Abstract
The relation between first and higher order mental states is currently unknown. In particular, the relation between conscious experience and introspection is difficult as the same methods are used to investigate them. In order to make progress in the scientific understanding of consciousness, introspection or both, it is fundamental to understand whether their relation is serial (conscious experience feeds into introspection) or reciprocal. Although the amount of empirical evidence directly addressing this question is sparse, the little that exists suggests a more complex situation that must be taken into account in order to characterise the relationship between first and higher order mental states. We propose a testable integrative model in an attempt to explain the existing data and to make new empirical predictions.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Arnold, D.G.. 1997. Introspection and its objects. Journal of Philosophical Research 22: 87–94.
Aru, J., T. Bachmann, W. Singer, and L. Melloni. 2012. Distilling the neural correlates of consciousness. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews 36: 737–746.
Bargh, J.. 1997. The automaticity of everyday life. In Advances in Social Cognition, ed. R.W. Wyer Jr.. NJ: Erlbaum.
Dretske, F.. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Fleming, S., and C.D. Frith. 2014. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition. Berlin: Springer.
Graham, G., and J. Neisser. 2000. Probing for relevance: What metacognition tells us about the power of consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 9: 172–177.
Green, D.M., and J.A. Swets. 1966. Signal Detection Theory and Psychophysics. New York: Wiley.
Hassin, R.R.. 2013. Yes it can – on the functional abilities on the human unconscious. Perspectives on Psychological Science 8(2): 195–207.
Jachs, B., M. Blanco, S. Grantham-Hill, and D. Soto. 2015. On the independence of visual awareness and metacognition: A signal detection theoretic analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 41(2): 269–276.
Jack, A., and A. Roepstorff. 2002. Retrospection and cognitive brain mapping: From stimulus-response to script-report. Trends in Cognitive Science 6: 333–339.
Kanai, R., V. Walsh, and C. Tseng. 2010. Subjective discriminability of invisibility: A framework for distinguishing perceptual and attentional failures of awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 19(4): 1045–1057.
Koivisto, M., M. Lähteenmäki, T.A. Sørensen, S. Vangkilde, M. Overgaard, and A. Revonsuo. 2008. The earliest electrophysiological correlate of visual awareness? Brain and Cognition 66(1): 91–103.
Koriat, A., and R. Levy-Sadot. 2000. Conscious and unconscious metacognition: A rejoinder. Consciousness and Cognition 9: 193–202.
Lamme, V.A.F.. 2010. How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness. Cognitive Neuroscience 1(3): 204–240.
Lycan, W.G.. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge: Bradford-MIT.
Lyons, W.. 1986. The disappearance of Introspection. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Marcel, A.J. (1993). Slippage in the unity of consciousness. In: Ciba Foundation Symposium No 174 – Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Consciousness. Chichester: John Wiley, pp. 168–186
Metcalfe, J., and A.P. Shimamura. 1994. Metacognition: Knowing about knowing. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Mogensen, J.. 2011a. Almost unlimited potentials of a limited neural plasticity: Levels of plasticity in development and reorganization of the injured brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18: 13–45.
Mogensen, J.. 2011b. Reorganization in the injured brain: implications for studies of the neural substrate of cognition. Frontiers in Psychology: Consciousness Research 2(7): 1–10.
Mogensen, J.. 2012a. Cognitive recovery and rehabilitation after brain injury: mechanisms, challenges and support. In Brain Injury – Functional Aspects, Rehabilitation and Prevention, ed. A. Agrawal, 121–150. Rijeka, Croatia: InTech.
Mogensen, J.. 2012b. Reorganization of Elementary Functions (REF) after brain injury: Implications for the therapeutic interventions and prognosis of brain injured patients suffering cognitive impairments. In Brain Damage: Causes, Management and Prognosis, eds. A.J. Schäfer, and J. Müller, 1–40. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Mogensen, J.. 2014. Reorganization of Elementary Functions (REF) after brain injury and in the intact brain: A novel understanding of neurocognitive organization and reorganization. In Horizons in Neuroscience Research. Vol. 15., eds. J. Costa, and E. Villalba, 99–140. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Mogensen, J.. 2015. Recovery, compensation and reorganization in neuropathology – levels of conceptual and methodological challenges. In Cognitive Plasticity in Neurologic Disorders, eds. J.I. Tracy, B.M. Hampstead, and K. Sathian, 3–28. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mogensen, J., and H. Malá. 2009. Post-traumatic functional recovery and reorganization in animal models. A theoretical and methodological challenge. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 50: 561–573.
