Abstract
Research concerning the value of communal resource management is limited in two respects. First, while many studies present evidence that communal management is common among traditional societies, a strong theoretical basis is lacking to explain why individuals participate in monitoring and sanctioning efforts. Second, few studies have actually demonstrated resource conservation. There are several ecological and economic reasons for thinking that groups may find it harder to design appropriate conservation measures than to prevent free-riding. However, if groups can surmount these problems, communal management may have advantages over privatization or government control. These arguments are illustrated using results from a pilot study of the communal management of mother-of-pearl shell (Trochus niloticus) in the Kei Islands of Eastern Indonesia. It is found that villagers successfully cooperate to defend access to, and regulate their own harvest of trochus. In doing so, they are able to prevent free-riding, and to provide themselves with a long-term source of cash income. However, it is here argued that their aim is “gain rather than restraint.”
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Acheson, J. and Wilson, J. (1996). Order out of chaos. The case for parametric fisheries management. American Anthropologist 98(3): 579–594.
Alvard, M. S. (1993). Testing the “ecologically noble savage ” hypothesis: Interspecific prey choice by Piro hunters of Amazonian Peru. Human Ecology 21( 4)au: 355–387.
Alvard, M. S. (1995). Intraspecific prey choice by Amazonian hunters. Current Anthropology 36(5): 789–818.
Andamari, R. Subagiyo, and Talaohu, S. H. (1991). Panen trochus (Trochus niloticus) di desa Nolloth, P. Saparua dengan sistem “sasi.” Jurnal Penelitian Perikanan Laut 60: 31–36.
Anderson, T. L. and Simmons, R. T. (eds.) (1993). The Political Economy of Customs and Culture: Informal Solutions to the Commons Problem. Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Boston.
Axelrod, R. and Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science 211: 1390–1396.
Bailey, C. and Zerner, C. (1992). Community based fisheries management institutions in Indonesia. Maritime Anthropological Studies 5(1): 1–17.
Baines, G. (1982). Traditional conservation practices and environmental management: The international scene. In Morauta, L. Pernetta, J. and Heaney, W. (eds.), Traditional Conservation in Papua New Guineas: Implications for Today. Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, Boroko, Papua New Guinea, pp. 45–58.
Berkes, F. (1989a). Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development. Belhaven Press, London.
Berkes, F. (1989b). Cooperation from the perspective of human ecology. In Berkes, F. (ed.), Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable Development. Belhaven Press, London, pp. 70–88.
Berkes, F. Feeny, D. McCay, B. J. and Acheson, J. M. (1989). The benefits of the commons. Nature 340: 91–93.
Boyd, R. and Lorberbaum, J. (1989). No pure strategy is evolutionarily stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Nature 327: 58–59.
Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (1985). Culture and the Evolutionary Process. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (1992). Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else ) in sizable groups. Ethology and Sociobiology 13: 171–195.
Brown, J. L. (1964). The evolution of diversity in avian territorial systems. Wilson Bulletin 76: 160–169.
Bulmer, R. N. H. (1982). Traditional conservation practices in Papua New Guinea. In Traditional Conservation in Papua New Guinea: Implications for Today. Morauta, L. Pernetta, J. and Heaney, W. (eds.) , Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, Boroko, Papua New Guinea, pp. 59–78.
Carrier, J. (1982). Conservation and conceptions of the environment: A Manus case study. In Morauta, L. Pernetta, J. and Heaney, W. (eds.), Traditional Conservation in Papua New Guinea: Implications for Today. Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, Boroko, Papua New Guinea, pp. 39–44.
Carrier, J. (1987). Marine tenure and conservation in Papua New Guinea: Problems in interpretation. In McCay, B. J. and Acheson, J. M. (eds.), The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. University of Arizona Press, Tucson, AZ, pp. 142–170.
Christy, F. T. Jr. (1969). Fisheries goals and the rights of property. Transactions of the American Fisheries Society 2: 369–378.
Clark, C. W. (1973). The economics of overexploitation. Science {vn181}: 630–634.
Clark, C. W. and Mangel, M. (1984). Foraging and flocking strategies: Information in an uncertain environment. American Naturalist 123: 626–641.
