The Dichotomized States of Shame in the Scholastic Buddhism

Abstract

Shame is by and large dichotomized into hrī and (vy)apatrāpya in the Buddhist context. In the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra scholasticism, both hrī (in Chinese translation: 慚 cán) and (vy)apatrāpya (in Chinese translation: 愧 kuì) are subsumed under the wholesome (kuśala) states (dharmas). In this paper, firstly, previous studies and the etymologies of the two terms above will be closely reviewed; secondly, the exposition and contrast of hrī and (vy)apatrāpya between the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra will be minutely contextualized; thirdly, the merit of possessing dichotomized states of shame will be thoroughly investigated. Central to my research is a glimpse of the scholastic Indian Buddhist sophistication, exemplified by two kinds of shame, as well as the initial consideration of hrī and (vy)apatrāpya in the context of shame, guilt, and conscience in the Anglophone philosophy, while also taking their association with Buddhist morality (śīla) and concentration (samādhi) into account.

Background of This Study

I am deeply grateful to the generous financial support of the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development under the project I-136–107.1–2017 on my current study of the ethical framework for Buddhist meditation practice. I have also deep gratitude to the most valuable suggestions from the reviewers of Journal of Dharma Studies, especially to their advising me on relating shame in the Indian context to the Anglophone philosophy. All errors in this paper remain mine.

The dichotomized states of shame, hrī and (vy)apatrāpya, occur frequently in the Buddhist scriptures. Both terms, hrī and (vy)apatrāpya, are chiefly glossed by lajjā/lajjanā,²meaning ‘shame’, ‘bashfulness’, or ‘embarrassment’. Nevertheless, these two kinds of shame are almost always told apart in the scholastic Buddhism. Shame is in Sanskrit not one concept, just like its complexity and multifacetedness in the Anglophone philosophy.³ Starting from the concept of shame, the distinction of ‘guilt-cultures’ and ‘shame-cultures’ was popularized specially by American anthropologists (Atkins, 1960; Benedict, 1946; Cottingham, 2013; Deigh, 1996). Studies on the shame cultures represent a growing field in this field. In one recent article, it is summarized (Cottingham, 2013) that ‘the guilt-cultures of society places great emphasis on ideas of conscience, personal accountability and liability to blame and punishment, while shame-cultures emphasises personal status or standing, as measured in terms of public esteem or its forfeiture’. Whether such contrast of guilt and shame is also related in the Buddhist context is one of my major concerns in this paper. As far as I know, hrī and (vy)apatrāpya in the scholastic Buddhism are most eligible equivalent terms for comparing to guilt and shame in the Anglophone philosophy.

In Sanskrit, both hrī and (vy)apatrāpya are categorized into wholesome (kuśala) states (dharmas) in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra scholasticism. The existing studies on the wholesome (kuśala) and unwholesome (akuśala) states (dharmas) in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra scholastic Buddhism are also relatively extensive, yet have not particularly focused on certain (pairs or sets of) these Buddhist dharmas. In fact, recent years have witnessed a growing global academic interest in providing an overall feature for the ground-breaking study of these intriguing dharmas in the framework of scholastic Buddhism. Some representative works in this field include Kuśala and Akuśala (Schmithausen, 2013), A Study of the Saṃskāra Section of Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka (Kramer, 2013), The One Hundred Elements (dharma) of Yogācāra (Saito et al., 2014), and The Seventy-five Elements (dharma) of Sarvāstivāda (Saito et al., 2018). Overall, research on Buddhist dharmas in the context of scholastic Buddhism has received considerable scholarly attention worldwide, and especially in the past ten years.

