Abstract
We develop and test hypotheses derived from a multi-level theoretical framework for understanding factors shaping the credit risk and capital structure of a quintessentially Asian form of investment known as project finance. It differs from other corporate financing approaches. A project company is separate and bankruptcy remote from the investing firm sponsors that create it. The project company relies extensively on debt capital provided by creditors to fund project operations. Creditors provide more (less) debt as a percentage of overall project capital when there is less (more) risk of project failure and non-repayment. We define a target risk framework identifying country-, industry-, syndicate-, firm-, and project-related factors shaping Asian project finance company credit risk and thus, project debt. In a sample of 238 project finance companies announced in 13 Asian countries from 1995–2004, we observe substantial effects on project capital structure with respect to country-level factors linked to institutional and macroeconomic theories, syndicate structure factors linked to agency theory, and lead sponsor experience and project size factors linked to learning and transaction cost theories. We argue that these and other determinants of project finance company credit risk and capital structure in Asia since the mid-1990s anticipate similar relationships now emerging elsewhere around the globe.
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Notes
IB researchers familiar with a classic teaching case of FDI and political risk in a decolonizing Papua New Guinea in the early 1970s, Bougainville Copper Ltd. (Hammond & Allan, 1974), may be surprised to learn that Bougainville Copper was itself a project finance company with the Australian MNC parent, Rio Tinto, as its lead sponsor.
The potential of our Asian empirical setting to inform research in other parts of the world underscores Peng’s (2005) point of how China strategy research has made theoretical contributions to global strategy research.
See, e.g., Brealy and Myers (2006) for an overview of this research.
This agency-based prediction competes with an alternative view also proposed by Esty and Megginson (2003) in the related context of bank lending syndicate size and risk. They conjecture that banks create larger lending syndicates in order to deter strategic default by borrowers, because the larger the syndicate the more expensive it is for borrowers to restructure. We note this alternative prediction but think it less apt in the case of equity-holding syndicates. Here, default concerns do not implicate borrowers, but perhaps, default by third-party service providers. Individually, such default is not likely to result in major project re-structuring. Indeed, it is a common project finance practice to engage alternative third-party service providers on a stand-by basis to fill in the event of non-performance by an active service provider (Finnerty, 1996).
Where project equity is split equally between a foreign and domestic sponsor, we code the observation as 0 indicative of domestic lead sponsorship.
Projects occasionally begin with approximately 100% debt-capitalization. In these cases, the nominal equity sponsor or sponsors are also temporarily substantial project creditors.
Those 13 countries are: Australia, Azerbaijan, Bengladesh, China (PRC), Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, and South Korea.
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We benefited from comments, criticisms and suggestions for revision received from Mike Peng (APJM Editor-in-Chief), Arie Lewin participants at the Fourth Annual AIB/JIBS Conference on Emerging Research Frontiers in International Business in San Diego, November 2006, and an anonymous reviewer. We thank Randy Westgren and the UIUC Center for International Business and Education and Research (CIBER) for generous financial support. All remaining errors are ours.
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Vaaler, P.M., James, B.E. & Aguilera, R.V. Risk and capital structure in Asian project finance. Asia Pacific J Manage 25, 25–50 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-007-9045-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-007-9045-4