Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

UN Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Aid Allocation

  • Published:
Human Rights Review Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Does public condemnation or shaming of human rights abuses by the United Nations influence foreign aid delivery calculus across Western donor states? I argue that countries shamed in the United Nations Human Rights Council (formerly known as the United Nations Commission on Human Rights) encourage donor states to channel more aid via international and local non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, I find this effect to be more pronounced with increased media coverage. The findings of this paper suggest that international organizations do influence advanced democracies’ foreign policy. Moreover, the paper also finds that donor governments do not punish recipient leaders by scaling back on government-to-government aid, which is more fungible, despite public condemnations of their human rights practices owing largely to strategic concerns. These results are robust to a number of alternative data and estimation techniques.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. The “channel of delivery” is also known as the first implementing partner. The OECD’s Common Reporting Standard (CRS) database provides information on the channels that donors use to allocate aid, which includes (i) government-to-government aid, (ii) NGO and civil society aid, (iii) multilateral aid, (iv) public-private partnership, and (v) a residual “other” category.

  2. I use “UN shaming” to refer to shaming by both the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC).

  3. In this paper, I use “government-to-government aid” and “public sector aid” interchangeably. I also use “NGO aid” and “NGO and Civil Society aid” interchangeably.

  4. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx, accessed 6/14/2020

  5. This variable is measured as ln(x + 1), where “x” denotes the aid variable.

  6. The data for theoretically important human rights variable ends at 2011.

  7. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/troubles-plague-un-human-rights-council, accessed 6/14/2020

  8. In the robustness checks, I include a finer-grained measure of UN shaming.

  9. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/honduras, accessed 12/3/2020.

  10. This variable is measured as \(\frac {Exports_{d,r,t}}{GDP_{d,t}}*100\), where d represents the donor country, r represents the recipient country, and t denotes the year.

  11. See Allen and Flynn (2018, 460) for further discussion on why fixed effects are not be be used in analysis with relatively short time-period.

References

  • Acht, M, Mahmoud, T, & Thiele, R. (2015). Corrupt Governments Do Not Receive More State-to-State Aid: Governance and the Delivery of Foreign Aid through Non-state Actors. Journal of Development Economics 114:20–33.

  • Adhikari, B. (2019a). United Nations General Assembly Voting and Foreign Aid Bypass. International Politics 56(4):514–535.

  • Adhikari, B. (2019b). Power Politics and Foreign Aid Delivery Tactics. Social Science Quarterly 100(5):1523–1539.

  • Ahmed, F. (2012). The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival. American Political Science Review 106(1):146–165.

  • Aldrich, J, Sullivan, J, & Borgida, E. (1989). Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates ”Waltz Before A Blind Audience?”. American Political Science Review 83(1):123–141.

  • Alesina, A, & Dollar, D. (2000). Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? Journal of Economic Growth 5(1):33–63.

  • Allen, S, & Flynn, M. (2018). Donor Government Ideology and Aid Bypass. Foreign Policy Analysis 14(4):449–468.

  • Bagwell, S, & Hall, S. (2020). Publicity and Perceptions of Risk: The Effects of HRO Naming and Shaming on Sovereign Credit Rating. Journal of Human Rights: 1–13.

  • Bailey, M, Strezhnev, A, & Voeten, E. (2017). Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data. Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(2):430–456.

  • Barry, C, Clay, K, & Flynn, M. (2013). Avoiding the Spotlight: Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Direct Investment. International Studies Quarterly 57(3):532–544.

  • Baumgartner, F, & Jones, B. (2010). Agendas and Instability in American Politics. University of Chicago Press.

  • Bermeo, S. (2016). Aid Is Not Oil: Donor Utility, Heterogeneous Aid, and the Aid- Democratization Relationship. International Organization 70(1):1–32.

  • Birchler, K, & Michaelowa, K. (2016). Making Aid Work for Education in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Aid Effectiveness for Primary Education Coverage and Quality. International Journal of Educational Development 48:37–52.

