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Two-dimensionalism and the “Knowing Which” Requirement

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Abstract

Two-dimensional semantics aims to eliminate the puzzle of necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori truths. Recently many argue that even assuming two-dimensional semantics we are left with the puzzle of necessary and a posteriori propositions. Stephen Yablo (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81, 98–122, 2000) and Penelope Mackie (Analysis, 62(3), 225–236, 2002) argue that a plausible sense of “knowing which” lets us know the object of such a proposition, and yet its necessity is “hidden” and thus a posteriori. This paper answers this objection; I argue that given two-dimensional semantics you cannot know a necessary proposition without knowing that it is true.

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Notes

  1. Kripke’s argument is in his (1980). Pavel Tichy suggests this figurative way of dissolving the puzzle (1983). Other versions of the solution are found in Davies and Humberstone (1980), Chalmers (1996), and Jackson (1998).

  2. Davies and Humberstone (1980: 10, 20), Stalnaker (2001), Baldwin (2001).

  3. The bearers of the properties of necessity/contingency and a priority/a posteriority are primarily propositions, and only derivatively – the sentences that express them.

  4. Evans (1982), McDowell (1984), and Wiggins (2001), accept that requirement.

  5. The use of “water” there is similar to our use of “Jade,” though much more heterogeneous.

  6. There are two other strategies: The failure of transmission (Davies 2000), and the denial that the conclusion is puzzling. I believe, though, that these strategies are criticized successfully. For such criticism see Brewer 2000.

  7. The puzzle threatens anyone who rejects the cognitive requirement. If knowing which thing water is affects one's cognitive standing, as follows from the cognitive requirement, then Sally does not know the C-proposition by reflection alone. To know her own thoughts, she needs to grasp their content, and to do that she must reflect on her environment. This does not mean that Sally needs a basis for her knowledge of her thoughts; but it does mean that the very idea of grasping an externalist thought depends also on reflection on the world.

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  1. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, P.O. 653, Beer-Sheva, 84105, Israel

    Hagit Benbaji

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  1. Hagit Benbaji
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Benbaji, H. Two-dimensionalism and the “Knowing Which” Requirement. Acta Anal 23, 55–67 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-008-0022-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-008-0022-4

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