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The Obligation to Provide Reparations by Armed Groups: A Norm under Customary International Law?

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Abstract

Reparations represent a key element to redress the suffering caused to victims of armed conflict. Taking into account the predominantly non-international nature of contemporary armed conflicts and the fact that armed groups represent half of the participants, it seems legitimate to question whether reparations should also be provided by armed groups. From the victims’ perspective, the suffering caused to them remains the same irrespective of whether the perpetrator is a state or a non-state actor. In this context, there appears to be an emerging practice supporting the obligation of armed groups to provide reparation, as acknowledged in some UN reports. In addition, there have been examples of armed groups committing to provide some forms of reparation to victims through peace agreements, unilateral declarations and codes of conduct. This article analyses the recent international practice and examines any potential duty by non-state armed groups that could have been recognised in the provision of reparations. More precisely, the article evaluates whether the developments in the practice of armed groups could be considered as contributing to customary international law and suggests how this practice could be weighted together with the practice of states. It also identifies challenges and limiting factors in the provision of reparations by armed groups.

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Notes

  1. Roht-Arriaza (2010).

  2. Blázquez Rodríguez (2018), p. 407.

  3. Moffett (2015), p. 323.

  4. Carrillo-Santarelli (2017), p. 367.

  5. Dudai (2011), p. 785.

  6. International Centre for Transitional Justice (2009), p. 2.

  7. Dudai (2011), p. 786.

  8. Heffes and Frenkel (2017), p. 69.

  9. Pérez-León Acevedo (2008), pp. 16–17.

  10. Kalshoven (1991), pp. 830–832; Greenwood (2000), p. 250.

  11. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), pp. 537–545.

  12. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), p. 541.

  13. Evans (2012), p. 31.

  14. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), p. 545.

  15. Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons annexed to the Dayton Accords, 1995, Art. XI.

  16. UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/60, Section 2(2).

  17. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), p. 550.

  18. Sassòli (2010), p. 43.

  19. Blázquez Rodríguez (2018), p. 410.

  20. UN Security Council Resolution 1071 (1996), 30 August 1996, para. 8.

  21. UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1998/70 on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/70 (1998), para. 5(d).

  22. UN Secretary-General, Report on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, 13 April 1998, A/52/871–S/1998/318, para. 50.

  23. Resolution 60/147 on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (UNBPG) adopted and proclaimed by the UN General Assembly on 16 December 2005.

  24. UNBPG, Preamble, para. 7.

  25. UNBPG, Principle 15 (emphasis added).

  26. UNBPG, Principle 3(c).

  27. Moffett (2015), p. 331; Blázquez Rodríguez (2018), p. 409.

  28. Van Boven (2010), p. 3.

  29. Carrillo-Santarelli (2017), pp. 371–372.

  30. Evans (2012), p. 127.

  31. No state voted against but there were 13 abstentions.

  32. Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Mr. Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, 27 March 2015, A/CN.4/682, paras. 47–48.

  33. Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Mr. Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, 27 March 2015, A/CN.4/682, para. 47.

  34. Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Mr. Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, 27 March 2015, A/CN.4/682, para. 52.

  35. Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and Reparation, Nairobi, 19–21 March 2007, Preamble, para. 5.

  36. Couillard (2007), p. 449.

  37. Ibid., p. 449.

  38. See International Law Association, ‘Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict’ (2003–2014), https://www.ila-hq.org/index.php/committees (accessed 15 June 2019).

  39. See Hofmann (2018), p. 32.

  40. International Law Association, Committee on Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict, Resolution 2/2010 on International Law Principles on Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict (Substantive Issues) (15–20 August 2010), Art. 5(2).

  41. International Law Association, Committee on Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict, ‘The Hague Conference Report: Reparation for Victims of Armed Conflict’ (Substantive Issues) (2010), p. 13.

  42. Ibid., p. 13.

  43. Reparations to victims are contemplated in Art. 75 of the Rome Statute. For discussions about victims’ rights under international criminal law see Bassiouni (2006).

  44. These situations are those of the Central African Republic (I and II), Mali, Darfur (Sudan), Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the recently added case of Afghanistan. The list of situations and cases are available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situation.aspx (accessed 20 April 2020).

  45. See The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeals against the ‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations’ of 7 August 2012 with amended order for reparations (Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, 3 March 2015, ICC-01/04-01/06 A A 2 A 3; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, 24 March 2017, ICC-01/04–01/07; The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Judgment on the appeal of the victims against the ‘Reparations Order’, 8 March 2018, ICC-01/12-01/15 A.

  46. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, 25 January 2005, para. 600.

  47. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, 25 January 2005, para. 603.

  48. Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 25 September 2009, A/HRC/12/48, p. 401, para. 1867.

  49. Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 31 March 2011, p. 114, para. 419.

  50. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 5 February 2013, A/HRC/22/59, para. 177(d).

  51. Hardwood (2016), pp. 15–19. See also, Venkze (2016).

  52. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on Armed non-State Actors: The Protection of the Right to Life, 5 June 2018, UN Doc. A/HRC/38/44.

