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The pure theory of large two-candidate elections

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Authors
  1. John O. Ledyard
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Additional information

Northwestern University. The research for this paper has been supported by NSF grant SES8106896 which is gratefully acknowledged. The paper itself was prepared for presentation at the Conference on Political Economy at Carnegie-Mellon University in June 1983. Without that incentive it might still be unwritten. I have had the help and advice of many people—some of whom disagree with the conclusions. Among these were the participants in workshops at Cal Tech, Iowa, Tulane, Indiana, Stanford, and Northwestern University. The exacting standards of Howard Rosenthal are responsible for much of whatever quality in presentation exists. I thank him for this help and advice. Peter Coughlin found early lapses. An early version was presented at the Public Choice Society meetings, as my presidential address, in 1981.

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Ledyard, J.O. The pure theory of large two-candidate elections. Public Choice 44, 7–41 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124816

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