Abstract
Stalnaker argues that, while the two-dimensional framework can be used to give expression to the claims associated with rigidified descriptivism, it cannot be used to support that position. He also puts forward some objections to rigidified descriptivism. I agree that rigidified descriptivism cannot be supported by appeal to the two-dimensional framework. But I think that Stalnaker's objections can be avoided under a descriptivism that introduces a causal as well as a descriptive element — a descriptivism in which the relevant descriptions are allowed to be, not only rigidified, but anchored in causal exposure to referents.
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Pettit, P. Descriptivism, Rigidified and Anchored. Philosophical Studies 118, 323–338 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019551.74826.f0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PHIL.0000019551.74826.f0