  53. Ibid., p. 4, para. 7.

  54. Ibid., p. 19, para. 91.

  55. Ibid., p. 19, para. 94.

  56. Sivakumaram (2012), pp. 125–133.

  57. Agreement on Peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 22 June 2001.

  58. Para. B-3 of the Agreement establishes that ‘[t]he Parties shall safely return evacuees to their place of origin; provide all the necessary financial/material and technical assistance to start a new life, as well as allow them to be awarded reparations for their properties lost or destroyed by reason of the conflict’.

  59. Para. B-2 of the Agreement.

  60. See Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, ‘Philippines: MILF Signs an Action Plan to Prevent Recruitment and Reintegrate Children into Civilian Life’, 31 July 2009.

  61. Darfur Peace Agreement, 5 May 2006, paras. 194, 196 and 199.

  62. Ibid., paras. 200–213.

  63. International Centre for Transitional Justice (2007), p. 15.

  64. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on Armed non-State Actors: The Protection of the Right to Life, 5 June 2018, UN Doc. A/HRC/38/44, para. 91.

  65. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement, Juba, Sudan, 29 June 2007.

  66. Ibid., para. 9.1.

  67. Ibid., para. 9.2.

  68. Ibid., para. 9.3.

  69. Ibid., para. 8.1.

  70. Moffett (2015), p. 344.

  71. Final agreement to end the armed conflict and build a stable and lasting peace between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP), 21 November 2016, https://especiales.presidencia.gov.co/Documents/20170620-dejacion-armas/acuerdos/acuerdo-final-ingles.pdf (accessed 30 May 2019).

  72. See Olasolo and Ramírez Mendoza (2017).

  73. Colombian Peace Agreement (2016), Art. 5.1.3.7, at 197.

  74. ‘Segunda y definitiva entrega de información del listado de bienes y valores de Economía de Guerra de las FARC-EP’, 15 August 2017, https://static.iris.net.co/semana/upload/documents/15.08.2017-carta-para-incluir-bienes-fiscalia--esr-1.pdf (accessed 30 May 2019). Regarding this list of assets, the Constitutional Court of Colombia affirmed that they were to be exclusively used for the reparation of victims and not for the demobilisation or reintegration of members of the armed group. See ‘Bienes de las FARC sólo se usarán para reparación de víctimas: Corte’, El Tiempo, 4 July 2018, https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/cortes/corte-constitucional-dice-que-bienes-de-las-farc-solo-se-usaran-en-reparacion-de-victimas-239446 (accessed 30 May 2019).

  75. ‘Plazo para entrega de bienes a víctimas se mantiene’, El Tiempo, 25 August 2020, https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/farc-tiene-plazo-para-reparar-a-victimas-hasta-diciembre-533046 (accessed 2 October 2020).

  76. Accord politique pour la paix et la réconciliation en Republique Centrafricane, 6 February 2019, https://static.rfi.fr/pdf/2019/20190208_accord_paix_reconciliation_rca.pdf?platform=hootsuite&fbclid=IwAR1YNQSuycqWl9ZSrOc8MgIDHHpFe8bBuccrTSBxmkijXoo7GhjcmE_b7JM (accessed 30 May 2019). These armed groups are the Anti-Balaka-Aile Mokom; Anti-Balaka-Aile Ngaissona; Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC); Front Populaire pour la Renaissance la Centrafrique (FPRC); Mouvement des Libérateurs Centraficains Pour la Justice (MLCJ); Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC); Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC); Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation (3R); Révolution et Justice-Aile Belanga (RJ-Belanga); Révolution et Justice-Aile Sayo (RJ-Aile Sayo); Séléka Rénovée; Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR); Union des Forces Républicaines-Fondamentale (UFR-F); and Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC).

  77. Art. 5(i) of the Agreement.

  78. Art. 12 of the Agreement.

  79. See ‘Success of Central African Republic Peace Agreement Dependent on Parties Ending Violence, Engaging in Dialogue, Special Representative Tells Security Council’, 20 June 2019, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13854.doc.htm (accessed 28 June 2020).

  80. Somali Agreement on Implementing the Ceasefire and on Modalities of Disarmament, 15 January 1993, Art. III.

  81. Accord politique pour la paix et la réconciliation en Republique Centrafricane, 6 February 2019, Art. 12.

  82. Colombia Peace Agreement (2016), Art. 5.1.3.7.

  83. See Art. 37 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN General Assembly Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001 and Principle 22 of the UNBPG.

  84. Principle 22 of the UNBPG.

  85. Dudai (2011), p. 788.

  86. Communiqué relative to the events of 9 August 2001, ELN Head Office, Area Industrial cited by Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), p. 3610, para. 365.

  87. See Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of Human Rights in Colombia, 23 June 2016, A/HRC/31/3/Add. 2, at p. 6, para. 19.

