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A Public Law View of the New Generation of FTAs

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Abstract

This article intends to consider what the new generation of FITs might signify for our understanding of public law. Rather than modelling international public law or questioning its legitimacy derived from national public law (or one independently generated), I want to focus on a ‘public law’ thread running through all of this. The analysis here traces the transliteration of investment protection arbitration from public international law to international public law. It begins first by briefly outlining the established position of foreign direct investment protection in public international law. It then reviews the public law character claimed for investor-state arbitration, a claim which is criticised. And finally the analysis considers how those public law elements can feed ‘international public law’. This points to forms of transnational legal pluralism and I consider at the end what the implications may be for a conception of state and law.

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Notes

  1. Regarding usage here: call them what you will, FITs or international investment treaties (IITs) take many forms, whether free-standing bilateral (BITs) or multilateral treaties, or as part of larger ‘trade and investment partnerships’ (TIPs), such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada (CETA), or the treaties negotiated by the EU and Vietnam, Japan, Singapore, and so on, the still-born Trans Pacific Partnership (TTP) or its replacement, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CTTPP, now excluding the US). For the sake of simplicity, here ‘FIT’ will cover all of these instances whether or not the treaty includes a trade component, and unless otherwise specified. The text of most BITs and arbitration awards are available on the ITA database: https://www.italaw.com.

  2. See, e.g., Elkins et al. (2008); Schultz and Dupont (2015).

  3. North American Free Trade Agreement (1993) 32 ILM 289, 605 (in force 1994), replacing the 1988 US-Canada Free Trade Agreement to include Mexico. NAFTA is being replaced by the ‘Canada-US-Mexico Agreement’ (CUSMA) executed by the parties in late 2018 and still making its way through domestic implementation procedures. For the text of CUSMA, see, https://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng. European Energy Charter Treaty (1994) UNTS I-36116 (in force 1998): https://energycharter.org/process/energy-charter-treaty-1994/energy-charter-treaty/.

  4. UNCTAD (2019a, b). See further the UNCTAD website http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA. This and all websites referenced herein were last accessed on 18 June 2019.

  5. UNCTAD (2019a) superseding UNCTAD, ‘IIA Issues Note: Developments in international investment policymaking’ (May 2018).

  6. EU Concept Paper (2015) Investment in TTIP and beyond—The Path for Reform, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF.

  7. For example, Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Russia have terminated their participation in FITs. See, e.g, Maupin (2014); Blythe (2013), pp. 275–276; Karl (2008), pp. 232 et seq.

  8. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part [2017] OJ L 11, pp. 23–1079.

  9. Adopting for purposes of argument here the position of, e.g., Kumm (2004, 2009). See also the contributions in Klabbers et al. (2011) sketching the possibilities of an internationalised public law. It is not necessary here for me to sketch out or rely on any precise contours of ‘international public law’.

  10. Paulus (2009), p. 109, completing in effect the ‘constitutional reading of the constitutive instruments’ as advocated there. See also the analysis of CETA and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) in this vein by Stoll and Holterhus (2016).

  11. For example, Schwöbel (2010) provides a taxonomy of four possible and interlocking top-down conceptions: social, institutional, normative, analogical. Thus the approach of, e.g., Martinez (2003); Franck (2005); Howard (2017) proposing improvements to the system of investor-state arbitration with an eye on ‘output legitimacy’.

  12. See, e.g., van Harten (2007, 2010, 2013) as representative statements of his work.

  13. See, e.g., Schill (2010, 2011, 2012a, b); Schill and Djanic (2018); Jacob and Schill (2015); Petersmann (2008, 2012, 2015, 2017); Petersmann and Joerges (2006) as leading statements of their work.

  14. See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByYear.

  15. 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 575 UNTS 159 (ICSID Convention)). Not only various BITs, but also the European Energy Charter (ECT) (1994) UNTS I-36116 (in force 1998): see, e.g., https://energycharter.org/process/energy-charter-treaty-1994/energy-charter-treaty/ and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have contributed an increasing number of investor-state arbitrations. NAFTA accounts for slightly more than 60 cases, and the ECT around 113.

  16. UNCTAD (2019a, b) and as updated on its website http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByYear. First generation FITs account for almost all of these cases. UNCTAD lists 9 cases arising out of agreements dating from 2010, and slightly more than 800 from agreements dating between 1990 and 2009: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicableIia.