Dugatkin, L. A. Messerton-Gibbons, M. and Houston, A. I. (1992). Beyond the prisoner's dilemma: toward mode ls to discriminate among mechanisms of cooperation in nature. Trends in Ecology and Evolution 7(6): 202–205.
Dyson-Hudson, R. and Smith, E. A. (1978). Human territoriality: An ecological reassessment. American Anthropologist 80: 21–41.
Eggertson, T. (1993). Analyzing institutional successes and failures: A millennium of common mountain pastures in Ice land. In Anderson, T. L. and Simmons, R. T. (eds.), The Political Economy of Customs and Culture: Informal Solutions to the Commons Problem. Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Boston, pp. 109–126.
Feeney, D. Berkes, F. McCay, B. J. and Acheson, J. M. (1990). The tragedy of the commons: Twenty-two years after. Human Ecology 18: 1–19.
Feeny, D. Hannah, S. and McEvoy, A. (1996). Questioning the assumptions of the “tragedy of the commons ” model of fisheries. Land Economics 72(2): 187–205.
Hames, R. (1987). Game conservation or efficient hunting. In McCay, B. J. and Acheson, J. M. (eds.), The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. University of Arizona Press, Tucson, AZ, pp. 92–107.
Hames, R. (1990). Sharing among the Yanomamo: Part I, The effects of risk. In Cashdan, E. (ed.), Risk and Uncertainty in Tribal and Peasant Economies. Westview Press, Boulder, CO, pp. 89–106.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behavior I. Journal of Theoretical Biology 7: 1–16.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science 162: 1243–1248.
Harris, M. (1979). Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture. Random House, New York.
Hechter, M. Opp, K.-D. and Wippler, R. (1990). Introduction. In Hecter, M. Opp, K.-D. and Wippler, R. (eds.), Social Institutions: Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects. Aldine de Gruyter, New York.
Hooper, A. (1989). Tokelau fishing in traditional and modern contexts. In Ruddle, K. and Johannes, R. E. (eds.), Traditional Marine Resource Managem ent in the Pacific Basin: An Anthology. UNESCO/ROSTSEA, pp. 213–240.
Hunn, E. (1982). Mobility as a factor limiting resource use in the Columbia plateau of North America. In Williams, N. and Hunn, E. (eds.), Resource Managers: North American and Australian Hunter-Gatherers. Westview Press, Boulder, pp. 17–43.
Hviding, E. (1989). Keeping the sea: Aspects of marine tenure in Marovo lagoon, Solomon Islands. In Ruddle, K. and Johannes, R. E. (eds.), Traditional Marine Resource Management in the Pacific Basin: An Anthology. UNESCO/ROSTSEA, Jakarta, Indonesia, pp. 7–44.
Hermy, C. (1983). Gunung Mulu National Park, Sarawak. Oryx 17: 6–14.
Johannes, R. E. (1978). Traditional marine conservation methods in Oceania and their demise. Annual Review of Ecological Systematics 9: 349–364.
Johannes, R. E. (1981). Words of the Lagoon: Fishing and Marine Lore in the Palau District of Micronesia. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA.
Johannes, R. E. and MacFarlane, J. W. (1989). Assessing traditional fishing rights systems in the context of marine resource management: A Torres Strait example. In Ruddle, K. and Johannes, R. E. (eds.), Traditional Marine Resource Manage in the Pacific Basin: An Anthology. UNESCO/ROSTSEA, Jakarta, Indonesia, pp. 241–262.
Kaplan, H. and Hill, K. (1985). Food sharing among Ache foragers: Tests of Explanatory hypotheses. Current Anthropology 26(2): 223–245.
Kay, J. (1985). Native Americans in the fur trade and wildlife depletion. Environmental Review 9: 118–130.
Maynard Smith, J. (1964). Group se lection and kin selection. Nature 201: 1145–1147.
Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
McCay, B. J. (1980). A fishermen's cooperative, limited: Indigenous resource management in a complex society. Anthropological Quarterly 53: 29–38.
McCay, B. J. and Acheson, J. M. (eds.) (1987). The Question of the Commons. The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources. University of Arizona Press, Tucson.