Newell, B., and D. Shanks. 2014. Unconscious influences on decision making: A critical review. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37: 1–19.
Overgaard, M.. 2008. Introspection. Scholarpedia 3(5): 4953.
Overgaard, M.. 2010. How consciousness will change our view on neuroscience. Cognitive Neuroscience 1(3): 224–225.
Overgaard, M.. 2015. The challenge of measuring consciousness. In Behavioral Methods in Consciousness Research, ed. M. Overgaard. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Overgaard, M., and J. Mogensen. 2011. A framework for the study of multiple realizations: the importance of levels of analysis. Frontiers in Psychology: Consciousness Research 2: 1–10.
Overgaard, M., and J. Mogensen. 2014. Visual perception from the perspective of a representational, non-reductionistic, level-dependent account of perception and conscious awareness. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences. 369: 20130209.
Overgaard, M., and J. Mogensen. 2015. Reconciling current approaches to blindsight. Consciousness and Cognition 32: 33–40.
Overgaard, M., and K. Sandberg. 2012. Kinds of access: Different methods for report reveal different kinds of metacognitive access. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London – Series B: Biological Sciences 367: 1287–1296.
Overgaard, M., and T.A. Sørensen. 2004. Introspection distinct from first order experiences. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(7–8): 77–95.
Overgaard, M., M. Koivisto, T.A. Sørensen, S. Vangkilde, and A. Revonsuo. 2006a. The electrophysiology of introspection. Consciousness and Cognition 15: 662–672.
Overgaard, M., J. Rote, K. Mouridsen, and T.Z. Ramsøy. 2006b. Is conscious perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies during a visual task. Consciousness and Cognition 15: 700–708.
Overgaard, M., K. Fehl, K. Mouridsen, and A. Cleeremans. 2008. Seeing without seeing? Degraded conscious vision in a blindsight patient. PloS One 3(8): 1–4.
Piccinini, G.. 2003. Data from introspective reports – upgrading from common sense to science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10: 141–156.
Rahnev, D., B. Maniscalco, T. Graves, E. Huang, F.P. de Lange, and H. Lau. 2011. Attention induces conservative subjective biases in visual perception. Nature Neuroscience 14(12): 1513–1515.
Ramsøy, T.Z., and M. Overgaard. 2004. Introspection and subliminal perception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3(1): 1–23.
Rosenthal D (1997) A theory of consciousness. In: N. Block, O. Flanagan & G. Güzeldere (eds). The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Cambridge: MIT Press
Sandberg, K., and M. Overgaard. 2015. Using the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). In Behavioral Methods in Consciousness Research, ed. M. Overgaard. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sandberg, K., B. Timmermans, M. Overgaard, and A. Cleeremans. 2010. Measuring consciousness: Is one measure better than the other? Consciousness and Cognition 19: 1069–1078.
Sherman, M., A. Seth, A. Barrett, and R. Kanai. 2015. Prior expectations facilitate metacognition for perceptual decision. Consciousness and Cognition 35: 53–65.
Smith, R.. 2010. Against treating introspection as perception-like. Psyche 16(1): 79–86.
Stefanics, G., B. Hangya, I. Hernadi, I. Winkler, P. Lakatos, and I. Ulbert. 2010. Phase entrainment of human delta oscillations can mediate the effects of expectation on reaction speed. The Journal of Neuroscience 30(41): 13578–13585.
Timmermans, B., and A. Cleeremans. 2015. How can we measure consciousness? An overview of current methods. In Behavioral Methods in Consciousness Research, ed. M. Overgaard. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wierzchon, M., B. Paulewicz, D. Asanowicz, B. Timmermans, and A. Cleeremans. 2014. Different subjective awareness measures demonstrate the influence of visual identification on perceptual awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 27: 109–120.
Wyart, V., A.C. Nobre, and C. Summerfield. 2012. Dissociable prior influences of signal probability and relevance on visual contrast sensitivity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109(9): 3593–3598.
Zehetleitner, M., and M. Rausch. 2013. Being confident without seeing: What subjective measure of visual consciousness are about. Attention, Perception and Psychophysics 75(7): 1406–1426.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Overgaard, M., Mogensen, J. An integrative view on consciousness and introspection. Rev.Phil.Psych. 8, 129–141 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0303-6
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0303-6