\), since we then have \(out(G)\cup (a, b) \subseteq out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\) by A-Success, whence \(out(out(G)\cup (a, b)) \subseteq out(out(G)\dotplus (a, b))\), by monotony for out, so \(out(G\cup (a, b)) \subseteq out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\) by the closure properties of the out operator together with A-Closure. Now, by general set-theory \(out(G)\subseteq out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\) whenever \(out(G)\setminus out(G)\dotplus (a, b) = \emptyset\), so it suffices to show the latter. Suppose for reduction that \((c, d)\in out(G)\setminus out(G)\dotplus(a, b)\). Then, by A-Relevance there is an \(F\subseteq out(G)\) such that \((a, \neg b)\notin out(F)\). However b is inconsistent so \(\vdash \neg b\) contradicting \((a, \neg b)\notin out(F)\). Therefore \(out(G)\setminus out(G)\dotplus (a, b) = \emptyset\), which completes the case.
-
(b)
In the principal case where b is consistent we argue for each direction of the desired identity separately:
-
[\(\Rightarrow\)]: We wish to prove that \(out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\subseteq out(G)\dotplus_\delta(a, b)\). By the definition of δ we have \(out(G)\cap (out(G)\dotplus (a, b))\subseteq \bigcap\delta (out(G)\perp (a, \neg b))\), from which it follows that \((out(G)\cap (out(G)\dotplus (a, b)))\cup (a, b) \subseteq \bigcap\delta (out(G)\perp (a, \neg b))\cup (a, b)\). By monotony for out, therefore, we have \(out((out(G)\cap (out(G)\dotplus (a, b)))\cup (a, b)) \subseteq out(\bigcap\delta (out(G)\perp (a, \neg b))\cup (a, b))\), which, by the definition of \(out(G)\dotplus_\delta (a, b)\) implies \(out((out(G)\cap (out(G)\dotplus (a, b)))\cup (a, b)) \subseteq out(G)\dotplus_\delta (a, b)\). By lemma 18 it thus follows that \(out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\subseteq out(G)\dotplus_\delta (a, b)\), as desired.
-
[\(\Leftarrow\)]: We wish to show that \(out(G)\dotplus_\delta (a, b) \subseteq out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\), that is, we want to show that \(out(\bigcap\delta (out(G)\perp(a, \neg b))\cup (a, b))\subseteq out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\). By monotony for out and A-Closure it suffices to demonstrate that \(\bigcap\delta (out(G)\perp (a, \neg b))\cup (a, b)\subseteq out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\). Now, \((a, b)\in out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\), by A-Success, so we need only show that \(\bigcap\delta (out(G)\perp(a, \neg b))\subseteq out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\). The argument proceeds by contraposition: Suppose \((c, d)\notin out(G)\dotplus (a, b)\). In the limiting case where \((c, d)\notin out(G)\) we have \((c, d)\notin \bigcap\delta (out(G)\perp(a, \neg b)) \subseteq out(G)\) so we are done. So, suppose (c, d) ∈ out(G). Then \((c, d)\in out(G)\setminus out(G)\dotplus (a, b) \). By A-Relevance there is an F such that
-
1.
\(out(G)\cap (out(G)\dotplus (a, b))\subseteq F\subseteq out(G)\)
-
2.
\((a, \neg b)\notin out(F)\), and
-
3.
\((a, \neg b)\in out(F\cup (c, d))\).
By condition 1 and 2 and lemma 8 it follows that F can be extended to an \(F'\in out(G)\perp(a, \neg b)\). By condition 3 it follows that \((c, d)\notin F'\), and by 1 again it follows that \(out(G)\cap (out(G)\dotplus(a, b))\subseteq F'\). Hence, \(F'\in \delta(G\perp (a, \neg b))\), whence \((c, d)\notin \bigcap\delta(out(G)\perp(a, \neg b)) = out(G)\dotplus_\delta(a, b)\) as desired.
-
1.
-
This completes the proof.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Stolpe, A. Norm-system revision: theory and application. Artif Intell Law 18, 247–283 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-010-9097-5
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-010-9097-5