Abstract
In this paper, we provide new findings that add to the growing body of empirical evidence that important epistemic intuitions converge across cultures. Specifically, we selected three surprising effects of knowledge attribution recently obtained among US-based participants. We translated the vignettes used in the US studies into Mandarin Chinese and Korean and then ran the studies with participants in Mainland China, Taiwan, and South Korea. We found that, strikingly, all three of the effects first obtained in the US also emerged in the East Asian cultures we studied. Our findings not only cohere with but also provide—at least moderate—support for the existence of extensive convergences of important epistemic intuitions across cultures.
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Notes
Though many epistemologists draw on epistemic intuitions in developing their theories, it is a controversial question whether intuitions should play an evidential role in epistemology or philosophy more generally. For metaphilosophical criticisms of the method of cases, which treats intuitions as (at least prima facie) evidence, see, e.g., Williamson 2007, Cappelen 2012, Deutsch 2015, and Machery 2017.
Broadly speaking, epistemic intuitions include intuitions about knowledge attribution, epistemic justification, and so forth. As the focus of this paper (as well in WNS) is on intuitive knowledge attributions, for the sake of simplicity, we often employ the phrase “epistemic intuitions” interchangeably with a more precise phrase “patterns of knowledge attribution.”
See Part 2 for detailed reports of our findings, which complicate but cohere with this simplified summary.
Though Rose et al. (2019) found that lay people across cultures do not take knowledge to be sensitive to practical stakes, their study provides evidence for a distinct form of demographic variation: philosophers vs. lay people, as so many philosophers have the opposite intuition on this issue.
For those wanting to explore our studies in more detail, all of our stimuli and data can be found on OSF (https://osf.io/wspvq/?view_only=96e1a1e94bac41ec986fd173d19f6f35).
We would like to thank a reviewer of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology for urging us to address this important feature of “알고” in the Korean language.
For a contrary, minority stand on the issue, see Turri 2011.
The same was true for all of our studies presented in this paper: we recruited participants with the notice that their contribution would facilitate philosophical understanding of the nature of knowledge, and our participants willingly filled in a short survey without financial compensation.
Our studies all have two versions, one in Korean and the other in Mandarin Chinese, except the Chinese Third-person GESEE study which does not have a Korean counterpart. For studies that have both the Korean and Chinese versions, the experimental design is the same in both versions. After reporting the experimental design in the Korean version for each of our studies, we will omit the information when we report the corresponding Chinese version.
A reviewer of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology doubts whether it is felicitous for Abigail to say “the ticket is a loser” without knowing the actual outcome and suggests that people may interpret “Abigail knows that the ticket is a loser” in terms of “Abigail knows that the chance of the ticket winning is very low.” We acknowledge the possibility that among those who attributed knowledge to Abigail in Lotto, some may have interpreted “the ticket is a loser” as saying “the chance of ticket winning is very low.” As the reviewer pointed out, this possibility cannot be eliminated with the current experimental design that we borrowed from Friedman and Turri’s original study. Nevertheless, most people—both in our study and in Friedman and Turri’s study—did not ascribe knowledge in Lotto, which indicates that they did not interpret “the ticket is a loser” in this deflationary manner; if they had, they would not hesitate to ascribe knowledge. More importantly, assuming that among participants who ascribed knowledge in Lotto, some have done so based on their deflationary interpretation of “the ticket is a loser,” we would expect the probabilistic vs. perceptual evidence effect to be even stronger if the deflationary interpretation is eliminated, because this change is likely to prompt those participants to withdraw their knowledge ascription in Lotto. We would like to thank the reviewer for urging us to address this issue.
Friedman and Turri (2015: 1066) asked three other questions in their original study, which we also asked in our study. Since answers to those questions do not bear on the question of this paper, we did not attend to them.
ESEE has recently been replicated in Kneer et al. 2020.
The essence of GESEE is the robust impact that moral valence has regarding knowledge attribution. Following Buckwalter, we refer to the epistemic side-effect effect obtained in Gettierized cases as GESEE, no matter whether the Gettier intuition is obtained in those cases.
Potentially there are two major approaches to explain this observation: either moral valence directly affects knowledge attribution, or moral valence affects some mediating factor(s) which in turn affect(s) knowledge attribution. For example, Alfano, Beebe and Robinson (2012) argue that differently valenced side-effects engender asymmetric attributions of beliefs, which in turn generates asymmetric attribution of knowledge. Other mediating factors proposed to explain the original side-effect effect on intentionality attribution might, mutatis mutandis, also help explain GESEE (cf. Guglielmo and Malle 2010; Uttich and Lombrozo 2010; Sripada 2012, and Scaife and Webber 2013). Cova, Lantian, and Boudesseul (2016) show that even when controlling for those proposed mediators in mediation analyses, the direct impact of normative considerations remains significant, which suggests that ‘moral evaluations still play an irreducible role in shaping our judgments of intentionality’ (2016: 12). To sum up, it is still an on-going process investigating the true mechanism behind the side-effect effect, including the epistemic side-effect effect. Since our purpose is to investigate the patterns of knowledge attribution across cultures, we do not intend to take a stance on what explanation of this family of effects is ultimately correct.