  17. See https://www.icj-cij.org/en/list-of-all-cases.

  18. See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_body_e.htm; WTO (2015).

  19. Schill (2011), pp. 84–85; Legum (2015).

  20. The fact grounding the analysis by and the critique of van Harten (2007). See also Gazzini (2012); Karl (2008), pp. 232 et seq.

  21. 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 575 UNTS 159 (ICSID Convention)).

  22. 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330 UNTS 38 (New York Convention).

  23. For an overview of the regimes and administering bodies, see the UNCTAD website https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement.

  24. While conventional in private commercial arbitration, these features have long been insupportable, if not outright prohibited, in any well-functioning public justice system. Arbitrators and their system of appointment have been the focus of much criticism: see, e.g., van Harten (2010, 2012); Puig (2014); Schneiderman (2010).

  25. Following the basic principles of international arbitration: Douglas (2009); Sornarajah (2017).

  26. Including van Harten and Loughlin (2006); van Harten (2007); Schneiderman (2008, 2016); Schill (2010, 2011), pp. 78 et seq.; Schill (2012b); Schill and Djanic (2018); Jacob and Schill (2015); Petersmann (2008, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2017); Cutler (2016); Montt (2009); Kulick (2012, 2015); Burke-White and von Staden (2010a, b); against investor-state arbitration as international commercial (private) law: Brower (2008); van Aaken (2009). See also Maupin (2014) suggesting a model to reconcile the public elements with the private: Douglas (2004).

  27. Following here Goldsmith and Levinson (2009).

  28. Schill (2011), pp. 78 et seq.; see also Schill (2012a); Jacob and Schill (2015); Schill and Djanic (2018), pp. 42, 54 et seq. In agreement: Petersmann (2015, 2016) international investment law ought to do and can do more (in reply to Schneiderman (2016)).

  29. Alvarez and Topalian (2012); Douglas (2004); Burke White and von Staden (2010a), p. 285.

  30. Schneiderman (2008), pp. 74 et seq., 205 et seq. Sornarajah (2016) notes that the doctrines have arisen and developed at exponential rates since 1999. For background information on these administrative law doctrines and their national variations, see, e.g., Schill and Djanic (2018), p. 46 (proportionality an import from German law); Kingsbury and Schill (2009); Wade and Forsythe (2009); Brown (2011); Levinson (1998); Rubenstein Reiss (2015).

  31. Examples are legion here; see, e.g, Eiser Infrastruture v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36 (Award, 4 May 2017); Masdar Solar v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1 (16 May 2018); Foresight Luxemburg Solar v. Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/150 (Award, 14 November 2018); Wirtgen v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 2014-03 (Award, 11 October 2017); Antaris v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL PCA CASE No. 2014-0 (Award, 2 May 2018, Born dissenting); MESA Power v. Canada, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 2012-17 (Award, 24 March 2016); EDF International et al. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23 (Award, 11 June 2012); El Paso v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 (Award, 30 October 2011); CMS Gas v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (Award, 12 May 2005); LG & E v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (Award, 25 July 2007); see also Paine (2018).

  32. Eli Lilly v. Canada, UNCITRAL Case No. UNCT/14/2 (Award, 16 March 2017).

  33. See, e.g., EDF Internationalet al. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23 (Award, 11 June 2012); El Paso v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 (Award, 30 October 2011); Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (Award, 8 July 2016) but regulatory stasis (by way of officials’ representations grounding a legitimate expectation) does continue to feature before panels.

  34. Including, e.g., Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18 (Award, 26 July 2007) (mala fides by prosecutorial authorities); Waste Management v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2 (Award, 2 June 2000); Metalclad v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Award, 30 August 2000); Loewen v. USA, ICSID (Add. Fac.) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (Award, 26 June 2003); Saipem v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7 (Award, 30 June 2009); Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No. Arb/05/22 (Award, 24 July 2008); Bilcon, Clayton,et al. v. Canada, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 2009-04 (Award, 17 March 2015); Cervin & Rhone v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/2 (Award, 7 March 2017); Teinver v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1 (Award, 21 July 2017). In Loewen, although the administration of justice in Mississippi was shown to be unfair and unreliable, its errors and faults did not factor into deciding the narrow NAFTA claim pleaded. In Saipem, the determinative issue was the relationship between the Bangaldeshi courts and international commercial arbitration, rather than corruption or unreliability.

