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Possible-world semantics for counterfactual logics: A rejoinder

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References

  1. B. D. Ellis, F. C. Jackson and R. J. Pargetter, ‘An Objection to Possible-World Semantics for Counterfactual Logics’, this issue, pp. 359–363.

  2. B. D. Ellis, ‘Epistemology, Validity and Truth’, presented at the 1976 annual conference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy, Melbourne.

  3. K.Fine, critical notice of Lewis, D., Counterfactuals, Mind 84 (1975) 451–8.

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  4. T. McKay and P. van Inwagen, ‘Counterfactuals with Disjunctive Antecedents’, Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).

  5. D.Lewis, ‘General Semantics’, Synthese 22 (1970) 18–67.

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  6. B.Loewer, ‘Counterfactuals with Disjunctive Antecedents’, Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976) 531–7.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Princeton University, Princeton, USA

    David Lewis

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  1. David Lewis
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Lewis, D. Possible-world semantics for counterfactual logics: A rejoinder. J Philos Logic 6, 359–363 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00262070

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00262070

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