That being said, the juxtaposition and contextualization of two kinds of shame in the scholastic Buddhist dharmas have hitherto received scant attention by Buddhist scholars, let alone are they put under discussion in association with the shame and guilt cultures mostly interested by American scholars. It is a great pity. However, it also leaves abundant room for me to conduct this study. One might regard inquiry into shame and its related states as weighing too heavily on mind. But for me, the discussion and thorough study of these two Buddhist terms are not oppressive or shameful; rather, it is beneficial. In the scholastic Buddhism, hrī and (vy)apatrāpya are indeed characterized as wholesome (kuśala) dharmas, and their antipodes, two kinds of shamelessness (āhrīkya and anapatrapā), are designated as unwholesome (akuśala). This lends support to my research. More pragmatically, two kinds of shame (hrī and apatrāpya) are credited with being conducing to attaining one essential Buddhist meditation called samādhi,⁴ as illustrated in the Samāhitābhūmi (literally: The Level of Concentration) of the Yogācāra School. The passage on the detailed account of the beneficial factors for attaining samādhi runs in the Samāhitābhūmi as follows⁵:

What is conducive to samādhi (samādhisāṃpreya)? Such as hrī-liked shame, apatrāpya-liked shame, joy and respect (premagaurava), religious confidence and motivation (śraddhā⁶), right attention (yoniśomanaskāra), mindfulness and clear comprehension (smṛtisaṃprajanya), sensory restraint (indriyasaṃvara), right conduct of self-discipline (śīlasaṃvara), freedom from regret (avipratisāra) and so on, until pleasure (sukha) as the last one.

The citation above draws our attention to the important role of two kinds of shame, as they strikingly take up the first two positions of the beneficial factors to samādhi meditation. This paramount position again justifies the importance of this study, as not only many scholars are fascinated by the shame and guilt cultures, but also Buddhist practitioners without academic background longing simply for meditative silence would be very interested in this topic. Having prioritized the two kinds of shame for the sake of samādhi meditation, the passage above truly attracts us to further consider the exact meaning and possible divergence of these two Sanskrit terms.

To get a full appreciation of them, I will first turn to its definition in the authoritative Sanskrit dictionary. In A Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Monier-Williams, 1899), hrī is translated as ‘shame’, ‘modest’, ‘shyness’, and ‘timidity’; while the verbal form apa √trap for (vy)apatrāpya is construed as ‘to be ashamed or bashful’. The definition in the dictionary demonstrates that hrī and (vy)apatrāpya are synonyms; each denotes a state of shame. Though the juxtaposition of two kinds of shame is not explicitly clarified, we can somehow get the impression from the Monier-Williams Sanskrit English Dictionary that unlike apatrāpya, hrī is the kind of shame, largely related to (1) one’s moral integrity, as the definition ‘modest’ conveys and (2) embarrassment, as ‘shyness’ and ‘timidity’ suggest. According to the studies conducted by experts on the nuanced contrast of guilt and shame (Atkins, 1960; Cottingham, 2013; Dodds, 1951), ‘guilt’ system stresses in personal responsibility and inner moral integrity. In this sense, the first layer of hrī can be well related to the ‘guilt’ systems, while the second layer of hrī conveys to a large extent the embarrassment, in accord with the definition of shame in the broadest sense (Cottingham, 2013).

That the Monier-Williams Sanskrit English Dictionary has not sharply juxtaposed hrī and (vy)apatrāpya may well result from the quite undifferentiated usage of these terms in the Mahābhārata, one of the oldest and longest Indian epics. There the term hrī and apatrapā can be both compounded with adhomukha (having face downwards as a gesture of feeling shame). Moreover, according to the previous study (Hara, 2006), on the one hand, the word trapā, which shares the same verbal root with apatrāpya, is used in the similar context of hrī and expresses in like manner the sense of shame. On the other hand, hrī alone can convey one’s shame imbued with the sense of pride and honour. It may explain the first layer of hrī given in the Monier-Williams Sanskrit English Dictionary. However, in the Mahābhārata not only trapā, but also lajjā (bashfulness or shame) can be interchangeable with hrī, these terms are often interwoven and not clearly distinguished. It suggests that in the earliest work of Indian epics such notion of dichotomized shame did not exist.