  35. Usually expressly so stipulated in the FIT, e.g., CETA Art. 8.31; see also Douglas (2009); Sornarajah (2017).

  36. Oestergetel v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL (Award, 23 April 2012); Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13 (Award, 6 November 2008); International Thunderbird v. Mexico, UNCITRAL (Award, 26 January 2006); Mondev v. US, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 (Award, 11 October 2002); Metalclad v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Award, 30 August 2000).

  37. Bilcon, Clayton,et al. v. Canada, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 2009-04 (Award, 17 March 2015); Loewen v. USA, ICSID (Add. Fac.) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (Award, 26 June 2003); Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18 (Award, 26 July 2007); Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (Award, 8 July 2016); Frontier Petroleum v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (Award 12 November 2010); RosInvest v. Russian Federation AWA, SCC Arb. V 079/2005 (Award, 12 September 2010).

  38. Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (Award, 8 July 2016) (Born dissenting).

  39. Saipem v. Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7 (Award, 30 June 2009); ATA v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2 (Award, 18 May 2010); White Industries v. India, UNCITRAL (Award, 30 November 2011); SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, Interim Order, 17 December 2007); SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13 (Discontinuance, 29 May 2004); Loewen v. USA, ICSID (Add. Fac.) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (Award, 26 June 2003).

  40. Schill (2010, 2011). See also Montt (2009).

  41. Karl (2008), pp. 232 et seq.; Arato (2019) (assessing the impact on states’ regulatory behaviour in private law matters).

  42. See, e.g., Elkins et al. (2008); Sornarajah (2008); Cutler (2016), pp. 100–102.

  43. Blythe (2013); see Bronckers (2015). Loewen v. USA, ICSID (Add. Fac.) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (Award, 26 June 2003), of course, would be a forceful counter-example impugning the legal system of a developed nation (and supporting Bronckers’ thesis).

  44. Reflecting in part the recurring thesis and critique in Sornarajah (2006, 2015, 2016), see also Cutler (2016); van Harten (2013).

  45. See, e.g., CMS Gas v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (Award, 12 May 2005); Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/02 (Award, 29 May 2003). This is the thrust of the critique in, e.g., Schneiderman (2008), pp. 98–105, 208–213, the works in Perry-Kessaris (2014); Cutler (2016), p. 123; Cutler (2018); Perrone (2016); Sornarajah (2008) and motivates the drive to open arbitration to third-party submissions.

  46. Burke-White and von Staden (2010a), pp. 285–286.

  47. On ‘ordoliberalism’: Callison (2017); Schneiderman (2008, 2016).

  48. E.g., Arts. 52 and 53 of the ICSID Convention, Art. V of the New York Convention.

  49. Art. 53(1) of the ICSID Convention.

  50. Mexico v. Metalclad (2001) BCSC 664 (BCSC).

  51. See, e.g., Poland v. Eureko (26 November 2006) Brussels First Instance (71st Cham); International Thunderbird Gaming v. Mexico (14 February 2007) DC (Colum.); Canada (Attorney General) v. Clayton (2018) FC 436 (FCTD).

  52. UNCTAD (2018) remarked on a ‘turning point’ in investment treaty making, with 2017 seeing the fewest numbers of new FITs concluded since 1983. Even accounting for market saturation, terminations of FITs (22) outnumbered newly-concluded ones (18) or new ones entering into force. Since 2012 some 100 FITs have been terminated. More than 480 FITs concluded over 10 years ago have not yet entered into force. Moreover, certain states have halted the ratification of their FITs or have stopped concluding them completely. For states seeking to develop or maintain their investment and trade treaty relationships, older treaties—the ‘first generation models’—are being replaced with ‘new generation’ models, or are having their provisions amended and updated accordingly. Much of the focus in all these changes is investor-state arbitration.

  53. Sornarajah (2006, 2016) (noting the appearance of FET principles only as of 1999); see also Dumberry (2016, 2017).

  54. Schill (2011), pp. 78–79.

  55. In addition to being one of the primary points motivating the criticisms of investor-state arbitration, see also Brown (2010), p. 660 who plainly admits that the community of interests is made up of those using the foreign investment system. Thus also the contention of Burke-White and von Staden (2010a and 2010b) that investor-state arbitration needs a broader public law focus because of its impacts on a broader constituencies. See also Cutler (2016, 2018).