  • Bueno De Mesquita, B, & Smith, A. (2011). The Dictator’s Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics. Public Affairs.

  • Carleton, D, & Stohl, M. (1987). The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal. American Journal of Political Science 1002–1018.

  • Carter, D, & Stone, R. (2015). Democracy and Multilateralism: The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly.” International Organization 69(01):1–33.

  • Chapman, T, & Reiter, D. (2004). The United Nations Security Council and the Rally ’Round the Flag Effect. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(6):886–909.

  • Chaudhry, S, & Heiss, A. (2020). Dynamics of International Giving: How Heuristics Shape Individual Donor Preferences. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly. 1–25.

  • Chege, S. (1999). Donors Shift More Aid to NGOs. Africa Recovery 13(1):6.

  • Cingranelli, D, & Pasquarello, T. (1985). Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of US Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries. American Journal of Political Science 29(3):539– 563.

  • Cingranelli, D, Richards, D, & Clay, KC. (2014). CIRI Human Rights Data Project (v.2014-04-14). http://www.humanrightsdata.com/.

  • DiBlasi, L. (2020). From Shame to New Name: How Naming and Shaming Creates Pro-Government Militias. International Studies Quarterly.

  • Dietrich, S. (2013). Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Foreign Aid Allocation. International Studies Quarterly 57(4):698–712.

  • Dietrich, S. (2016). Donor Political Economies and the Pursuit of Aid Effectiveness. International Organization 70(01):65–102.

  • Dietrich, S, & Murdie, A. (2017). Human Rights Shaming through INGOs and Foreign Aid Delivery. The Review of International Organizations 12(1):95–120.

  • Drury, AC, Olson, R, & van Belle, D. (2005). The Politics of Humanitarian Aid: U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, 19641995. Journal of Politics 67(2):454–473.

  • Dunning, T. (2004). Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa. International Organization 58(02):409–423.

  • Dupuy, K, Ron, J, & Prakash, A. (2016). Hands Off My Regime! Governments Restrictions on Foreign Aid to Non-governmental Organizations in Poor and Middle-income Countries. World Development 84:299-311.

  • Easterly, W. (2006). The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. Penguin.

  • Esarey, J, & DeMeritt, J. (2017). Political Context and the Consequences of Naming and Shaming for Human Rights Abuse. International Interactions 43(4):589–618.

  • Fearon, J, Macartan, H, & Weinstein, J. (2009). Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia. American Economic Review 99(2):287–91.

  • Gibler, D. (2009). International Military Alliances, 1648-2008. CQ Press.

  • Gleditsch, K. (2002). Expanded Trade and GDP Data. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(5):712–724.

  • Heinrich, T, Kobayashi, Y, & Long, L. (2018). Voters Get What They Want (When They Pay Attention): Human Rights, Policy Benefits, and Foreign Aid. International Studies Quarterly.

  • IMF. (2014). International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).

  • Jablonski, R. (2014). How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on Foreign Aid Distribution. World Politics 66(2):293–330.

  • Kaufmann, D, Kraay, A, & Mastruzzi, M. (2016). Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The World Bank Group.

  • Keck, M, & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Cornell University Press.

  • Kegley Jr., C, & Hook, S. (1991). US Foreign Aid and UN Voting: Did Reagan’s Linkage Strategy Buy Deference or Defiance? International Studies Quarterly 35(3):295–312.

  • Keohane, R. (1967). The Study of Political Influence in the General Assembly. International Organization 21(02):221–237.

  • Kinzelbach, K, & Lehmann, J. (2015). Can Shaming Promote Human Rights? Publicity in Human Rights Foreign Policy. European Liberal Forum.

  • Knack, S. (2001). Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests. Southern Economic Journal 68(2):310–329.

  • Kuziemko, I, & Werker, E. (2006). How Much is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations. Journal of Political Economy 114(5):905–930.

  • Lebovic, J, & Voeten, E. (2006). The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR. International Studies Quarterly 50(4):861–888.

