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To Surrender or to Fight On? A Human Rights Perspective on Self-Defense

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Abstract

The traditional international law of self-defense provides little indication about how far states should be willing to defend. That choice is better understood as constrained, beyond the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum, by human rights norms that implicate responsibilities of the sovereign vis-à-vis its own population. Different conceptions of human rights, however, underscore different possible theories of the extent of self-defense. The main polarity is between a conception of self-defense as protecting bare life and a conception of self-defense as protecting collective self-determination. In the practice of justifying particular uses of self-defense, these foundations are constantly and dynamically rearticulated to justify fighting on, surrendering, or negotiating. This raises questions about the impact of conditions of uncertainty, different conceptions of agency, and the role of the international community. Ultimately, the article suggests that self-defense radicalizes anxieties about the foundation and finality of rights.

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Notes

  1. Lieblich (2021).

  2. Mégret (2016).

  3. For a rare effort by international lawyers to prod this dimension, see Chinkin and Kaldor (2017).

  4. Rodin (2004); Fabre and Lazar (2014).

  5. Renzo (2018).

  6. Mollendorf (2008).

  7. Fabre (2015).

  8. Rodin (2015).

  9. Dannenbaum (2018).

  10. See Rodin (2014).

  11. Dill (2015).

  12. I draw inspiration, in particular, from Steven Ratner’s work developing a form of non-ideal theory”tailored to international law” (Ratner 2015).

  13. Luban (1980).

  14. On the idea of self-contained regimes in international law, see United States of America v Islamic Republic of Iran [1980] ICJ 1 [40].

  15. On the self-contained character of the UN Charter, including as it relates to the use of force, see Bianchi (2009).

  16. Mégret and Redaelli (2022).

  17. Article 51 of the UN Charter only mentions states’ right of self-defense.

  18. This derives from the cardinal principle of the equality of states and remains very much the position of international law. See Wright (1970). This despite perplexity by cosmopolitan and revisionist Just War Theorists alike.

  19. Mégret and Redaelli (2022).

  20. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons [1996] ICJ 2 [97].

  21. Kasher and Yadlin (2005).

  22. Walzer (2016).

  23. Mégret and Vagliano (2017).

  24. Orend (2013).

  25. The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda (Second decision on the Defence’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9) ICC-01/04–02/06–1707 (4 January 2017).

  26. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (Protocol I) art 58.

  27. As the ICRC notes, it is “in their own interest that States should take such measures.” Pilloud et al. (1987), 692.

  28. Id.

  29. Kretzmer (2013).

  30. Cannizzaro (2006).

  31. Mégret and Redaelli (2022); Mégret and Vagliano (2017).

  32. Abresch (2005).

  33. Schabas (2007).

  34. Lieblich (2021).

  35. May (2008).

  36. McMahan (2004).

  37. HRC ‘General Comment 6: Article 6 (Right to Life)’ (1982) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 at 176, para. 2.

  38. HRC ‘General Comment 36: Article 6 (Right to Life)’ (2019) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36, para. 7.

  39. Id, para. 70.

  40. Id, para. 22.

  41. See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights’ (2010) section V. A. (right to life).

  42. See Osman v UK ECHR 1998-/VIII 3124; Bljakaj and Others v Croatia App no 74448/12 (ECtHR, 18 September 2014), ss 107–111.

  43. For a useful discussion see Todeschini (2016).

  44. Abu-Manneh (2021).

  45. Fabre (2014).

  46. Ingram (1994), 292.

  47. For a classic statement, see Walzer (1977), 254. This is the “analogical” position that sees states as endowed in their own name with a right of self-defense similar to that of individuals.

  48. Philpott (1995).

  49. Jones (2018).

  50. Bazargan-Forward (2017).

  51. Id., 155.

  52. Indeed, whatever doubts are entertained in international law about the scope of self-determination, certainly do not extend to situations where self-determination and sovereignty align. Summers (2005).

  53. Yau (2020).

  54. Ibhawoh (2020).

  55. On whether it even made sense for the ICCPR and the ICESCR to include self-determination as a right, see Jones (2018) (answering in the affirmative).

  56. Weitz (2015).

  57. Sauer (2022).

  58. Wheaton and Phillipson (1916), 87.

  59. Rivier (1896), 277–278.

  60. Simpson (2014).

  61. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217.

  62. Cited in Sbacchi (1997), 379.

  63. Moore (2014), 186.

  64. Rodin (2014), 81.

  65. Fabre (2016), 35.

  66. Fabre (2016), 36.

  67. Lynn (2012).

  68. Statman (2008).

  69. Cited in Stenton (2000), 145.

  70. On the notion of the Vichy regime as the “shield” of the French, see Burrin (1997).

  71. Caron (2018), 80.

  72. Afflerbach (2012).

  73. Davis (1900), 303.

  74. Eisikovits (2016).

  75. Fixdal (2012).

  76. On the difficulty of anticipating these conditions as a basis of decisions to comply with an order to surrender, see Caron (2018), 83.

  77. Mégret (2016).

  78. See also, for a more philosophical account, Moore (2014).

  79. Ohlin (2015), 134.

  80. Mégret (2010).

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Anne Laure Chaumette for the opportunity to discuss an early version of this paper in a seminar at the Centre de Droit International (CEDIN) of Université Paris Nanterre and to Nichole Barrett and James Stewart for allowing me to do the same at the Peter A. Allard School of Law of the University British Columbia. I am also indebted to Isabella Spano’s invaluable research assistance.

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Correspondence to Frédéric Mégret.

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Mégret, F. To Surrender or to Fight On? A Human Rights Perspective on Self-Defense. Jus Cogens 5, 1–32 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42439-022-00066-5

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