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Two challenges for a boolean approach to constitutive inference

  • Paper in the Philosophy of the Life Sciences
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Abstract

This paper discusses two challenges for a Boolean method for establishing constitutive regularity statements which, according to the regularity theory of mechanistic constitution, form the core of any mechanistic explanation in neuroscience. After presenting the regularity definition for the constitution relation and a methodology for constitutive inference, the paper discusses the problem of full variation of tested mechanistic factors and the problem of informational redundancy. A solution is offered for each problem. The first requires some adjustments to the original theory by introducing the technical notion of a set of types satisfying independent instantiability. The second one is resolved by demonstrating that the problem of informational redundancy is based on a confusion that fails to challenge the theory. It is concluded that the methodology of constitutive inference is consistent and plausible with respect to actual practice in neuroscience.

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Notes

  1. See also Couch (2011).

  2. Note that there is also a growing body of literature showing that mechanistic explanation is not the only kind of explanation in cognitive science or the life sciences (cf. Rusanen and Lappi 2007; Huneman 2010; Waskan 2011; Rice 2013; Ross 2015).

  3. For further important contributions on the brain networks constituting the tendency to group conformity, see Berns et al. (2005) and the study by Klucharev et al. (2009).

  4. Readers familiar with Harbecke (2010), Harbecke (2013b), Harbecke (2014b), Harbecke (2015a), and Harbecke (2015b) and Couch (2011) may want to skip Section 3 and continue with Section 4.

  5. Note that this understanding of constitution reflects what in metaphysics and philosophy of mind has been described as a “supervenience relation” (cf. McLaughlin and Bennett2008).

  6. Compare this approach to the notion of specific variables as proposed in Spohn (2006).

  7. The mereological theory presupposed here is General Extensional Mereology (GEM) as explicated by (Varzi 2009).

  8. Note that, this reconstruction simplifies the target data used by Domes et al. was statistical and not binary. Neverthelss, the authors present the results in a binary way by describing the reaction levels as “higher” vs. “lower” and as “enhanced” vs. “normal” (Domes et al. 2007, 1188).

  9. Note that in hypotheses M\(_{GC}^{M_{2}}\) and M\(_{GC}^{M_{2^{\ \prime }}}\), the expressions “X3” and “\(M_{3}\mathbf {X}_{3}^{\prime }\)” state exactly the same conditions; the latter merely makes more constituting mechanistic factors explicit than the former.

  10. One may object that, since F3 is causally sufficient for F5 and F6, any manipulation of F5 will target F3 and therefore be a manipulation of F6 as well. Hence, no systematic variation is possible within the slice. Without going much into depth here, the implicit assumption in the text is that the interventions on types F5 and F6 required for the difference test will not have to involve a change in the causes of F5 and F6 but change them directly to bring about the situations for comparison. This ensures independent variation within a slice.

  11. Lorenzo Casini (University of Geneva) presented this objection at the 3rd Annual Conference Society for the Metaphysics of Science at Fordham University in his “Comment on Harbecke”, 5th October 2017.

  12. For authors defending different versions of proportionality, see Yablo 1992; McGrath 1998; Shoemaker 2000; McLaughlin 2007; Schröder 2007; Crane 2008; Woodward 2008; List and Menzies 2009; Weslake 2013; Harbecke 2008, 2013a, 2014a; Harbecke and Atmanspacher 2012; Bernstein 2014.

  13. Note that the original objection formulated by Baumgartner and Gebharter (2016) and Baumgartner and Casini (2017) differs slightly from the one reconstructed here for my account as the original one focused on problems in Craver’s (2007) mutual manipulability account, which adapts a theory of causation by Woodward (2003). Nevertheless, both formulations of the objection share the same fundamental intuition.

  14. Note that Gebharter (2017a) has recently promoted a concept of intervention that may mitigate the problem of fat-handedness interventions before it even arises.

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  1. Philosophy of Science, Department of Economics and Department of Psychology, Witten/Herdecke University, Alfred-Herrhausen-Str. 50, 58448, Witten, Germany

    Jens Harbecke

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This article belongs to the Topical Collection: EPSA17: Selected papers from the biannual conference in Exeter

Guest Editors: Thomas Reydon, David Teira, Adam Toon

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Harbecke, J. Two challenges for a boolean approach to constitutive inference. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 9, 17 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-018-0238-0

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