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Game Theory

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The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

Abstract

Game theory concerns the behaviour of decision makers whose decisions affect each other. Its analysis is from a rational rather than a psychological or sociological viewpoint. It is indeed a sort of umbrella theory for the rational side of social science, where ‘social’ is interpreted broadly, to include human as well as non-human players (computers, animals, plants). Its methodologies apply in principle to all interactive situations, especially in economics, political science, evolutionary biology, and computer science. There are also important connections with accounting, statistics, the foundations of mathematics, social psychology, law, business, and branches of philosophy such as epistemology and ethics.

This chapter was originally published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, 2008. Edited by Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume

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    R.J. Aumann

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    Aumann, R. (2008). Game Theory. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_942-2

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    1. Latest

      Game Theory
      Published:
      22 March 2017

      DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_942-2

    2. Original

      Game Theory
      Published:
      10 November 2016

      DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_942-1

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