Abstract
The argument from causal closure of the physical (CCP) is usually considered the most powerful argument in favor of the ontological doctrine of physicalism. Many authors, most notably Papineau, assume that CCP implies that physicalism is supported by physics. I demonstrate, however, that physical science has no bias in the ontological debate between proponents of physicalism and dualism. I show that the arguments offered for CCP are effective only against the accounts of mental causation based on the action of the mental forces of a Newtonian nature, i.e. those which manifest themselves by causing accelerations. However, it is conceivable and possible that mental causation is manifested through the redistribution of energy, momentum and other conserved quantities in the system, brought about by altering the state probability distribution within the living system and leading to anomalous correlations of neural processes. After arguing that a probabilistic, interactionist model of mental causation is conceivable, which renders the argument from causal closure of the physical ineffective, I point to some basic features that such a model must have in order to be intelligible. At the same time, I indicate the way that conclusive testing of CCP can be done within the theoretical framework of physics.
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Notes
Bishop (2012, 61), for example, argues that “physics neither proves its own completeness nor needs such a principle”, and that CCP “makes no mention of anything but physical properties and laws”, so that CCP “clearly must be a metaphysical principle”.
By Newtonian forces I will always mean the causes of acceleration of the particles that make up the physical system – not just the forces in classical Newtonian mechanics.
Cf. Garcia (2014, 97).
For a discussion of the implications of the equivalence of these two formalisms and the ontological status of force see Wilson (2007).
In this sense, (F 1) and (E 1) imply that living organisms and their brains can be studied as conservative systems, inasmuch as they can be isolated from the environment. An anonymous reviewer correctly objected that there is no good argument supporting the claim that biological organisms or their brains can be viewed as isolated systems. Indeed, the notion of an isolated system is just a useful idealization even when applied to much simpler physical systems, let alone to living organisms and their brains - extremely complex systems, hardly ever in equilibrium, with a constant flux of energy in and out of them. However, all that the defender of (F 2) needs to show is that physiological research has never revealed a violation of the balance of energy, or any other conserved quantity in an organic subsystem, which cannot be physically accounted for; the claim that conservation of energy would apply to those subsystems if they were perfectly isolated follows by induction. This is pretty much a standard procedure in physics, in cases where there is no way to isolate a subsystem inside some impenetrable boundary. In force-based terminology, this is equivalent to the claim that no unaccounted for forces have been found. For a recent discussion of the fact that physics regularly uses heavy idealizations of its properties and laws and of limits of such idealizations see Teller (2004).
The claims (G 1) and (G 2) are true for any physical force, both in classical and in quantum domain. Otherwise, a force would violate either the laws of conservation of energy and/or momentum (by affecting a physical system without altering its energy or momentum), or the Second Law of Thermodynamics (by redistributing the energy and momentum without supplying them to the system, which means without doing work).
This claim is valid weather the Papineau’s argument is exhibited in the force-based or the energy-based formalism, because these formalisms are – as demonstrated – physically equivalent. The very notion of a conservative force implies, in order to be defined, the introduction of the idealization of an isolated system, as opposed to the open systems with boundaries through which there is a flux of energy and other conserved quantities. The work of the force is numerically equal to the increase of energy of the system on which the force acts, which is necessarily accompanied by the equal decrease of the energy of the system which performs the action. Consequently, saying that A causes an acceleration of B through a force is equivalent to saying that causation is manifested by the transference of energy from A to B. Therefore, by choosing to identify forces with causes of acceleration Papineau committed himself to the transference theory of causation. I thank the anonymous reviewer for requiring me to clarify this point.
Consideration of various interpretations of specific elements of quantum theory designed in order to challenge CCP and construct an interactionist model of causation is beyond the scope of this paper. For some of the interesting ideas of this kind see e.g. Penrose (1994), Beck and Eccles (1992), Stapp (1993), and Schwartz et al. (2004).
Averil and Keating expressed in no uncertain terms that “changes in the energy of non-physical things are undefined, i.e. there is no way of specifying the state of a non-physical thing in terms of the variables of physics” (Averil and Keating 1981, 105).
In quantum mechanics the entropy is given by Von Neumann’s expression S = − kBTr(ρ ln ρ) where Tr is a trace operator, and ρ is density matrix.
Chalmers, though, built his naturalistic dualism on the assumption that only phenomenal, but not intentional properties are irreducible, so that under psychophysical laws he means those that connect the fundamental phenomenal properties with the physical. In this work I proceed from the standpoint that the dualist model should be consistent and include all mental properties in a unique causal mechanism. On this point I concur with Bishop who, commenting on causation at work in human behavior, stated that “focusing on intentional states is likely too narrow for us to gain a fuller insight into meaningful human action”. (Bishop 2012, 59).
The discussion can be easily generalized to grand canonical ensembles, which exchange both energy and particles with the environment. Although such an analysis would be more realistic, given the open nature of the biophysical systems, for the sake of simplicity and illustrativeness I will limit myself to the consideration of canonical ensembles.
In a similar manner, in order to define the state of a system under certain contextual conditions Bishop introduces ‘contextual topology’, “constructed by picking out particular reference states and defining the appropriate observables for these states” (Bishop 2012, 71).
Cf. Lowe (2008, 74).
Chalmers (1996) suggested the principle of structural coherence as the bridge from features of physical processes to features of experience, in order to explain the structure of the phenomenal domain. His idea is based on the assumption that consciousness supervenes on the functional organization of the brain. Although an interactive dualist will hardly agree with the latter assumption and consequently reject the explanatory value of Chalmers’ principle, she may find the suggestion of structural coherence rather useful as a means of quantifying mental parameters, because it establishes a functional link between physical and mental properties.
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Dimitrijević, D.R. Causal closure of the physical, mental causation, and physics. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 10, 1 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-019-0267-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-019-0267-3