  88. ‘Colombia’s Farc rebels apologize for “great pain” caused by kidnappings’, The Guardian, 12 September 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/12/colombias-farc-rebels-apologize-kidnapping-peace-accord (accessed 30 May 2019).

  89. ‘South Sudan VP confirms apology for Bor Massacre’, Sudan Tribune, 3 April 2012, https://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-VP-confirms-apology,42124 (accessed 30 May 2019).

  90. Shaw (2010), pp. 127–129.

  91. ‘Guatemala Rebel Apology’, The New York Times, 14 March 1999, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/14/world/guatemala-rebel-apology.html (accessed 30 May 2019).

  92. ‘IRA offers “sincere apologies” for 30 years of civilian slaughter’, The Telegraph, 17 July 2002, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1401616/IRA-offers-sincere-apologies-for-30-years-of-civilian-slaughter.html (accessed 30 May 2019).

  93. Dudai (2011), pp. 798–801.

  94. Ibid., p. 800.

  95. Moffett (2015), p. 334.

  96. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions on Armed non-State Actors: The Protection of the Right to Life, 5 June 2018, UN Doc. A/HRC/38/44, para. 94.

  97. Bangerter (2012).

  98. Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), Code of War, Colombia 1995. See Bangerter (2012), p. 83.

  99. New People’s Army (NPA), Basic Rules, Philippines 1969. See Bangerter (2012), p. 72.

  100. Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Eight Codes of Conduct, Sierra Leone, no date. See Bangerter (2012), pp. 73–74.

  101. Viet Cong, Code of Disciplines, Vietnam, no date. See Bangerter (2012), p. 75.

  102. The National Resistance Army, Code of Conduct, Uganda, 1982. See Bangerter (2012), pp. 76–77.

  103. See Sects. 5.1 and 5.2 on the issue of the general acceptance of rules.

  104. See Mastorodimos (2015), p. 128.

  105. Art. 30(b) of the Articles on State Responsibility (2001) and the Articles of the Responsibility of International Organizations, UN General Assembly Resolution 66/10 of 9 December 2011.

  106. See Geneva Call, ‘Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for adherence to a total ban on anti-personnel mines and for cooperation in mine action’, https://genevacall.org/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2013/12/DoC-Banning-anti-personnel-mines.pdf (accessed 30 May 2019).

  107. Principle 23(f) of the UNBPG.

  108. Sassòli (2010), p. 18.

  109. This has been argued by the author in her recent book, Íñigo Álvarez (2020).

  110. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2005), p. xlii.

  111. To date, 50 non-state armed groups have signed the commitment on the prohibition of anti-personnel mines. See https://genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/ (accessed 30 May 2019).

  112. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, ICTY Case No. IT-94-I-T, paras. 107–108.

  113. A further discussion about the role of the practice of armed groups in the formation of customary international humanitarian law can be found in Íñigo Álvarez (2017).

  114. See Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law Commission on the Identification of Customary International Law, at https://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/1_13.shtml (accessed 7 June 2019).

  115. Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Mr. Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, 22 May 2014, UN Doc. A/CN.4/672, p. 32, para. 45.

  116. International Law Commission Report, Sixty-eighth Session (2016), UN Doc. A/71/10, p. 88.

  117. Ibid., pp. 89–90, para. 9.

  118. Fifth Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Mr. Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, 14 March 2018, UN Doc. A/CN.4/717, pp. 18–19, para. 40.

  119. Ibid., p. 18.

  120. Ibid., p. 22, para. 49.

  121. Fortin (2018), p. 351.

  122. Kelly (2017), p. 49.

  123. Rondeau (2011), p. 668.

  124. Third Report on Identification of Customary International Law by Mr. Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, 27 March 2015, UN Doc. A/CN.4/682, pp. 54–56.

  125. Hiemstra and Nohle (2017), p. 22.

  126. Roberts and Sivakumaran (2012), pp. 149–152.

  127. Ibid., p. 151.

  128. Bellal and Heffes (2018), p. 126.

  129. On the concept of general acceptance see Kelly (2017), pp. 47–85.

  130. See Sect. 3 on UN Commissions of Inquiry and Sect. 4.3 on codes of conduct by armed groups.

  131. Hiemstra and Nohle (2017), p. 27.

  132. Mastorodimos (2015), p. 133.

  133. Tomlinson (2012), p. 59.

  134. Art. 34 of the Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary para. 2.

  135. For instance, Geneva Call has self-monitoring systems where armed groups report directly to the organization and they also conduct field missions to verify compliance in the event of allegations of violations. On the advantages of self-reporting see Sivakumaran (2015), pp. 144–145.

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    Laura Íñigo Álvarez

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This article is based on the research carried out in the PhD dissertation ‘Towards a regime of responsibility of armed groups in international law’ at Utrecht University. The book has just been published by Intersentia in July 2020.

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Íñigo Álvarez, L. The Obligation to Provide Reparations by Armed Groups: A Norm under Customary International Law?. Neth Int Law Rev 67, 427–452 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-020-00176-1

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