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Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification

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Abstract

This article compares evolutionary equilibrium notions with solution concepts in rational game theory. Both static and dynamic evolutionary game theory are treated. The methods employed by dynamic theory, so-called “game dynamics”, could be discovered to be relevant for rational game theory also.

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  1. Institut für Statistik und Informatik an der UniversitÄt Wien, Rathausstra\e 19/3, A-1010, Wien, Austria

    Immanuel M. Bomze

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Bomze, I.M. Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification. Int J Game Theory 15, 31–57 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01769275

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