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Twenty-One Arguments against Propensity Analyses of Probability

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I argue that any broadly dispositional analysis of probability will either fail to give an adequate explication of probability, or else will fail to provide an explication that can be gainfully employed elsewhere (for instance, in empirical science or in the regulation of credence). The diversity and number of arguments suggests that there is little prospect of any successful analysis along these lines.

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  1. Antony Eagle
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Eagle, A. Twenty-One Arguments against Propensity Analyses of Probability. Erkenntnis 60, 371–416 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000023408.61887.6a

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