Before some new convincing evidence for the counterargument might emerge in the future, we can give credence to the theory that Buddhist sources for the first time systematized the states of shame. Previous research (Harvey, 2000) shows that a clear distinction of shame is drawn in the Pāli Buddhist literature. There, hiri, the equivalence of Sanskrit hrī, is ‘self-respect’, which causes one to seek to avoid any action one feels is not worthy of oneself and lowers one’s moral integrity. Ottappa, the equivalence of apatrāpya, is ‘regard for consequences’, being stimulated by concern over reproach and blame for an action (whether from oneself or others), embarrassment before others (especially those people one respects), legal punishment, or the karmic results of an action (p. 11).

When I apply Cottingham’s philological studies and analyses to Harvey’s interpretation hiri, it appears that the Pāli word hiri is akin to ‘clear conscience’⁷ other than ‘guilt conscience’. Clear conscience goes beyond the compass of the term ‘shame’ could ever cover, because shame is a matter of being ‘embarrassed’ (Cottingham, 2013, p. 737). It follows that in the Pāli, Buddhist context ‘shame’ would be not a perfect translation of hiri. Although the term hiri in Pāli Buddhism is not the major concern of this paper, its interpretation of ‘self-respect’ for hrī is echoed in the Sarvāstivāda Buddhist scholasticism. It will be discussed in the third chapter of this paper.

The Pāli Buddhist scriptures initially put forward the contrast of two kinds of shame by providing juxtaposition of their application and semantic contents. The Sanskrit scholastic Buddhism, marked out by Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra Buddhism, carefully contrived the seventy-five dharmas by the former one hundred dharmas by the latter, aiming at systematizing all the phenomenon, subsuming, and expounding them in their systems. Among the well-devised seventy-five or one hundred dharmas in the scholastic Buddhism, shame is always divided into two: hrī and (vy)apatrāpya with elaborate contrast. In the pages that follow, I will minutely investigate the well work-out dichotomy of shame in the Yogācāra and Sarvāstivāda scholastic Buddhist sources. Not only will I provide English translation for the relevant passages, but also attempt to appreciate the climax of Indian Buddhist exegeses: the scholastic Buddhism, taking two kinds of shame as example. Another main issue of this paper is the initial consideration of hrī and (vy)apatrāpya in the context of shame, guilt, and conscience in the Anglophone philosophy, while also taking their association with Buddhist morality (śīla) and concentration (samādhi) into account.

At this stage, I really do not want to keep the audience in suspense, and wish to preview my following studies on hrī and apatrāpya in the Sanskrit scholastic Buddhism. In the Yogācāra scholasticism, hrī denotes guilt-liked shame (lajjā) of one’s own accord in his or her transgression. It is guilt-liked shame because it largely accords with the emphasis of guilt on ideas of conscience, personal accountability, and liability (Cottingham, 2013); apatrāpya or its variant vyapatrāpya is in general the shame (lajjā) out of fear of public blame or bad reputation. This squares more with shame, as shame-cultures emphasize personal status or standing, measured in terms of public esteem or its forfeiture (Cottingham, 2013). By comparison, in the Sarvāstivāda two interpretations of hrī and apatrāpya were given: their first explanation is quite complicated and mingled, hrī is interpreted as endowed with respect (sagauravatā), veneration (sapratīśatā) and submission to fear (bhayavaśavartitā), while apatrāpya as seeing or perceiving fear (bhayadarśitā) on account of one’s own transgression (avadya). Neither of them can be rendered exactly as ‘shame’, perhaps they are a bit closer to the concept of ‘conscience’; however, the second explanation preserved in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya sees nearly eye to eye with the Yogācāra’s definition of hrī and apatrāpya: hrī (慚 cán) is defined as being blushful/ashamed in the transgression when considering oneself, and apatrāpya (愧 kuì) as being blushful/ashamed in one’s own transgression when considering others.

hrī and apatrāpya in the Yogācāra Scholasticism

Let me take Yogācāra works as a starting point. In the Yogācāra scholasticism, following works are taken into consideration in my paper: (1) the Pañcaskandhaka, which in most cases gives the briefest explanation of the Buddhist dharmas; (2) the Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya, which frequently amplifies the explanation in the Pañcaskandhaka; and (3) the Bodhisattvabhūmi and the Samāhitābhūmi, the core constituents of the Yogācārabhūmi aiming chiefly not at the elucidation of the Buddhist dharmas, however, incorporating their explication into its works.