Mayor and Third-person Mayor cases can be found in the appendix.
Note that while we separated the question of knowledge ascription and the question of confidence level, Buckwalter (2014) only asked the question of knowledge ascription while allowing his participants to answer the question on a seven-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). This difference in our experimental designs does not prevent us from observing whether the GESEE pattern emerges among our participants but may render more detailed comparisons between our results and Buckwatler’s inapplicable.
Though the GESEE pattern didn’t emerge both in our first and our second Chinese study of the third-person mayor case, participants’ responses to the case differed quite substantially between the two studies. Specifically, the participants in the first study did not show the Gettier intuition, while those in the second study did. We think that the difference might be attributed to our different ways of framing the questions after participants read the vignette. In the first Chinese study, we gave participants the translation verbatim of Buckwalter’s third-person mayor case and the question followed, where we asked participants: “Do you agree or disagree with the statement, ‘James the office secretary knew that members of the local community would [get/lose] jobs’?” In the second Chinese study, we changed the office secretary’s name James into Li Ming, and framed the question differently, where we asked participants: “Do you agree or disagree with the statement, ‘Li Ming, the office secretary knew that members of the local community would [get/lose] jobs, as he heard the conversation between the mayor and his economic strategists’?” (see the appendix). We think that the temporal element highlighted in the questions of our second Chinese study helped prompt participants’ Gettier intuition. At the time when Li Ming heard the conversation between the mayor and the economic strategists, the mayor and the economic strategists were deliberating about a contract which was latter secretly swapped by the company and thus was not the one actually causing job increase/decrease. The presence of the temporary element was likely to prime the participants to focus on the causal disconnection between the facts of the world and Li Ming’s true belief about it, and thus led them to the denial of knowledge in both the harm and benefit conditions.
It is contentious whether anyone actually endorsed the analysis of knowledge in terms of justified true beliefs. See Dutant 2015 on this issue.
Markus Kneer et al. (2020) also replicated the knowing without believing effect.
For a discussion of Schulz and Schwitzgebel’s finding, see Buckwalter, Rose, and Turri 2015.
See Knobe, Joshua, Difference and robustness in the patterns of philosophical intuition across demographic groups, forthcoming, for a helpful discussion for this cultural phenomenon.
While we expect extensive cross-cultural convergences of epistemic intuitions, such convergences are compatible with the existence of various cross-cultural divergences of people’s epistemic intuitions. For example, Waterman et al. (2018) found that people across cultures were not equally sensitive to skeptical pressures. Specifically, their studies show that a majority of Chinese and Americans, but only a minority of Indians, withdrew knowledge ascription in zebra-like cases.
Though this discussion focuses on pragmatism and non-pragmatic nativism as potential explanations for extensive epistemic convergences across cultures, we do not assume that the two accounts are the only possible explanations.
Craig (1990) offers a systematic elaboration and defense of the pragmatic understanding of the concept of knowledge. He singles out certifying reliable informants as the purpose of the concept of knowledge. Though we see merits of the pragmatic approach to analyzing the concept of knowledge, we share many critics’ skepticism that the concept of knowledge serves any unique purpose (c.f., for example, Rysiew 2012; Beebe 2012).
This particular claim about our concept of knowledge fits into a broader picture of nativism expounded by Scholl and Leslie (1999), which holds that certain concepts in theory of mind (usually including belief, pretense and desire, etc.) are innate.
The pragmatist and nativist explanations are not mutually exclusive. A concept of knowledge may become innate thanks to natural selection because it serves pragmatic purposes that are so crucial for our survival. Nevertheless, the two explanations can come apart. Even if an element of the concept of knowledge is not innate, it can be part of the shared core concept of knowledge simply due to the same pragmatic purpose that it serves across cultures.
As mentioned, not everyone agrees with this methodology. See footnote 1.
Though the third-person GESEE helps to mitigate the worry that the asymmetry of knowledge attribution in harm and benefit conditions is directly driven by the desire to blame the wrong-doer, it doesn’t rule out that the asymmetry is caused by the general, communal need to hold the wrong-doers responsible. It might be due to the pressure of consistency: that since we want to attribute knowledge to the wrongdoer in order to hold him responsible, we’d better also attribute knowledge to the observer who bases her belief on similar evidence.