  • Lebovic, J, & Voeten, E. (2009). The Cost of Shame: International Organizations and Foreign Aid in the Punishing of Human Rights Violators. Journal of Peace Research 46(1):79–97.

  • Licht, A. (2010). Coming into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival. Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(1):58–87.

  • Lumsdaine, D. (1993). Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989. Princeton University Press.

  • McKinlay, R, & Little, R. (1977). A Foreign Policy Model of US Bilateral Aid Allocation. World Politics 30(01):58–86.

  • Mearsheimer, J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security 19(3):5–49.

  • Moore Jr., J, & Pubantz, J. (2017). The New United Nations: International Organization in the Twenty-First Century. Taylor & Francis.

  • Murdie, A, & Davis, D. (2012). Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs. International Studies Quarterly 56(1):1–16.

  • Murdie, A, & Peksen, D. (2013). The Impact of Human Rights INGO Activities on Economic Sanctions. The Review of International Organizations, 8(1): 33–53.

  • Neumayer, E. (2003a). Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Quantitative Analysis Of 21 Donor Countries. Social Science Quarterly 21:650–666.

  • Neumayer, E. (2003b). Is Respect for Human Rights Rewarded? An Analysis of Total Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Flows. Human Rights Quarterly 25(2):510–527.

  • Nielsen, R. (2013). Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions Against Repressive States. International Studies Quarterly 57(4):791–803.

  • OECD. (2015). Creditor Reporting System Database, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

  • Owens, T, & Hoddinott, J. (1999). Investing in Development or Investing in Relief: Quantifying the Poverty Tradeoffs Using Zimbabwe Household Panel Data. Working Paper.

  • Peksen, D, Peterson, T, & Drury, AC. (2014). Media-Driven Humanitarianism? News Media Coverage of Human Rights Abuses and the Use of Economic Sanctions. International Studies Quarterly 58(4):855–866.

  • Peterson, T, Murdie, A, & Asal, V. (2018). Human rights, NGO Shaming and the Exports of Abusive States. British Journal of Political Science 48(3): 767–786.

  • Pettersson, J, & Johansson, L. (2013). Aid, Aid for Trade, and Bilateral Trade: An Empirical Study. The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 22(6):866–894.

  • Powlick, P. (1995). The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials. International Studies Quarterly 39(4): 427–451.

  • Remmer, K. (2004). Does Foreign Aid Promote the Expansionof Government? American Journal of Political Science 48(1): 77–92.

  • Riddell, R. (2007). Does Foreign Aid Really Work? Oxford University Press.

  • Risse-Kappen, T, Ropp, S, & Sikkink, K. (1999). The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge University Press.

  • Robinson, P. (1999). The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy? Review of International Studies 25(2): 301–309.

  • Vadlamannati, K, Janz, N, & Berntsen, Ø. (2018). Human Rights Shaming and FDI: Effects of the UN Human Rights Commission and Council. World Development 104: 222–237.

  • van Belle, D. (2000). Press Freedom and Global Politics. Greenwood Publishing Group.

  • Volkens, A, Onawa L, Pola L, Sven R, Henrike S, & Annika W. (2011). Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR), Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

  • Werker, E, & Ahmed, F. (2008). What Do Nongovernmental Organizations Do? Journal of Economic Perspectives 22(2):73–92.

  • Wong, W. (2012). Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs Transforms Human Rights. Cornell University Press.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science and International Relations, Nazarbayev University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan

    Bimal Adhikari

Authors
  1. Bimal Adhikari
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Bimal Adhikari.

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Appendix

Appendix

Table 3 Summary statistics
Full size table
Table 4 Human rights shaming & NGO and civil society aid
Full size table
Table 5 UN shaming & NGO and civil society aid with conditioning variables
Full size table
Table 6 UN shaming & NGO and civil society aid—alternative modeling strategies
Full size table
Table 7 UN shaming & NGO and civil society aid—treatment regression estimator
Full size table

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Adhikari, B. UN Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Aid Allocation. Hum Rights Rev 22, 133–154 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-020-00613-x

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-020-00613-x

Keywords

Search

Navigation