Abstract
The problem of weakness of the will is often thought to arise because ofan assumption that freely, deliberately and intentionally doing something must correspondto the agent's positive evaluation of doing that thing. In contemporary philosophy, a verycommon response to the problem of weakness has been to adopt the view that free, deliberateaction does not need to correspond to any positive evaluation at all. Much of thesupport for this view has come from the difficulties the denial of it has been thought togive rise to, both with respect to giving an account of weakness, as well as explaining thefuture-directed nature of intentions. In this paper I argue that most of these difficulties onlyarise for one particular version of the view that free, deliberate action must correspond toa positive evaluation, a version associated with Donald Davidson's account of weakness.However, another version of this view is possible, and I argue that it escapes the standardobjections to the Davidsonian account.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Bach, L.: 1984, 'Default Reasoning: Jumping to Conclusions and Knowing When to Think Twice', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 65, 33–58.
Bratman, M.: 1979, 'Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will', Nous 155–171.
Bratman, M.: 1985, 'Davidson's Theory of Intention', in LePore and McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events, Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1428 pp.
Bratman, M.: 1999, 'Two Faces of Intention', in Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The Philosophy of Action, Oxford University Press, pp. 15–34.
Charles, D.: 1983, 'Rationality and Irrationality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, pp. 191–212.
Davidson, D.: 1980, 'How IsWeakness of theWill Possible?', Essays on Actions & Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 21–43.
Grice, H. P. and J. Baker: 1985, 'Davidson on Weakness of the Will', in Vermazen and Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson, Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp.27–49.
Grice, H. P.: 2001, in Richard Warner (ed.), Aspects of Reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
McCann, J.: 1998, 'Practical Rationality and Weakness of the Will', The Works of Agency, on Human Action, Will and Freedom, Cornell University Press, pp. 213–233.
Mele, A.: 1987, Irrationality, An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control, Oxford University Press.
Peacocke, C.: 1985: 'Intention and Akrasia', in Vermazen and Hintikka (eds.), Essays on Davidson, Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 51–73.
Pears, D.: 1982, 'Motivated Irrationality', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 56, pp. 155–177.
Pears, D.: 1984, Motivated Irrationality, Oxford University Press.
Taylor, C. C. W.: 1980, 'Plato, Hare and Davidson on Akrasia', Mind LXXXIX, 499–518.
Watson, G.: 1977, 'Scepticism About Weakness of the Will', Philosophical Review 86, 316–339.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Henden, E. Intentions, All-Out Evaluations and Weakness of the Will. Erkenntnis 61, 53–74 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000037506.33652.d3
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000037506.33652.d3