Abstract
In recent years, an increasing number of theoretical biologists and philosophers of biology have been opposing reductionist research agendas by appealing to the concept of biological autonomy which draws on the older concept of autopoiesis. In my paper, I investigate some of the ontological implications of this approach. The emphasis on autonomy and autopoiesis, together with the associated idea of organisational closure, might evoke the impression that organisms are to be categorised ontologically as substances: ontologically independent, well-individuated, discrete particulars. However, I argue that this is mistaken. Autopoiesis and biological autonomy, properly understood, require a rigorous commitment to a process ontological view of life.
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Notes
For a defence of a non-reductionist systems biological stance on organisms that draws on Robert Rosen’s cognate idea of organisms as metabolism-repair systems see Cornish-Bowden (2006).
The term ‘thing’ as I use it is wider than the technical term ‘substance’ that, within the philosophical discourse, refers to either the specific Aristotelian (essentialist) concept of a discrete particular (belonging to some natural kind) or to some of its later derivatives, e.g., the Cartesian concepts of mental versus material substance (substance dualism). It is worth stressing, though, that ‘thing’, in the definition given above, is a technical term too, alluding to the everyday understanding of the word but not necessarily coinciding with it.
For notable exceptions see the overview of the history of process philosophy in Seibt (2016). Seibt, who was the first to promote process philosophy in the context of contemporary analytic metaphysics, has repeatedly diagnosed Western metaphysics with being under the spell of the ‘myth of substance’, see, e.g., Seibt (1997), 143.
The relations between the so-called New Mechanism, substance ontology and process ontology are, however, complex. The New Mechanists do not deny the existence and relevance of processes; instead, most of them endorse a dualistic ontology according to which mechanisms are composed of entities and activities (the latter also being called interactions or operations) (Machamer et al. 2000; Bechtel 2006; Illari and Williamson 2013). Yet, what distinguishes these accounts from genuine process ontological accounts is the assumption that entities composing mechanisms can be identified independently of the activities or processes in which they are involved. This is in line with the further substance ontological tenet that for every process there must be a substance on which this process is ontologically dependent.
A close affinity to process ontology is also apparent in Hans Jonas’ philosophy of the organism (Jonas 2001) as well as in the organicist movement in biology in the mid of last century (most notably, Waddington 1956), both currently being rediscovered by today’s philosophers of biology (Meincke 2018a; Weber and Varela 2002; Gilbert and Sarkar 2000; Nicholson and Gawne 2015).
All italics in quotes are taken from the original if not stated otherwise.
“The actual way in which such an [autopoietic] organization may in fact be implemented in the physical space, that is, the physical structure of the machine, varies according to the nature (properties) of the materials which embody it” (Maturana and Varela 1980, 81).
“It is our assumption that there is an organization that is common to all living systems, whichever the nature of their components” (Maturana and Varela 1980, 76). An even more radical version of this view is Robert Rosen’s relational biology that is said to follow the maxim “Throw away the matter and keep the underlying organization” (Rosen 1991, 119). According to Rosen, “[t]he most materially disparate natural systems can still be analogous” if they share the same “bauplan” (ibid.). “Life is the manifestation of a certain kind of (relational) model. A particular material system is living if it realizes this model” (Rosen 1991, 254).
This is why Maturana and Varela resist categorising autocatalytic processes as instances of autopoiesis: “Autocatalytic processes do not constitute autopoietic systems because among other things, they do not determine their topology. Their topology is determined by a container that is part of the specification of the system, but which is independent of the operation of the autocatalysis” (Maturana and Varela 1980, 94).
Common philosophical understanding stresses the inseparability of matter and form which are taken to constitute a genuine unity according to hylomorphism, as opposed to dualistic accounts.
“We maintain that living systems are machines and by doing this we point at several notions which should be made explicit. First, we imply a non-animistic view which it should be unnecessary to discuss any further. Second, we are emphasizing that a living system is defined by its organization and, hence, that it can be explained as any organization is explained, that is, in terms of relations, not of component properties. Finally, we are pointing out from the start the dynamism apparent in living systems and which the word ‘machine’ connotes.”
Maturana and Varela use the term ‘mechanistic’ as an antonym of ‘vitalistic’ (1980, 74), i.e., devoid of the reductionist connotations the term has today: “Our approach will be mechanistic: no forces or principles will be adduced which are not to be found in the physical universe. Yet, our problem is the living organization and therefore our interest will not be in properties of components, but in processes and relations between processes realized through components” (1980, 75).