First of all, the definition of hrī and apatrāpya is given in a brief manner in the Pañcaskandhaka, where two dharmas are both related to bashfulness/shame (lajjā) but contrasted sharply as follows⁸:

What is hrī? It is the bashfulness/shame (lajjā) with regard to one’s own (ātmānam) conduct due to [his or her] transgression (avadya). What is apatrāpya? It is the bashfulness/shame (lajjā) caused by worldly (loka) [judgement] on [one’s own] transgression.

The passage clearly illustrates that hrī and apatrāpya are intimately associated with one common physiological phenomenon in daily life: lajjā (bashfulness). When realizing something done wrong by oneself, that person would be bashful. In Sanskrit lajjā stems from the verbal root √lajj, literally means ‘to turn red in face’ with derived meaning ‘to be ashamed’. Here the citation in the Pañcaskandhaka illustrates that some fresh interpretation has been added to the pretty much interchangeable phrases lajjā, hrī, and apatrāpya in the Mahābhārata. That putting new wine in old bottles by investing well established Sanskrit words with extended meanings is paradigmatic of the scholastic Buddhism. In the Pañcaskandhaka, lajjā (shame/bashfulness) is employed as the gloss or anchor of hrī and apatrāpya, while hrī is construed as caused by one’s own self, apatrāpya as triggered by worldly or better to say social assessment and judgement. And when we apply Cottingham’s theory to the Sanskrit terms hrī and apatrāpya in this context, hrī denotes more precisely the guilt-liked shame than conscience-liked shame, for it arises under the circumstance of one’s transgression, but a clear conscience does not need to presuppose one’s fault, while apatrāpya encompasses the shame caused by others like worldly judgement. In the Anglophone philosophy, apatrāpya appears to be closer to the semantic domain of shame, as Cottingham (2013) summarized ‘shame is being embarrassed seen by others in a setting where your untoward behaviour is the object of a certain class of ‘participant-reactive attitudes’.⁹

Secondly, supplemented by an expressive internal monologue and the relationship between shame and one’s future conduct, Triṃśikavijñaptibhāṣya provided an enlarged exegesis for hrī and apatrāpya as follows¹⁰:

hrī is the bashfulness/shame (lajjā) due to [his or her] transgression (avadya) through [facing] oneself or the doctrine [to which one is adhered]. Transgression is actually evil from the nature of being blamed by virtuous people, because of its unfavourable result/consequence. The [sort of] the shame/bashfulness, which is the timidity in mind due to a committed or [yet] not committed transgression, called hrī. It (hrī) has the function of giving basis for restraint from misconduct. apatrāpya is the bashfulness/shame (lajjā) on account of worldly [affairs] (loka) due to [his or her] transgression. One is blushful by the transgression [and] from the fear (bhaya) of being infamous (aśloka) and so on, thinking that: “after having known that because I am doingwhat is blamed in the world, one will blame [me].” It (apatrāpya) also has the function of giving basis for restraint from misconduct.

The quotation above shows that Triṃśikavijñaptibhāṣya has amplified the definition of hrī in the Pañcaskandhaka by (1) adding [facing] doctrine (dharma), to which one is adhered, also as the circumstance, under which shame/bashfulness arises in case of hrī; (2) giving further explanation of transgression (avadya) as being blamed by virtuous people, because of its unfavourable result/consequence; and (3) extending transgression that is yet not committed also to the cause of shame/being bashful (hrī), so as to taking precautions against future misconduct.