  56. Chevron and Texaco v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 34877 (Award, 31 August 2011); Bilcon, Clayton,et al. v. Canada, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 2009-04 (Award, 17 March 2015); Bear Creek Mining v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21 (30 November 2017); Metalclad v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Award, 30 August 2000); Waste Management v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2 (Award, 2 June 2000); Lone Pinev.Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2 (pending) (provinces imposing new restrictions on existing mining licences to prohibit fracking); Rockhopper v. Italy, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/14 (pending) (Italy’s reintroduction of a ban against oil exploration and production within the 12-mile coastal band).

  57. Bilcon, Clayton,et al.v. Canada, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 2009-04 (Award, 17 March 2015); Bear Creek Mining v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21 (30 November 2017).

  58. Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 (Award, 8 July 2016).

  59. Eiser Infrastruture v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36 (Award, 4 May 2017); Masdar Solar v. Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1 (16 May 2018); Foresight Luxemburg Solar v. Spain, SCC Case No. 2015/150 (Award, 14 November 2018); Wirtgen v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 2014-03 (Award, 11 October 2017); Antaris v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL PCA CASE No. 2014-0 (Award, 2 May 2018, Born dissenting).

  60. Dumberry (2016, 2017); Porterfield (2006) examining whether the tests developed not by states but by international arbitration panels could constitute customary international law. Yet consider the criticism of Sornorajah (2016).

  61. While the awards arising out of the Argentinian debt crisis and Ecuador’s management of its natural resources fund the standard citations in support (and the critique), as well as the Spanish solar subsidy cases, there are other and more recent examples as well: Vattenfall v. FRG, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6 (Award, 11 March 2011); Metalclad v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Award, 30 August 2000); Waste Management v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2 (Award, 2 June 2000); Lone Pinev.Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2 (pending); Rockhopper v. Italy, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/14 (pending). See also Perrone (2016).

  62. Howse (2008), pp. 73 et seq. notes the impact that international economic law has on domestic government and on the way public power is organised and exercised. See also Hindelang and Hagemeyer (2017); Hindelang and Krajewski (2016); Schill and Djanic (2018). With an added South American input, see, e.g., Shan (2008).

  63. See https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/. In August 2018 it announced proposals for a major revision to its rules, and is consulting extensively with stakeholders. This includes considering the possibility of a multilateral investment court. The NAFTA rules (until CUSMA takes effect) and UNCITRAL rules have also seen similar adjustments. These efforts by the ICSID and UNCTAD, however, pertain to structural changes, rather than normative or substantive ones extending to supervisory jurisdiction and norms.

  64. In 1998, sustained public criticism from civil society and other groups killed support for the 1995 OECD-sponsored ‘Multilateral Agreement on Investment’ (MAI). Attempts to resurrect it thereafter in the context of WTO negotiations failed. Ironically, though, its conception of investor-state arbitration became the core text for foreign investment protection provisions in first generation FITs. See also Howard (2017).

  65. 2017 Key elements of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement—Memo: ‘11. Investment […] The EU has also tabled to Japan its reformed proposal on the Investment Court System. For the EU, it is clear that there can be no return to the old-style Investor to State Dispute Settlement System (ISDS)’, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1955. Whether the changes advanced under the ICSID and UNCITRAL may be read as an attempt to preserve the market share of those institutions in response to the new generation of FITs is a question left for another time.

  66. Alvarez and Topalian (2012), p. 492 (‘[…] [T]he Argentina cases show that the international investment regime is the enemy of the state’); Sornarajah (2016) calling the system ‘fraudulent’.

  67. Leading critiques of investor-state arbitration include, among others, van Harten (2007); Schneiderman (2008, 2013); Sornarajah (2015); as well as van Harten and Scott (2015) (on a potential regulatory chill); Brown (2013) (regulatory chill); Franck (2005) (institutional perspective and remedies); Tienhaara (2011); Tienhaara (2018) (from an environmental protection perspective).

  68. See Karl (2008), p. 232 for just such a ‘cost–benefit analysis’. And see, for instance, Roberts (2010) emphasising that states retain the power of defining treaty standards to which they are subject.