Other controversially discussed features of the theory include its dismissal of reproduction and evolution and its equation of life with cognition. For a defence against these criticisms see Luisi (2003).
Moreno recognises this in Moreno and Mossio (2015), 5 f. (fn. 7): “Biological systems maintain themselves but do not generate themselves spontaneously (as wholes, although of course they do generate some [sic] their functional components).”
Maturana and Varela (1980) famously dismiss reproduction as not being essential to life: “Reproduction requires a unity to be reproduced; this is why reproduction is operationally secondary to the establishment of the unity, and it cannot enter as a defining feature of the organization of living systems” (100) (see already footnote 13).
“[T]he the unity’s boundaries, in whichever space the processes exist, is [sic] indissolubly linked to the operation of the system. If the organization of closure is disrupted, the unity disappears” (Varela 1979, 55).
“[…] closure and the system’s identity are interlocked, in such a way that it is a necessary consequence for an organizationally closed system to subordinate all changes to the maintenance of its identity” (Varela 1979, 58).
Varela therefore actually rejects speaking of ‘feedback’ as this concept “requires and implies an external source of reference, which is completely absent in organizational closure” (Varela 1979, 56).
“[A]ll apparent informational exchanges with its environment will be, and can only be, treated as perturbations within the processes that define its closure, and thus no “instructions” or “programming” can possibly exist” (Varela 1979, 58). “Autopoietic machines do not have inputs or outputs. They can be perturbated by independent events and undergo internal structural changes which compensate these perturbations” (Maturana and Varela 1980, 81).
One of these is the question of whether in order for a system to qualify as autopoietic it really has to produce all of its components itself. As we now know, organisms provide accommodation for plenty of other organisms, and even in cells there are components which are not directly produced, such as essential amino acids, maybe also mitochondrial DNA.
Elsewhere this dimension is also referred to as ‘basic autonomy’ (e.g., Moreno and Etxeberria 2005).
Arnellos and Moreno (2015) coin the term ‘constitutive-interactive closure principle’ for the reciprocal relationship between the two dimensions of biological autonomy.
For this and the following see also Montévil and Mossio (2015) on which Moreno and Mossio substantially rely.
For a discussion of this theory of bio-agency with respect to the possibility of artificial agents see Meincke (2018b).
Moreno & Mossio (2015, 52ff.) refuse to rely on the notion of ‘formal causation’ while regarding causation through constraints as a weak form of ‘downward causation’.
I am therefore not entirely convinced of Moreno and Mossio’s criticism that the autopoiesis theory, by lacking “the (explicit) theoretical distinction between processes and constraints” (2015, 6), also fails to provide a sufficiently sharp distinction between living and non-living systems. Maturana and Varela’s emphasis that an autopoietic system “has its own organization (defining network of relations) as the fundamental variable which it maintains constant” (1980, 79), and that the “concatenation of processes” rather than mere processes alone make an organisation autopoietic (79 f.; quoted above), points towards a view in line with the idea that living systems, qua autonomous systems, promote the conditions of their own existence. This does not touch on the point that the theory of biological autonomy deserves credit for fleshing out the interactive dimension inherent in this autopoietic process.
One aspect left out for reasons of space concerns the ontological status of boundaries. The emphasis on boundaries in both the autopoiesis theory and the theory of biological autonomy might seem reminiscent of the idea of a substance as a discrete particular neatly separated from its surroundings. As I intend to show elsewhere, this impression is mistaken. Living boundaries – properly understood – do not isolate the organism from the environment but rather allow for, and enact, the interaction with the environment that is constitutive of the organism’s synchronic and diachronic existence. Living boundaries, in both theories, are processual just as living systems are.
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Acknowledgements
This paper was funded by the European Research Council, grant agreement number 324186 (“A Process Ontology for Contemporary Biology”, grant holder: John Dupré). Previous versions were presented in March 2017 at the workshop “Organisms: Living Systems and Processes” in Exeter, UK, organised by myself and John Dupré as part of the research project, and in September 2017 at the Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA) in Exeter, UK. I am grateful to the audiences for helpful discussions and suggestions. I am also grateful to John Dupré and to two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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This article belongs to the Topical Collection: EPSA17: Selected papers from the biannual conference in Exeter
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Meincke, A.S. Autopoiesis, biological autonomy and the process view of life. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 9, 5 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-018-0228-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-018-0228-2