In case of apatrāpya, it is another sort of the shame/bashfulness, ensuing from the fear of being infamous, due to one’s transgression. apatrāpya presupposes the fear of being blamed in the world, though such kind of blame may even not take place, but could just exist in one’s mind. It is indeed the fear of being blamed due to one’s transgression, that apatrāpya arises. This strengthens my interpretation hrī and apatrāpya in the earlier part of this chapter: hrī is very much analogous to ‘guilt-liked shame’, while apatrāpya is the shame out of fear of public blame.

It is notable that the function as ‘giving basis for restraint from misconduct’ was supplemented in the Triṃśikavijñaptibhāṣya for two kinds of shame. This function can lead to upholding morality, though not articulated here. But it is attested in the Bodhisattvabhūmi.

Thirdly, the Bodhisattvabhūmi has given minute account of vyapatrāpya and then measured it against hrī. The following passage focuses on the relationship between (1) possessing the dichotomized states of shame, (2) upholding morality, and (3) being free of regret¹¹:

In this respect through adopting the [Buddhist] morality (śīlasamādāna) from another person, when violating any code of moral discipline (śikṣāvyatikrama), a bodhisattva develops vyapatrāpya when comparing with others. Through having an extremely pure attitude towards the morality, a bodhisattva develops hrī in comparison with self, when violating any code of moral discipline... In this way, by adopting [the Buddhist morality] and relying on a pure attitude (āśayaviśuddhi) [toward the morality], this bodhisattva generates hrī and vyapatrāpya. Through these [dichotomized] states of shame one upholds morality. The one upholding morality is free of regret.

The passage above exhibits the contrast of hrī and vyapatrāpya in the first place, their merit as leading to upholding morality, and resulting in being free of regret in the second place. Despite the discussion in the Bodhisattvabhūmi ends up there in being free of regret, we can carry on its explication by relating free of regret to the attainment of concentration (samādhi), because the procedure starting from freedom from regret moving towards attaining concentration is well established and widely transmitted in the Buddhist tradition.¹²

Now revert to the benefit of hrī and apatrāpya as conducive to concentration (samādhi) in the Samāhitābhūmi, despite that its reason was not explicated there, I postulate that it is the function of giving basis to the restraint from misconduct and consequences of upholding morality and being free from regret that facilitate one’s attainment of concentration. Both Bodhisattvabhūmi and Samāhitābhūmi belong to the voluminous Yogācārabhūmi, the compendium of the Yogācāra scholasticism.

To summarize, in the Yogācāra scholastic scriptures, hrī is the guilt-liked bashfulness/shame (lajjā or lajjanā) of one’s own accord due to [his or her] transgression (avadya), while (vy)apatrāpya is the bashfulness/shame out of fear (bhaya) of, or respect for (bhayagaurava) others. Both kinds of shame give basis for restraint from misconduct, and further result in upholding one’s morality and being free from regret. And this may render their merit as being conducive to attaining concentration (samādhi), as articulated in the Samāhitābhūmi, since upholding morality and being free from regret are integral to concentration in Buddhism.

hrī and apatrāpya in the Sarvāstivāda Scholasticism

The existent Sarvāstivāda scholastic scriptures¹³ are chiefly preserved in their Chinese translation by Xuanzang 玄奘. The sources of my citations are as follows: (1) 阿毘達磨集異門足論 Ā-pí-dá-mó jí-yì-mén-zú-lùn (the Saṃgītiparyāyaśāstra), 阿毘達磨品類足論 Ā-pí-dá-mó pǐn-lèi-zú-lùn (the Prakaraṇapādaśāstra), and 阿毘達磨發智論 Ā-pí-dá-mó fā-zhì-lùn (the Jñānaprasthānaśāstra),¹⁴ (2) 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 Ā-pí-dá-mó dà-pí-póshā-lùn (the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā),¹⁵ (3) the Abhidharmakośa and Abhidharmakośabhāṣya¹⁶ (AKBh), and (4) 阿毘達磨順正理論 Ā-pí-dá-mó shun-zhèng-lǐ-lùn (the *Nyāyānusāraśāstra).¹⁷ (1) and (2) are known as orthodox Sarvāstivāda scriptures, while (3) and (4) are framed within the broad Sarvāstivāda lineage.