Nelson, R. (1982). A conservation ethic and environment: The Koyukon of Alaska. In Williams, N. and Hunn, E. (eds.), Resource Managers. Westview Press, Boulder, pp. 211–228.
Nowak, M. and Sigmund, K. (1993). A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms titfortat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Nature 364: 56–58.
Olson, M. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups ( first published in 1965). Schocken Books, New York.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Packer, C. and Ruttan, L. M. (1988). The evolution of cooperative hunting. American Naturalist 132: 159–198.
Palmer, C. T. (1991). Kin-selection, reciprocal altruism, and information sharing among Maine lobstermen. Ethology and Sociobiology 12: 221–235.
Peoples, J. G. (1982). Individual or group advantage? A reinterpretation of the Maring ritual cycle. Current Anthropology 23(3): 291–309.
Polunin, N. (1984). Do traditional marine reserves conserve? A view of Indonesia and New Guinean evidence. In Ruddle, K. and Akimichi, T. (eds.), Senri Ethnological Studies (No. 17). National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, pp. 267–283.
Rappaport, R. (1969). Ritual regulation of environmental relations among a New Guinea people. In Vayda, A. P. (ed.), Environment and Cultural Behavior: Ecological Studies in Cultural Anthropology. The Natural History Press, Garden City, NY, pp. 181–201.
Redford, K. (1991). The ecologically noble savage. Orion, 9: 24–29.
Ross, E. (1978). Food taboos, diet and hunting strategy: The adaptation to animals in Amazon cultural ecology. Current Anthropology 19: 1–36.
Ruddle, K. and Akimichi, T. (eds.), (1984). Senri Ethnological Studies (No. 17). National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka.
Ruddle, K. and Johannes, R. E. (eds.) (1989). Traditional Marine Resource Management in the Pacific Basin: An Anthology. UNESCO/ROSTSEA, Jakarta, Indonesia.
Runge, C. F. (1981). Common property exte rnalities: Isolation, assurance, and resource depletion in a traditional grazing context. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63(4): 595–606.
Sethi, R. and Somanathan, E. (1996). The evolution of social norms in common property resource use. The American Economic Review 86(4): 766–788.
Soltis, J. Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J. (1995). Can group-functional behaviors evolve by cultural group selection? Current Anthropology 36(3): 473–494.
Taylor, M. (1992). The economics and politics of property rights and common pool resources. Natural Resource Journal 32: 633–648.
Trivers, R. (1971). The evolution of re ciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology 46: 35–57.
Vehrencamp, S. L. (1983). A mode l for the evolution of despotic versus egalitarian societies. Animal Behavior 31: 667–682.
Wallace, A. R. (1869). The Malay Archipelago: The Land of the Orang-utan and the Bird of Paradise. Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York.
White, T. A. and Runge, C. F. (1995). The emergence and evolution of collective action: Lessons from watershed management in Haiti. World Development 23(10): 1683–1698.
Williams, G. C. (1966). Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Wilson, D. S. (1983). The group selection controversy: History and current status. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 14: 159–187.
Wilson, D. S. and Dugatkin, L. A. (1991). Nepotism vs. tit-for-tat, or why should you be nice to your rotten brother? Evolutionary Ecology 5: 291–299.
Zann, L. P. (1989). Traditional management and conservation of fisheries in Kribati and Tuvalu Atolls. In Ruddle, K. and Johannes, R. E. (eds.), Traditional Marine Resource Management in the Pacific Basin: An Anthology. UNESCO/ROSTSEA, Jakarta, Indonesia.
Zerner, C. (1990). Community management of marine resources in the Maluku Islands. Unpublished manuscript prepared for the Fisheries Research and Development Project. Jakarta, Indonesia.
Zerner, C. (1994). Transforming customary law and coastal management practices in the Maluku Islands, Indonesia, 1870-1992. In Western, D. And Wright, R. M. (eds.), Strum, S. C. (assoc. ed.), Natural Connections: Perspectives in Community-Based Conservation. Island Press, Washington, D.C. pp. 80–112.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Ruttan, L.M. Closing the Commons: Cooperation for Gain or Restraint?. Human Ecology 26, 43–66 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018744816814
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018744816814