Abstract
Here are two prima facie plausible theses about propositional knowledge: (i) a belief could still constitute knowledge even if the belief is justified in a way that’s compatible with its being either false or accidentally true; (ii) each instance of knowledge is related to its subject in a way similar to that in which each intentional action is related to its agent. Baron Reed (2007, 2009) develops and defends a novel argument for the incompatibility of (i) and (ii). In this paper, I clarify and critically assess Reed’s incompatibility argument. Against the backdrop of an example in which an action is non-intentional due to the role that an accidentally true belief plays in the action’s etiology, I argue that Reed’s incompatibility argument defeats itself: two of its premises are themselves jointly incompatible.
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Notes
On the basis of (i) his incompatibility argument and (ii) his case for the claim that the conjunction of fallibilism and attributabilism is “of central importance to the epistemological theories of our day” (2007: 245), Reed concludes that “knowledge, as we now conceive of it, is impossible” (2007: 261; cf. 2009: 103).
Unless otherwise noted, in what follows “moral responsibility” abbreviates “practical moral responsibility.”.
On (a), just as an emphasized “knows” often expresses an epistemic relation that’s logically stronger than mere knowledge, an emphasized “does” often expresses a practical relation stronger than mere performance.
Note that mere performance doesn’t suffice for apt performance. My rolling “boxcars” (two sixes) with a pair of fair dice is a non-apt action, as is the focal action in a “secondary causal deviance” case (cf. Mele & Moser, 1994: 47ff.).
This case blends aspects of Mele and Moser’s second “Fred” case (which features a misread hand-written code) with aspects of Pritchard’s “Temp” case.
Note that one’s performing an action, A, non-intentionally doesn’t suffice for one’s performing A unintentionally (cf. Mele & Moser, 1994: 45).
Sosa (2015: 158) sketches and discusses a somewhat similar case:
A prisoner is told by his jailer that throughout the coming night his jail cell will be unlocked, but the jailer’s testimony is only a cruel joke. The prisoner does form the belief, though, and by acting on it that night, he escapes, since completely by accident the door was unlocked. Is his escape intentional? Is it apt? It is hard to deny that the prisoner escapes intentionally (by design). Moreover, his escape does seem plausibly enough to manifest a degree of competence already seated in him as he lay in bed prepared to make his move.
I find the ascription of intentionality to the prisoner’s escape counterintuitive, and I suspect that many other action theorists would as well (cf. Gibbons, 2010; Mele, 1987, 1992; Mele & Moser, 1994). I hasten to add that, as he (2015: 10ff.) continually notes and as the parenthetical material in the above passage indicates, Sosa’s use of “intentionally” is somewhat stipulative, “restricted to that of ‘by design’” (10n4). Depending on what exactly Sosa means by “by design” and related expressions (“on purpose,” “according to plan,” etc.), it may turn out that he and I don’t genuinely disagree about the intentionality status of his example’s focal action. In any event, I’m confident that Sosa’s (currently relatively under-described) case could be amplified so as to illustrate the possibility of apt yet non-intentional action. For another case that illustrates the indicated possibility (though perhaps not as clearly as the one that I focus on in the main text), see Mele and Moser’s (1994: 51) “Arnold” case.
For brief critical discussion of the “apt action” interpretation of Reed’s argument, see note 13.
See Coffman (2017: 16–21) for discussion and defense of the thesis that the salient beliefs in cases like this one are “gettiered”—that is, fall short of knowledge in the way illustrated by cases like those Gettier (1963) described. Prominent theorists who would so classify such “hidden helper” examples include Plantinga (1993), Hiller and Neta (2007), Turri (2011), Greco (2012), and Schafer (2014).
Reflection on cases like Sosa’s (2011: 26) “magnetic target” example reveals that there could be an action (e.g., hitting a target with a metal-tipped arrow) whose status as apt depends on the satisfaction of a condition whose obtaining is both extrinsic to the subject’s performance and external to the subject’s awareness (e.g., a nearby magnet’s being inoperative). Accordingly, a duly modified version of the above argument against (1) refutes a version of (1) whose antecedent involves “apt action” Attributabilism (rather than “intentional action” attributabilism).
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Coffman, E.J. Is Fallible Knowledge Attributable?. Acta Anal 37, 73–83 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00488-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-021-00488-8