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Buddha and Wittgenstein on the Notion of Self

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Abstract

The notion of Self plays a significant role in the philosophical speculations of Buddha and Wittgenstein. For the Buddha, ‘Self’ has empirical validity without ultimate reality. However, the Real Self is transcendent. It is the Absolute which is immanent as well as transcendent. It cannot therefore be bound to thought-constructions. The Absolute is Nirvāṇa; it is peaceful, immortal and unproduced which is unspeakable and can only be realised through immediate spiritual experience. To deal with Nirvāṇa rigourously, Buddha upholds a negative method of describing it as final. He prefers to subscribe to the philosophy of silence, for the bliss of Nirvāṇa is beyond empirical reality. Some striking affinities with such Buddhist notion of Self can be found in Wittgensteinian philosophy of Self. For Wittgenstein, the ‘Self’ comes into being through one’s own world. The Self or the metaphysical subject does not belong to the world; rather it is the limit of the world. The metaphysical Self is different from the empirical Self or ego with which psychology deals. The psychological self pertains to and explains the worldly state-of-affair. Besides, the philosophical Self or I is not the human being, the human body or the human soul with psychological properties, but the boundary (not a part) of the world. Self or I is not the name of a person. It therefore is inexplicable. Since it is unspeakable, we must be silent about it, for whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. Wittgenstein finally submits that this is all that really matters in human life. A comparative study of the two great philosophers suggests that the Buddhist philosophy of Self apparently echoes in the Wittgensteinian philosophy of Self.

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Notes

  1. Gudmunsen (1977). Wittgenstein and Buddhism. New York: Macmillan Press, pp. 122–125.

  2. Andrej (2016). The Concept of Self in Buddhism and Brahmanism: Some Remarks. Asian Studies IV (XX), 1, pp. 81–95.

  3. Sharma (2007). The Advaita Tradition in Indian Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, p. 25.

  4. Kaṭha Upaniṣad, 3.12.

  5. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 4.3.32.

  6. Sharma (2007) op.cit, p.26.

  7. Rhys Davids, & C.A.F. (2007)(Tr.) The Dialogues of the Buddha, 3 Volumes: Digha Nikāya 15. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.; Horner, I.B. (2004) (Tr.) The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings, 3 Volumes: Majjhima Nikāya 72. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.; Rhys Davids, Mrs. & Woodward, F.L. (2005). (Tr.). Kindred Sayings: translation of the Samyutta Nikāya 4 Volumes: Samyutta Nikāya 44,8. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

  8. Rhys Davids (1934). Outlines of Buddhism, p.46.

  9. Horner (2004). (Tr.). Majjhima Nikāya 72, op. cit.; Rhys Davids, T.W. & C.A.F. (2007)(Tr.) Digha Nikāya 1., op.cit.

  10. Warren (1922). (Tr.). Buddhism in Translation: Samyuta Nikāya 22, 15. (Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. III). Cambridge, Mass.

  11. Sharma (2007). op. cit., pp.28–29.

  12. Andrej. op.cit., pp. 89–90.

  13. Ibid.

  14. Ibid.

  15. Ibid.

  16. Ibid.

  17. Ibid.

  18. Ibid.

  19. Shravak (1999). Buddha's Rejection of the Brahmanical Notion of Ātman. In Dessein Bart (ed.), The Notion of Self in Buddhism, Communication & Cognition, Vo1.32, Nr.1/2 (pp.9–20).

  20. Ibid.

  21. Ibid.

  22. Ibid.

  23. Jayatilleke (1963). Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, pp.475–476.

  24. Ibid, p.476.

  25. Pears & McGuinness (2012). op. cit., Tractatus 7.

  26. Jayatilleke (1963). op. cit.

  27. Slater (1950). Paradox and Nirvana. Chicago, p. 121; cp. also Radhakrishnan, S. The Teaching of Buddha by Speech and by Silence. The Hibbert Journal, 35, pp. 350 ff.

  28. Rhys Davids & C.A.F. (2007). (Tr.) Digha Nikāya, 16., op.cit.

  29. Ibid.

  30. Ibid., 10.

  31. Poussin, Bib.Budd.IV. (1903). Mūlamādhyamika Kārikā 18, 6. St.Petersbourg.

  32. Levi (1907). (ed.). Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra IX, 23. Paris.

  33. Winch (1980). Ludwig Wittgenstein—Culture and Value. Oxford: Blackwell, p.92.

  34. Pears and McGuinness (2012). Ludwig Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 6.4312. London: Routledge, p.87. (Hereafter TLP).

  35. TLP, p.70.

  36. Ibid., 5.632, p.69.

  37. Anscombe, & Von Wright, (eds.), Anscombe, (tr.) (1961). Ludwig Wittgenstein: Notebooks 1914–1916, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p.84e. (Hereafter NB).

  38. Ibid., p.82e. Also see TLP, 6.522.

  39. NB, p.84e.

  40. TLP, 5.641.

  41. Ibid.; Also see NB, p.82e.

  42. NB, p.49e.

  43. McGuinness (2002). Approaches to Wittgenstein: Collected Papers. London: Routledge, p.15.

  44. NB, p.80e.

  45. TLP, 5.632–633.

  46. Black (1964). A Companion to Wittgenstein’s “Tractatus”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.309.

  47. Copleston (1999). A History of Philosophy, Vol.6, Burnes and Oates. Kent: Tunbridge Wells, p.284.

  48. Schopenhauer, Aurther. Die Welf, Sec. 2, M.Black’s Translation.

  49. Von Wright & Nyman (eds.) (tr.) Winch, P. (1980). op.cit, p.23.

  50. Pradhan (2003). R.Balasubramanian on Wittgenstein: The Search for Advaitic Roots. In S.Rao and G.Mishra (eds), in Paraṁparā: Essays in Honour of R.Balasubramanian. Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, p.241.

  51. Balasubramanian (1996). Primal Spirituality of the Vedas: Its Renewal and Renaissance. Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, p.16.

  52. Audi (2009). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 978.

  53. TLP, 4.022.

  54. Choudhary (2007). Wittgensteinian Philosophy and Advaita Vedānta. New Delhi: D.K.Printworld (P) Ltd. P.140.

  55. Ganguly (1968). Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Preliminary. Santiniketan: Vishva-Bharati, p.114.

  56. Sluga & Stern (1996). The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.32.

  57. Gudmunsen (1977). op.cit., p.124.

  58. Anscombe (1953) (Tr.) Ludwig Wittgenstein Josef Johann Philosophical Investigations, II.iv,178e. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

  59. Ibid., I,357.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Allahabad, Prayagraj, Uttar Pradesh, 211002, India

    Surya Kant Maharana

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Maharana, S.K. Buddha and Wittgenstein on the Notion of Self. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 39, 43–54 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-022-00270-0

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