Abstract
This is the second part of a paper dealing with truth and translation. In Part A a revised version of Tarski's Convention T has been presented, which explicitly refers to a translation mapping from the object language to the metalanguage; the vague notion of a translation has been replaced by a precise definition. At the end of Part A it has been shown that interpreted languages exist, which allow for vicious self-reference but which nevertheless contain their own truth predicate – this is possible if truth is based on a nonstandard translation mapping. However, this result has only been proved for languages without quantifiers. In Part B we now extend the result to first-order languages, and we show that this can be done in three different ways. In each case, the addition of a truth predicate to an interpreted language with a high degree of expressiveness leads to changes in the ontology of the language.
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Leitgeb, H. Truth as Translation – Part B. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30, 309–328 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017982316171
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017982316171