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Justice as the Virtue of “No Unacceptable Harm to the Human”

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Abstract

Through a semantic analysis of such common words as “good,” “right,” and “rights,” this article tries to argue that “justice” as a value-term basically means “no unacceptable harm to the human” or “respecting the deserved rights of the human” in the meta-ethical sense. In real life, then, the becoming of universal justice as an authentic moral virtue depends first and foremost upon the concrete and dynamic cultivation of such a universalistic ethical attitude: regarding neither merely oneself nor some persons specially related to oneself, but everyone as the “human,” and valuing all of them morally important and dignified so as not to do morally unacceptable harm to them, but to respect their deserved rights.

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Notes

  1. As for the differentiation between the so-called meta-ethics and normative ethics, see Frankena (1973, pp. 4–5, 96).

  2. For Chinese texts in this article, I have referred to the following English translations before adding my own modifications: Chan (1963), Knoblock (1988–1994), Lau (1970), Legge (1960), and Watson (1963).

  3. It is quite strange that, although modern Western scholars have researched into the relationship between the good and the right for a long time and often made a clear definition of the value-term of the “good” as “desirability,” they have scarcely made a clear definition of the value-term of the “right” as “acceptability,” even if they themselves have also understood and used it in this very sense.

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Liu, Q. Justice as the Virtue of “No Unacceptable Harm to the Human”. Fudan J. Hum. Soc. Sci. 10, 179–192 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40647-017-0165-z

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