Abstract.
We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments. We propose an extension of the so-called uniform rule and show that it is the unique rule satisfying Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, reversibility, and an equal-treatment condition. The resulting rule turns out to be peaks-only and individually rational: the allocation assigned by the rule depends only on the peaks of the preferences, and no agent is worse off than at his individual endowment.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Received: 8 September 1995/Accepted: 30 October 1996
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Klaus, B., Peters, H. & Storcken, T. Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments. Soc Choice Welfare 15, 297–311 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050106
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050106