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An integrative view on consciousness and introspection

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Abstract

The relation between first and higher order mental states is currently unknown. In particular, the relation between conscious experience and introspection is difficult as the same methods are used to investigate them. In order to make progress in the scientific understanding of consciousness, introspection or both, it is fundamental to understand whether their relation is serial (conscious experience feeds into introspection) or reciprocal. Although the amount of empirical evidence directly addressing this question is sparse, the little that exists suggests a more complex situation that must be taken into account in order to characterise the relationship between first and higher order mental states. We propose a testable integrative model in an attempt to explain the existing data and to make new empirical predictions.

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Overgaard, M., Mogensen, J. An integrative view on consciousness and introspection. Rev.Phil.Psych. 8, 129–141 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0303-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-016-0303-6

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