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Imagining a non-biological machine as a legal person

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Abstract

As non-biological machines come to be designed in ways which exhibit characteristics comparable to human mental states, the manner in which the law treats these entities will become increasingly important both to designers and to society at large. The direct question will become whether, given certain attributes, a non-biological machine could ever be viewed as a “legal person.” In order to begin to understand the ramifications of this question, this paper starts by exploring the distinction between the related concepts of “human,” “person,” and “property.” Once it is understood that person in the legal sense can apply to a non-biological entity such as a corporation, the inquiry then goes on to examine the folk psychology view of intentionality and the concept of autonomy. The conclusion reached is that these two attributes can support the view that a non-biological machine, at least in theory, can be viewed as a legal person.

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Notes

  1. Briefly, a word about terminology; some use the term “non-biological machine” or “artificial intelligence (AI),” others “artilect,” and still others “artifact.” For ease of use and consistency I will use the term “non-biological machine,” except where quoting directly, but any of the others would suffice.

  2. Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

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Acknowledgments

This article is derived from prior papers delivered at a number of conferences held in 2005. The primary papers have appeared in print in Proceedings of the Symposium on Next Generation Approaches to Machine Consciousness sponsored by The Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behavior (SSAISB), and in the AAAI Fall Symposium 2005, Machine Ethics, sponsored by the American Association for Artificial Intelligence. Permission to use those papers is appreciated. Likewise, the comments and suggestions from attendees at those conferences have been helpful in refining the ideas.

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Correspondence to David J. Calverley.

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Calverley, D.J. Imagining a non-biological machine as a legal person. AI & Soc 22, 523–537 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-007-0092-7

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