  69. Howse (2008).

  70. In addition to the critiques of international investment law cited above, see also (from a private law point of view) Arato (2019).

  71. See, e.g. Buchanan (2002); Buchanan and Keohane (2006) regarding the constraints of political legitimacy.

  72. Model BITs, which disclose a likely or advised starting position for state negotiations, had already started to show substantive and substantial revisions along these lines. See https://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties (e.g. Canada 2004, IISD).

  73. See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/.

  74. Ibid.

  75. Esp. Art. 14 CUSMA.

  76. Howard (2017); Levesque (2017), p. 67.

  77. Levesque (2017); Mbengue and Schachere (2019).

  78. As argued, among others, prominently by Schill (2010); Jacob and Schill (2015).

  79. Ohler (2016), pp. 239–242 characterises CETA’s structural and jurisdictional evolution in terms of ‘democratic legitimacy’ and supporting the ‘rule of law’.

  80. The EU’s experience with ever increasing ECT arbitration over solar power subsidy programmes in Spain (also in the Czech and Slovak Republics) playing no doubt a background role.

  81. Costa v. ENEL (Case C-6/64) [1964] ECR 585 (ECJ); Van Gend en Loos v. Ned. Admin. der Belastingen (Case 26/62) [1963] ECR 1 (ECJ).

  82. See, e.g., Cappeletti (1987); Koopmans (1986), pp. 926–927: ‘This institutional trend can also be traced in the early case law of the Court of Justice. The things that mattered in the 1950 s and the early 1960s were subjects like the autonomy of the High Authority vis-à-vis the Member States, the Community legal system as a legal order in its own right, the priority of this legal order over national law, and the effect of Treaty obligations on the rights of citizens—the line of authority of Van Gend & Loos and Costal ENEL, in a way.’ [footnote omitted].

  83. Rather than repeating the list here, I refer the reader to the References.

  84. Taking Krisch (2010) and Zumbansen (2010) as primary reference points. See also Paiement (2013).

  85. Advocated by, among others, Howard (2017); Franck (2005). Martinez (2003) argues for a systemic, integrated view (national–international) to be in place before any suggestions are evaluated.

  86. See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/ (for EU trade and investment) and https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/text-texte/cptpp-ptpgp.aspx?lang=eng (for the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, CPATPP).

  87. See the note above. The EU-Mexico Agreement-in-Principle (as of June 2018) tracks in greater detail the path struck by CETA.

  88. See, e.g., Hofmann and Tams (2012); Kulick (2012); Titi (2014); Mouyal (2016); Ghodoosi (2017); Cutler (2016); Hindelang and Krajewski (2016) exploring the various domestic social and economic interests that ought to be (and in new-generation FITs are supposed to be) weighed equally favourably—if not determinatively—against the interests of foreign direct investment. See also the contributions in Sacerdoti et al. (2014), pp. 163–262.

  89. Loveland (2006), pp. 31 et seq.; Bradley et al. (2015), pp. 45 et seq.; Régimbald and Newman (2017), pp. 72 et seq. The Constitutions of the US and Canada confer ‘powers’ on their respective legislative branches, not ‘rights’, as does, e.g., that of Belgium. And see Marsilius of Padua (1980), pp. 15 et seq., 34 et seq., 45 et seq. (discussing Arisottle).

  90. Putting to one side the potential questions about public international law and international relations.

  91. See, e.g., Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver-General of New Brunswick [1892] AC 437 (PC Can); Wheare (1951), pp. 11 et seq. Note that explicit reference to a sub-state entity’s rights, as in the US doctrine of ‘states’ rights’, only arises in the competition between the interests of that sub-state entity and the federal level within the overriding legal framework of the US Constitution.

  92. In this discussion, however, I do not want to be understood as invoking or engaging with Hohfeld’s theory of jural opposites and correlatives.

  93. See, as the customary framing of ‘rights’, e.g., Alexy (2004), pp. 19, 114 et seq. And see therefore the view of Dicey on constitutionally conferred powers: Dicey (1967), pp. 91 et seq., 150–151.

  94. So, too, in federations, as between the federal constituents. Admittedly in these situations the courts delimit legislative and administrative jurisdiction. But this in and of itself does not translate a state’s legislative jurisdiction into a ‘right to regulate’.