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Acknowledgements
For comments on earlier versions of this article, we are grateful to Dan Greco, Yao Lin, Lauro Remmler, John Turri, two anonymous reviewers of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology, and participants in our presentation at Buffalo Annual Experimental Philosophy Conference in 2015. We are also grateful to Sungil Han, Sun-Joo Shin, and Jiewuh Song for their generous assistance in recruiting Korean participants. Finally, we owe special thanks to Joshua Knobe for his tremendous support throughout the process as we worked on this project.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 The mayor case from Buckwalter 2014
The mayor of a small town is trying to decide whether or not to sign a new contract with a local corporation. The math is all very complex, but all his economic strategists think that there’s a relatively good chance that one outcome is that it will [create/cut] jobs for workers in the community. The mayor says, “all I really care about is campaign contributions, not people’s jobs, and I am sure to get millions from the corporation if I agree.” So, he decides to sign their contract. The corporation, however, didn’t take any chances. They secretly switched the contract with a totally different one right before the mayor signed it. By changing all the fine print, in some cases the opposite of what the mayor thought he was signing, the corporation could be sure it got what it wanted. Sure enough, shortly after the mayor signed the contract, a number of members of the community [got/lost] jobs, and the mayor received a huge donation to his reelection campaign.
At the end of the story:
Do you agree or disagree with the statement, “The mayor knew that by signing the contract he would [create/cut jobs]”?
1.2 The third-person mayor case from Buckwalter 2014
The mayor of a small town is trying to decide whether or not to sign a new contract with a local corporation. The contract is very complex, but all his economic strategists think that there’s a relatively good chance that one outcome is that it will [create/cut] jobs for workers in the community. The mayor says, “all I really care about is campaign contributions, not people’s jobs, and I am sure to get millions from the corporation if I agree.” James the office secretary overheard everything, and is appalled by what the mayor said. Nonetheless, the mayor decides to sign the contract. The corporation, however, didn’t take any chances. They secretly switched the contract with a totally different one right before the mayor signed it. By changing all the fine print, in some cases the opposite of what the mayor thought he was signing, the corporation could be sure it got what it wanted. Sure enough, shortly after the mayor signed the contract, a number of members of the community [got/lost] jobs, and the mayor received a huge donation to his reelection campaign.
After the story:
Do you agree or disagree with the statement, “James the office secretary knew that members of the local community would [get/lose] jobs”?
1.3 The Chinese third-person pump case
Wen Bin’s job is to pump water into the cistern, which then supplies the water to the farms owned by several families in the community. One day, as Wen Bin operates the pump, he hears a broadcast on the radio. The radio report says that a new chemical from a nearby factory, chemical X, has found its way into the local reservoir, and that it will be very [beneficial/poisonous] to all the local townspeople’s crops. Wen Bin continues pumping the water while chatting with his girlfriend, “I don’t care about their crops; I just want to earn my pay.” Wen Bin’s friend, Li Ming, overheard everything, and is appalled by what Wen Bin said. Sure enough, the crops started [thriving/dying]. It turned out that the radio broadcast got it wrong about the chemical in the water. After analyzing the water, scientists found no trace of chemical X at all. And later scientific reports further confirmed that the crops were all [thriving/dying] due to a totally different cause, i.e., a fungus that had been secretly growing inside the pump.
Do you agree or disagree with the statement, “Li Ming, Wen Bin’s friend, knew that the townspeople’s crops would [thrive/die], as he heard the broadcast and Wen Bin’s words”?
1.4 The Chinese third-person air case
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “we are thinking of starting a new program. Based on careful and convincing analysis offered by our financial and tech experts, it will help us increase profits, but it will also [improve/harm] air quality of the city.” The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about the air quality. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.” Thus, they decided to start the new program. The secretary of the chairman, Li Ming, overheard everything, and is appalled by what the chairman said. Sure enough, shortly after the company started the new program, the air quality was [improved/harmed]. It turned out that the experts in the company got it wrong about the environmental effects of the new program. The new program actually has no effect at all to the air. The fact that the air quality had been [improved/harmed] was due to a totally different cause, i.e., a new waste disposal plant that had started to operate.
Do you agree or disagree with the statement, “Li Ming, the secretary of the chairman, knew that the air quality would be [improved/harmed], as he heard the conversation between the vice-president and the chairman”?
1.5 The Chinese third-person mayor case
The mayor of a small town is trying to decide whether or not to sign a new contract with a local corporation. The contract is very complex, but all his economic strategists think that there’s a relatively good chance that one outcome is that it will [create/cut] jobs for workers in the community. The mayor says, “all I really care about is campaign contributions, not people’s jobs, and I am sure to get millions from the corporation if I agree.” Li Ming, the office secretary overheard everything, and is appalled by what the mayor said. Nonetheless, the mayor decides to sign the contract. The corporation, however, didn’t take any chances. They secretly switched the contract with a totally different one right before the mayor signed it. By changing all the fine print, in some cases the opposite of what the mayor thought he was signing, the corporation could be sure it got what it wanted. Sure enough, shortly after the mayor signed the contract, a number of members of the community [got/lost] jobs, and the mayor received a huge donation to his reelection campaign.
After the story:
Do you agree or disagree with the statement, “Li Ming, the office secretary knew that members of the local community would [get/lose] jobs, as he heard the conversation between the mayor and his economic strategists”?
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Yuan, Y., Kim, M. Cross-Cultural Convergence of Knowledge Attribution in East Asia and the US. Rev.Phil.Psych. 14, 267–294 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00523-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00523-y