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Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

  • Book
  • © 2013

Overview

Authors:
  1. Demet Çetiner

    1. Düsseldorf, Germany

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  • Explains in detail how the operations research methods are applied to a real-life problem as revenue sharing of airline alliances
  • Combines concepts in game theory with OR methods
  • Includes comprehensive surveys on the related subjects
  • Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems (LNE, volume 668)

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Table of contents (9 chapters)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages i-xv
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  2. Introduction

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 1-2

  3. Selected Topics in Revenue Management

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 3-30

  4. A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 31-41

  5. Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 43-72

  6. Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 73-82

  7. Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 83-109

  8. Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 111-132

  9. A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 133-157

  10. Conclusions and Future Research

    • Demet Çetiner
    Pages 159-161

  11. Back Matter

    Pages 163-168
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Keywords

About this book

​A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.

Reviews

From the book reviews:

“The book has nine chapters. … the book is well-written, self-contained, and would be of interest to academics working in this area. … it brings together the theoretical (centralized) allocation approach with the heuristics for the decentralized case … .” (Arne K. Strauss, Interfaces, Vol. 44 (5), September–October, 2014)

Authors and Affiliations

  • Düsseldorf, Germany

    Demet Çetiner

About the author

Demet Çetiner worked as research assistant at the University of
Duisburg-Essen, Germany from 2008-2012. Since 2012 she has worked at the Supply Chain Consulting department of Bayer Technology Services.

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