  95. As suggested by, inter alia, Petersmann (2012, 2017); Petersmann and Joerges (2006); Schill (2011); Jacob and Schill (2015); Schill and Djanic (2018), but all with the underlying assumption that international economic law could be fully and coherently integrated into a wider international public law system of principles and rules, a globalised constitutionalism.

  96. Schill (2011, 2012b), at pp. 86–93, 96 et seq., has suggested that a comparative law approach may be able to generate and fund such a pool of ‘general principles of public law’. But I do not read him as suggesting (at least as things now stand) a coherent, uniform, single system. See also, e.g., Paulus (2009); Kulick (2012).

  97. Kelsen (1967).

  98. Relying generally on Zumbansen (2010); Krisch (2010); Petersmann (2008, 2012, 2017); Held (1995); Kumm (2009), and very broadly on their conceptual roots in Teubner’s theory of autopoiesis and Luhman’s systems theory.

  99. See, e.g., Schill (2010); Kingsbury and Schill (2009); Stone-Sweet (2010). More broadly in international economic law, see, e.g., Andenas and Zleptnig (2008) (the WTO context).

  100. Schill (2012b); Endicott (2017), pp. 286–287; Craig (2009), pp. 622 et seq.; Wade and Forsythe (2009), pp. 305 et seq.

  101. Endicott (2017), pp. 286–287; Craig (2009), pp. 622 et seq.

  102. R v. Oakes (1985), and see, e.g., Choudhry (2006); Johnston (2009).

  103. For a recent theoretical analysis of proportionality, with particular attention to the problems surrounding the essential balancing exercise required, see Huscroft, Miller and Webber (2017).

  104. As in the ‘ordoliberalism’ exchange between Schneiderman (2016); Petersmann (2016); see also Schneiderman (2013); Perry-Kessaris (2014) (for a left of centre analysis); Sornarajah (2008) (criticising the neo-liberal ideology of international investment law).

  105. The effect is simply to distinguish ordinarily non-compensable limiting regulation from indirect or creeping expropriation, and a state may still be liable under some other FIT obligation or standard. See, e.g., Barker (2012), pp. 242 et seq., 256–257.

  106. Alternative characterisations, especially relying on the FET standard (in first-generation FITs), is commonplace. For example, increased tariffs for R&D in Mobil Oil and Murphy Oil v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4 (Award, 20 February 2015, Philippe Sands dissenting) and reduced export quotas in Pope and Talbot v. Canada (Interim Award, 26 June 2000) (NAFTA) were deemed not to be expropriations, but in both cases they did constitute breaches of other NAFTA Treaty obligations and standards.

  107. One of the critical elements in the argument that investor-state arbitration is a form of global administrative/public law, following van Harten and Loughlin (2006).

  108. Borrowing from Hart (1994) (including the ‘internal perspective’); from Berger and Luckman (1991); Searle (1995). See also Koskenniemi (2005), p. 548 (citing Weber).

  109. Recognised as long ago as Montesquieu (1989), Pt 1, Bk 1, Ch. 3, pp. 8–9.

  110. Benvenisti (2013), for example, would activate this into a concrete principle of trusteeship—the state being the trustee of its human and material capital for the benefit of all of the people (present, and future), and Buchanan (2002) considers it a moral precondition to legitimate democratic government. See also Buchanan and Keohane (2006) in respect of international institutions.

  111. Raising obviously problems in democratic practice regarding voting rights and such like, as evidencing a voice in policy and rule-making.

  112. The recent increased attention devoted in investment scholarship to improving ‘sustainable development’ in international investment law represents a signal admission against interest by the industry. See e.g., Sacerdoti et al. (2014); Hindelang and Krajewski (2016).

  113. In the context of international organizations, see for example Steffek (2015) who calls for closer attention to the democratic character of their ‘output legitimacy’.

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Acknowledgments

My thanks to the organisers of the 2018 Ius Commune Conference Workshop, where an earlier version of this paper was presented, for their efforts in co-ordinating the publication of those papers with the NILR, to the anonymous reviewers, and to the editorial team of the NILR for their patience and understanding in accommodating unforeseen exigencies. All errors remain the responsibility of the author.

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Haljan, D. A Public Law View of the New Generation of FTAs. Neth Int Law Rev 66, 237–270 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40802-019-00142-6

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