Abstract
In this article from 1928, translated here for the first time, Tanabe Hajime examines the concept of self-evidence, mainly in the light of Husserl and Brentano. The author starts out by establishing, through a preliminary analysis of the Cartesian cogito, two criteria for self-evidence, namely adequate fulfillment of the intention of Sosein, and the coextension of Dasein and Sosein (being-there, or existence, and being-such, or essence/properties). He then proceeds to consider four domains of knowledge through the prism of the question of their claim to self-evidence: knowledge of mathematical objects, categorial intuition, the ontological proof for the existence of God and finally, outer perception. Dedicating the last paragraph to a critical assessment of Husserl’s account of perception, the author concludes that all self-evidence is founded on inner perception. Outlining a creative appropriation of phenomenology while elucidating the conditions for certainty, this text constitutes an important milestone in a period leading up to Tanabe’s break with Nishida as well as to his critique of Heidegger, thus laying the groundwork for his independent philosophical stance.
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Notes
Ego: 自我 jiga. The ego or “the I”. For consistency, we have in all instances translated as “ego”. All notes, including bibliographical references, are established by the translators.
Moment: 契機 keiki, i.e., a dialectical rather than temporal moment: das Moment rather than der Moment. (Cf. YAMAUCHI, 2020, p. 52, footnote.)
I.e., intention of being-such, just as, further down, Daseinsmeinen refers to intention of existence. A. Meinong had distinguished between Seinsmeinen (intention of being) and Soseinsmeinen in MEINONG 1910, §§ 45-46.
Free from Dasein: daseinsfreiなる – daseinsfrei naru. Whenever the structure of the sentence does not allow for the direct integration of “daseinsfrei”, we have adopted this translation, conserving the composite German term used by Tanabe in parenthesis. For freedom from existence (Daseinsfreiheit), cf. MEINONG 1907, p. 33 et passim.
Becomes intended: 志向せられる shikō serareru. I.e., becomes the “object” of intentionality.
Intending: 志向すること shikō suru koto. I.e., taking … as object of intentionality.
Cf. BRENTANO 1928, p. 6.
The mediation of the knower’s knowing: 知るものの知る媒介 shiru mono no shiru baikai. Or “the knowing mediation of the knower”.
The intending and the intended: 志向 するものと志向せられるもの shikō suru mono to shikō serareru mono. In other words, the “subject” and “object” of intentionality.
Mediating consciousness of fulfillment: 媒介の充実意識 baikai no jūjitsu ishiki.
Gegenstandstheorie: i.e., Meinong’s object theory. Cf., for instance, TANABE, 1963, p. 26, 105, 235, 278 for Meinong’s object theory.
I.e., character of knowledge.
Axiomatic formalism: 公理主義形式主義 kōrishugi keishikishugi.
I.e., axiomatic formalism, and infra.
Self-evidence of being: 存在の明証 sonzai no meishō.
I.e., a fundamentally erroneous theory. Cf. HUSSERL 1968, p. 139.
Cf. HUSSERL 1968, p. 145.
Representations: 表象 hyōshō, i.e., Vorstellungen. This German term is traditionally translated as “presentation” in the phenomenological literature in English, while Repräsentation (see below) is translated as “representation”; a literal reading of the corresponding Japanese terms used here by Tanabe (respectively 表象 and 表現 hyōgen) obliges us to invert the relationship.
Objectival aspect: 対象的側面 taishō-teki sokumen. Objectival, i.e., pertaining to the object, Gegenstand, rather than “objective” (客観的 kyakkan-teki, i.e. the opposite of “subjective”) – a term which does not appear in this text.
Categorial presentation: 範疇的表現 hanchū-teki hyōgen, corresponding to kategoriale Respräsentation (cf. Husserl 1968, p. 165 et passim.)
Objectness: 対象性 taishôsei. I.e., Gegenständlichkeit or the vis-à-vis that characterizes the object (Gegenstand) as such, rather than objectivity (Objektivität), i.e., independence of the subject.
Direct: 直接的 chokusetsu-teki, generally rendered as “immediate” in this text, but to make the contrast with “indirect” (間接的 kansetsu-teki) clear, we deviate from the rule in this passage.
Unifying direction: 統一的方面 tōitsu-teki hōmen. “Unifying direction” or “unifying aspect”.
Developmental aspect: 発展の方向 hatten no hōkō. “Aspect of development” or “direction of development”.
The most perfect being: 最完全者 saikanzensha. Or, to convey the ontological neutrality of 者: “what is most perfect”. This goes for all mentions of “the perfect being”.
Lived experience: 体験 taiken, which corresponds to the German “Erlebnis”.
Determination: 規定 kitei. Determination or definition (cf. intra., p. [276], [277]). In the few instances where Tanabe uses the term 限定 gentei in the present text, we translate “de-termination”, in order to draw attention to the synonymity with “delimitation”, which distinguishes gentei from kitei.
The meaning which the idea intends: 観念の志向する意味 kannen no shikō suru imi.
Homogenize: 同質化する dōshitsuka suru, i.e., literally, convert them to the same quality (shitsu).
De-termination: 限定 gentei. Cf. note 27 in the above.
Infinite bringing into presence of the representational aspects: 無限の象面の発現 mugen no zōmen no hatsugen. Or, “the bringing into presence of the representational aspects of the infinite”.
I.e., adumbrations.
Cf. HUSSERL 1913, § 143.
Cf. HUSSERL 1913, § 138.
Cf. for instance NATORP 1965, p. 69.
Infinitesimal objectivation: 極微の客観化 kyokubi no kyakkanka.
Bringing to the limit: 極限化 kyokugenka. Or “extremization”, which we favor in the following lines.
存立 sonritsu, i.e., Bestand or bestehen.
Outer perception of the Gestalt as a whole: 全体的形態的外部知覚 zentai-teki keitai-teki gaibu chikaku. For the translation of keitai as “Gestalt”, cf. “On the concept of perception”, in TANABE, 1963, p. 233–239.
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YAMAUCHI 2020: Logos et Lemme. Pensée occidentale, pensée orientale, French translation by A. Berque, CNRS Editions, Paris.
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明証の所在 (meishō no shozai), in TANABE 1963, pp. 273-286. Originally published 1928, in 『哲学雑誌』(tetsugaku zasshi: Journal of Philosophy).
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Jelby, M.E., Urai, S. Tanabe Hajime — “Where self‐evidence resides”. Journal East Asian Philosophy 2, 1–12 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43493-021-00003-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s43493-021-00003-8