Same as the Yogācāra sources,¹⁸hrī and apatrāpya are translated in the AKBh also as 慚 cán and 愧 kuì respectively. The Sanskrit AKBh stated two groups of explanations (kalpa) of hrī and apatrāpya. In its first group of explanation, hrī is interpreted as endowed with respect (sagauravatā), veneration (sapratīśatā), and submission to fear¹⁹ (bhayavaśavartitā); apatrāpya is rendered as seeing or perceiving fear (bhayadarśitā) on account of transgression (avadya).²⁰ Moreover, AKBh added a second group of definition of hrī and apatrāpya relating them to the root √lajj, where hrī (慚 cán) is defined as being bashful/ashamed in the transgression when considering oneself, apatrāpya (愧 kuì) being blushful/ashamed in one’s own transgression when considering others.²¹

It is clear that the second group of explanation of hrī and apatrāpya in the AKBh largely squares with the definition in the Yogācāra scriptures as discussed before, whereas the first group of explanation of hrī and apatrāpya in the AKBh may have its root in some orthodox Sarvāstivāda works. More precisely, Saṃgītiparyāyaśāstra, Prakaraṇapādaśāstra, Jñānaprasthānaśāstra, and Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā and the first group of explanation of the AKBh are solid on the definition of hrī (慚 cán) and apatrāpya (愧 kuì). In these works, 慚cán, the Chinese translation of hrī, covers a wide variety of meanings: (1) possessing shame (in Chinese: 有羞 yǒu-xiū, cf. lajjā in the AKBh), (2) possessing respect²² (in Chinese: 有敬 yǒu-jìng, cf. sagauravatā in the AKBh), and (3) possessing the submission to fear (in Chinese: 於自在者有怖畏轉 yú zì-zài-zhě yǒu-bù-wèi-zhuǎn, cf. bhayavaśavartitā in the AKBh), while 愧 kuì, the Chinese translation of apatrāpya, encompasses the following dimensions: (1) possessing the sense of shame (in Chinese: 有恥 yǒu-chǐ, cf. *lajjā in the AKBh) and (2) [being able to] perceive fear (in Chinese: [能]見怖畏 [néng] jiàn-bù-wèi, cf. bhayadarśitā in the AKBh²³). This suggests that the traditional interpretation in the Sarvāstivāda School largely dissents from the outlook of the Yogācāra scholasticism. However, the AKBh, Mahābhārata, and Pāli sources are on the same page of ascribing respect to the interpretation of hrī; this implies that the same Sanskrit word hrī might have undergone some change of primary meanings in the course of history.

That being said, hrī and apatrāpya are analogized in the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā to the cloth of dharmakāya on every sentient being in the Form Realm (rūpadhātu), whereas the generality of sentient beings located in the Desire Realm (kāmadhātu) is lack of such cloth due to their absence of hrī and apatrāpya, with exception of bodhisattvas and untainted bhikṣunis.²⁴ The Buddha thus instructs people to cultivate and practice hrī and apatrāpya diligently, in order to protect the world.²⁵ In comparison, in the exegeses of the AKBh, those shameless ones, who are absent of hrī and apatrāpya, are compared to ones who are drunk.²⁶ They are likened to charred seeds and impotent to uphold moralities.²⁷

Finally, regarding the time sequence of arousing hrī and apatrāpya, the AKBh held that these two are asynchronous, because looking at self and looking at others canot take place at the same time.²⁸ On the contrary, *Nyāyānusāraśāstra argued that hrī and apatrāpya arise simultaneously.²⁹

Conclusion

In the scholastic Buddhist dharmas, shame is mainly dichotomized into hrī and (vy)apatrāpya. Both are regarded as wholesome (kuśala) dharma in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra scholasticism. Nevertheless, Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra dissent from each other on their definition of these two terms.

