Abstract
A successful declaration of one’s identity in saying “ahaṃ Brahmāsmi” is a result of knowing one’s own self as indistinguishable from Brahman. The non-difference between oneself and the Brahman is one’s true identity, and it goes without saying, knowledge of one’s true identity constitutes the correct knowing of one’s own self. That the said non-difference is upheld by vedānta, and we need to put this ideal non-difference into practice is the crux of Vivekananda’s practical vedānta. Vivekananda gives certain reasons for the practicability of vedānta. This paper’s part I is an exposition of Vivekananda’s practical vedānta, focussing on those reasons for practical vedānta and orienting each towards an analytical understanding. In part II, a linguistic analysis of Vivekananda’s approach to one’s identity has been carried out after introducing J. Hintikka’s interpretation of Descartes’ “I think, therefore, I am” and G. Misra’s interpretation of sat (existence, reality or being) cit (consciousness, knowledge or cognition) ānanda (bliss, intense happiness or felicity). The latter’s interpretation displays a positivist’s linguistic analysis of vedānta, whereas the former’s does a speech act theorist’s analysis of Descartes’ cogito principle. The present analysis indicates that practical vedānta can be read in the light of analytic philosophy and Vivekananda’s approach to one’s identity can be understood in terms of speech acts.
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Notes
The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. 2., Advaita Ashrama, Kolkata, Seventeenth Edition, 2013 (in short, CW, 2), p. 298.
“Tat tvam asi” appears nine times in Chapter VI of Chāndogya Upaniṣad. In Svāmī Gambhīrānanda’s translated Chāndogya Upaniṣad With the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya, Advaita Ashrama (Publication Department), Kolkata, 1983, Seventh Reprint, May 2015, pp. 468–496; 8.7, 9.4, 10.3, 11.3, 12.3, 13.3, 14.3, 15.3 and 16.3 of Chapter VI.
“Ahaṃ Brahmāsmi” aappears twice in I.IV.10 of Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. In Swami Madhavananda’s translated Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad With the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya, Advaita Ashrama (Publication Department), Kolkata, 1934, Fifteenth Reprint, December 2015, p. 100. Although it has been stated explicitly by Vivekananda that “tat tvam asi” is the essence of Vedanta, the two statements—“ahaṃ Brahmāsmi” and “tat tvam asi”—are equally important for this paper. I sincerely thank one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper for the suggestion that “ahaṃ Brahmāsmi” should get due importance in this paper.
Hintikka (1962) (referring to last one’s page numbers).
Misra (1976a).
Haldane and Ross (1911).
CW, 2, p. 338. He also says, “Everything it [religion] claims must be judged from the standpoint of reason. Why religions should claim that they are not bound to abide by the standpoint of reason, no one knows. If one does not take the standard of reason, there cannot be any true judgment, even in the case of religions”. CW, 2, p. 337.
CW, 2, p. 295.
Wittgenstein (1980).
Ibid.
Vivekananda considers Bhagavadgītā “the best commentary we have on Vedanta philosophy”. See CW, 2, p. 296.
Searle adopts this procedure to derive the rules from the conditions of making a non-defective sincere promise (Searle 1969).
The two examples are owing to Searle (1969), p. 133 and p. 177. Searle says that his discussion on deriving “ought” from “is” in Speech Acts is meant to “clear up misunderstandings, to meet objections” raised against Searle (1964), “How to derive “ought” from “is””, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 73, pp. 43–58. More importantly, the discussion is meant “to integrate” the conclusions of his earlier paper “within the general account of speech acts”. See Searle (1969), p. 177.
CW, 2, p. 296.
CW, 2, p. 297.
CW, 2, p. 298. Of course in accordance to Vivekananda’s practical vedānta, “practical” may be interpreted as “application of the Vedāntic ideal” in concrete situations of life so as to elevate one’s actual life to the ideal. This does not mean that he advocates for dualism between “practical” and “ideal”. Accordingly, neither it means that he pulls the ideal down in order to harmonize it with the “practical” nor that he considers each and every practice to be followed as an ideal. The ideal can be achieved by everyone, not that everyone stands as an ideal.
Ibid.
When “practical” presupposes “ideal”, the ideal has been put into actuality.
Wittgenstein (1953).
CW, 2, p. 298.
Ibid.
Ibid.
CW, 2, p. 300.
CW, 2, p. 311.
CW, 2, p. 309.
Hintikka (1962), p. 64.
Maitra (2014).
Misra (1976), p. 127.
Ibid.
Misra (1976), p. 128.
Ibid.
Misra (1976), p. 127.
Carnap (1950.
Misra (1976), p. 127.
Misra (1976), p. 128.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ayer (1953–54).
Misra (1976), p. 125.
Misra (1976), p. 124.
Quine (1951).
Misra (1976), p. 124.
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Acknowledgements
The author sincerely thank Prof. Ashok Vora, Prof. R.C. Pradhan, Prof. G.P. Das, Prof. R.N. Ghosh, Prof. P.K. Mohapatra, Dr. R.C. Majhi, Prof. N.N. Chakraborty, Dr. Jhadeswar Ghosh, Dr. Sankuntala Bora, Dr. A.Uttam Sharma, Prof. B.K. Agarwala and Prof. A. Dasgupta for their comments/ discussions/ encouragements; and two anonymous reviewers of this paper for their constructive comments.
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Lenka, L. Knowing One’s Own Self: An Analysis of Vivekananda’s Approach to One’s Identity. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 35, 267–278 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-017-0130-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-017-0130-x