Modal Empiricism

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xiv

   PDF

2. The Debates on Scientific Realism

   • Quentin Ruyant

   Pages 1-12

3. Theories, Models and Representation

   • Quentin Ruyant

   Pages 13-33

4. Contextual Use and Communal Norms

   • Quentin Ruyant

   Pages 35-72

5. Modal Empirical Adequacy

   • Quentin Ruyant

   Pages 73-110

6. Situated Possibilities, Induction and Necessity

   • Quentin Ruyant

   Pages 111-147

7. Scientific Success

   • Quentin Ruyant

   Pages 149-182

8. Theory Change

   • Quentin Ruyant

   Pages 183-207

9. Semantic Pragmatism

   • Quentin Ruyant

   Pages 209-230

This book proposes a novel position in the debate on scientific realism: Modal Empiricism. Modal empiricism is the view that the aim of science is to provide theories that correctly delimit, in a unified way, the range of experiences that are naturally possible given our position in the world. The view is associated with a pragmatic account of scientific representation and an original notion of situated modalities, together with an inductive epistemology for modalities. It purports to provide a faithful account of scientific practice and of its impressive achievements, and defuses the main motivations for scientific realism. More generally, Modal Empiricism purports to be the precise articulation of a pragmatist stance towards science.

This book is of interest to any philosopher involved in the debate on scientific realism, or interested in how to properly understand the content, aim and achievements of science.

• the scientific realism debate
• situated modalities
• empirical adequacy in theories
• standard induction
• modal empiricism
• the aim of science
• Fraasen's theory
• scientific realism
• synthesis of scientific literaturw
• situated modalities of science

“Ruyant’s book is intricate, dense, and interesting. … I recommend this book for those who want an overview of the literature on models and representation, those who want to learn more about different empiricist positions, particularly alternatives to Constructive Empiricism, and those who (like myself) are greatly interested in the development of scientific metaphysics compatible with empiricism.” (Richard Lauer, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Vol. 54 (4), 2023)

• General Philosophy of Science, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico, Mexico

  Quentin Ruyant

Quentin Ruyant is currently a post-doctoral fellow in Philosophy of Science at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. He obtained his PhD in Philosophy of Science at UCLouvain / Université de Rennes 1. He has been working on scientific realism, structural realism and empiricism, and is currently doing research on the role of modalities in scientific representation.

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