In the Yogācāra sources, both kind of shame are glossed by one common physiological phenomenon in daily life: lajjā or its variant lajjanā (bashfulness with shame), whereas hrī is very much analogous to ‘guilt-liked shame’, arising on the occasion of one’s transgression after facing oneself or the doctrine, to which one is adhered; (vy)apatrāpya is the bashfulness/shame out of fear of being infamous from others’ judgement and criticism in one’s transgression. Following Cottingham’s elucidation of shame and shame-liked states, I provide my working definition ‘guilt-liked shame [of one’s own accord]’ for hrī, while ‘shame [out of fear of others]’ for apatrāpya. If we compare hrī and (vy)apatrāpya with the shame and guilt cultures in the Anglophone philosophy, it reveals that hrī squares more with the notion of guilt, while (vy)apatrāpya more with shame. Possessing shame is not shameful; on the contrary, it is celebrated as wholesome dharmas and factors conducive to concentration (samādhi), one fundamental Buddhist meditation. The function of possessing two kinds of shame is described in the Triṃśikavijñaptibhāṣya as giving basis for the restraint from misconduct. In the Bodhisattvabhūmi, one who possesses hrī and (vy)apatrāpya is characterized as upholding morality and being free of regret. These functions form the merits of hrī and (vy)apatrāpya for one’s behaviour and cultivation.

Quite the contrary, the Sarvāstivāda School has not related hrī and apatrāpya to samādhi, but hrī and apatrāpya were praised as they protect the world. Moreover, the traditional Sarvāstivāda works have interpretated two kinds of shame in a twofold manner. In the first group of interpretation, hrī and apatrāpya are not just shame: hrī (慚 cán) covers a wider range of (1) possessing shame, (2) possessing respect, (3) possessing the submission to fear; while apatrāpya (愧 kuì) is construed as (1) possessing the sense of shame and (2) [being able to] see or perceive fear. In the second group of interpretation, which correspond closely to their explanation in the Yogācāra sources, hrī is explained as shame/bashfulness (lajjanā) when considering oneself, apatrāpya as shame/bashfulness (lajjanā) when considering others. It appears that my working translation of hrī as ‘guilt-liked shame [of one’s own accord]’ and apatrāpya as ‘shame [out of fear of others]’ can only be partly applied to their second group of interpretation in the Sarvāstivāda sources. The first group of interpretation of hrī and apatrāpya is quite conflated, but it may well reflect the traditional Sarvāstivāda exegeses on these terms, revealed by the majority of existent Sarvāstivāda sources. And when we put the first group of interpretation under the microscope, the AKBh, Mahābhārata, and Pāli sources are on the same page of attributing respect to the interpretation of hrī. And in case of apatrāpya (愧 kuì), it overlaps the feeling of shame. The Sanskrit terms hrī and apatrāpya must have undergone the change of their primary meanings in the different contexts in the course of history.

The Chinese translation hrī and apatrāpya would be one typical example of Chinese reception of Buddhist terminology into its culture. More than one thousand years has passed since the dichotomized states of shame were first translated into Chinese as 慚 cán and 愧 kuì. In modern Chinese 慚 cán connotates the worm of conscience arising when a person realizes he or she cannot meet the requirements set up by him- or herself; 愧 kuì connotates the worm of conscience arising when a person realizes he or she canot meet the requirements by others. The distinction of hrī and apatrāpya in the Buddhist scholasticism might have well crept into the Chinese language and helped form Chinese philosophy on shame. In fact, in modern Chinese language, 慚愧 cán-kuì is mostly used as one phrase, which exactly means ‘shame’. As hrī and (vy)apatrāpya are not easy to distinguish in the Indian context, people in China barely reflect upon the divergence of 慚 cán and 愧 kuì, while using the phrase 慚愧 cán-kuì very often when expressing ashamed, bashful, or embarrassed feelings.

When we talk about the shame, guilt, and conscience cultures in the Anglophone contexts, as far as I know, hrī and apatrāpya in the scholastic Buddhism are most eligible Sanskrit equivalent terms. Up to now, these terms are quite understudied. I hope my paper could make some contribution to this study.