Abstract
It’s a familiar fact that there is something it is like to see red, eat chocolate or feel pain. More recently philosophers have insisted that in addition to this objectual phenomenology there is something it is like for me to eat chocolate, and this for-me-ness is no less there than the chocolatishness. Recognizing this subjective feature of consciousness helps shape certain theories of consciousness, introspection and the self. Though it does this heavy philosophical work, and it is supposed to be relatively obvious to anyone who introspects, it is rather difficult to see just what this phenomenal me-ness is supposed to be; indeed, many philosophers deny it exists. In this paper we try to provide a clear sense of what phenomenal me-ness involves, and then then consider some arguments for the existence of phenomenal me-ness experience as well as some accounts of what gives rise to it. In the end, we argue that the plausible senses of me-ness are a good deal thinner than what often seems to be claimed.
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Notes
This phenomenal me-ness, or something like it, goes by many different names—for-me-ness, subjective character, phenomenal me-ness, experiential subjectivity, etc. For simplicity’s sake we stick with Phenomenal Me-ness, but we acknowledge—and indeed believe—that many different things are meant at different times.
Kriegel (2009) p. 375 claims that this me-ness is not introspectible, though it is phenomenologically apparent. On some level we find this unintelligible, unless a particular model of introspection is presupposed. All we mean by introspection here is the way we know our own experiences and no-one else’s, and on that reading it is difficult to see how anything could be phenomenologically manifest that is not introspectible.
We assume here that it would not make much sense to identify PM with a bare particular (that differs between Sally and Sally*), since its bareness would seem to rule out its making a phenomenal/qualitative contribution.
And we note again that if someone wants to call one of these proposals phenomenal me-ness they should feel free. But the discussion will be advanced if authors make clear that they do not intend something that meets our conditions.
Kriegel (2009)
This seems to be the view of Williford (forthcoming a).
We thank an anonymous referee for putting the view this way and forcing us to face it more squarely.
This gets us into debates about the viability of the self-representational theory of consciousness that deserve (and have received) discussion beyond what we can give them here. See Kriegel and Williford (2006).
It is worth noting that Sartre, averse as he is to positing non-conscious governors of our mental lives, will automatically assume that the irresistible impulse to self-ascribe conscious states is grounded in a conscious, phenomenologically salient feature of those states. Since almost no one nowadays shares (or should share, in any case) this aversion, we shouldn’t make his same assumptions. For an excellent discussion that develops the Sartrean view discussed here, see Williford (forthcoming b).
For a thorough discussion of the varieties and approaches to them, see Gertler (2010).
Not only does phenomenological reflection fail to support the unreflective PM theses, it also can’t support the singular PM theses. How could it establish that my me-ness is different from everyone else’s when I only have access to my own?
We limit ourselves to the peculiarities of self-reference mentioned in Grünbaum (2012) as it is his argument we will consider, but one can easily imagine making a similar argument from the phenomenon of Immunity to Error through Misidentification (Shoemaker 1968). It should be clear to those familiar with that status that our response here would apply to that argument as well. See also Howell (2006) for other reasons to doubt that IEM would require something like PM.
It should be noted that Grünbaum (2012) does not explicitly endorse our necessary conditions for PM. He does seem to intend his description of “minimal self-consciousness” to be an example of what we have called PM, and he cites a similar literature. In any case, his argument is still a strong and interesting contender for establishing what we are calling PM.
This is a simplification of the argument made by (Grünbaum 2012: 275).
This objection applies to a related argument by Zahavi and Kriegel (forthcoming) in which they claim “One straightforward explanation of the intuitiveness of the claim that all conscious states are states we are aware of is that every conscious state has a for-me-ness built into its very phenomenal character.” Again, this just pushes the question back—why are we aware of this for-me-ness? It’s not clear how a phenomenal characteristic can explain consciousness if our awareness of it must itself be conscious.
To be fair, Grünbaum’s argument isn’t trying to establish what we are calling PM. His own view seems to involve a “me-ish” mode of apprehending content, which would seem consistent with the anonymity of what is apprehended. We are, in fact, sympathetic with something like this view. See Howell (2006) for a view in this ballpark.
Because they think “for-me-ness” accompanies all consciousness, Zahavi and Kriegel cannot use these cases of pathological consciousness to defend for-me-ness. They explicitly deny that these cases lack for-me-ness in Zahavi and Kriegel (forthcoming).
Billon’s own proposal is that inserted thoughts are not phenomenally conscious. This proposal deserves further discussion, but it doesn’t seem to fit with the reports by patients who say things like “He treats my mind like a screen and flashes his thoughts onto it like you flash a picture.” (Mellor 1970: 10) It is worth mentioning, though, that those who tie PM to the existence of consciousness like Kriegel (2009) and others who are inclined towards self representational approaches to consciousness (Kriegel and Williford 2006) will have to adopt Billon’s extreme approach if they think thought insertion indicates a lack of PM.
For a discussion of various accounts of delusion and difficulties that beset them, see Bortolotti (2009).
O’Brien (2007) builds a sophisticated account of self-reference and basic self-knowledge around this idea.
Indeed, the whole of Sartre’s most accessible work, The Transcendence of the Ego, could be read as a development of this basic picture.
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Howell, R.J., Thompson, B. Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness. Rev.Phil.Psych. 8, 103–127 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0309-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0309-0